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When Voluntary, Incentive-Based Controls Fail: 
Structuring a Regulatory Response to Agricultural 
Nonpoint Source Water Pollution  
Douglas R. Williams* 
For most of its thirty-year life-span, the Clean Water Act’s 
(CWA) program for controlling pollution from industrial facilities 
and municipal water treatment plants has been the primary focus of 
federal water pollution control law and policy. While the wisdom of 
this program for controlling “point sources” through technology-
based effluent limitations has been roundly debated, there is little 
question that it has yielded sizeable gains in water quality. It is now 
clear, however, that the CWA’s emphasis on controlling discharges 
from point sources has not achieved the level of cleanup at which the 
CWA aims.1 Moreover, further water quality gains from the control 
of point sources, while certainly not exhausted, are likely to be too 
limited, too costly, or both, to achieve water quality objectives.2  
 
 * Professor of Law, Saint Louis University School of Law. Thanks to my colleagues at 
Saint Louis University who participated in a workshop presentation of this Article. Special 
thanks to Constance Wagner, Melissa Cole, and Dan Hulseboch for their helpful comments. 
Thanks also to NAELS for the invitation to participate in this exceptionally well-run 
conference. This Article was prepared for the 2002 National Association of Environmental Law 
Societies’ (NAELS) Conference: “Sustainable Agriculture: Food for the Future” held at 
Washington University School of Law in St. Louis on March 15-17, 2002. 
 1. On the extent of current water quality problems, see U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL 
PROTECTION AGENCY, NATIONAL WATER QUALITY INVENTORY: 1998 REPORT TO CONGRESS 
(2000), at http://www.epa.gov/305b/98report/ (last visited Mar. 30, 2002) [hereinafter 1998 
WATER QUALITY REPORT]; U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY & U.S. DEPARTMENT 
OF AGRICULTURE, CLEAN WATER ACTION PLAN: RESTORING AND PROTECTING AMERICA’S 
WATERS 9 (1998), at http://www.cleanwater.gov/action/cwap.pdf (last visited Mar. 30, 2002) 
[hereinafter CLEAN WATER ACTION PLAN].  
 2. The EPA and USDA have concluded that implementation of the existing programs 
will not stop serious new threats to public health, living resources, and the nation’s waterways, 
particularly from polluted run off. These programs lack the strength, resources, and framework 
to finish the job of restoring rivers, lakes, and coastal areas. To fulfill the original goal of the 
Clean Water Act—“fishable and swimmable” water for every American—the nation must chart 
a new course to address the pollution problems of the next generation. 1998 WATER QUALITY 
21 
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The gist of the nation’s current water quality problems is the 
absence of effective measures to control nonpoint source pollution—
the diffuse and pervasive streams of pollutants that enter our waters 
over broad expanses of land and through the air, rather than from a 
discrete and identifiable “point,” such as a pipe or ditch.3 Agricultural 
activities are deeply implicated in this problem. “Farmers and 
ranchers control how most of our land is used and managed . . . . 
They are, literally, the most important soil, water, fish, wildlife, and 
recreational managers in the U.S.”4 They have not, however, been 
particularly good stewards of our water resources: excessive or 
inappropriate use of fertilizers and pesticides, soil erosion, habitat 
alteration, soil salinization, animal wastes, and rates of water usage 
are causing serious water quality problems throughout the country.5 
Indeed, agricultural nonpoint source pollution is now considered the 
nation’s most persistent and most difficult water quality problem.6  
Farms occupy a special place in the imagination of most 
Americans, evoking ideas about closeness to land and water 
resources, fierce independence, and a strong stewardship ethic.7 
Across the country, states and local governments are concerned with 
losses of prime agricultural land, giving rise to “right-to-farm” 
legislation and other measures to protect farmland from encroaching 
 
REPORT, supra note 1, at i; see also Richard B. Stewart, A New Generation of Environmental 
Regulation?, 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 21, 28 (2001); Robert W. Adler, Integrated Approaches to 
Water Pollution: Lessons from the Clean Air Act, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 203, 203-04 
(1999) [hereinafter Alder, Integrated Approaches]; Drew Caputo, A Job Half Finished: The 
Clean Water Act After 25 Years, 27 Envtl. L. Rep. 10574 (Nov. 1997); William F. Pedersen, Jr., 
Turning the Tide on Water Quality, 15 ECOLOGY L.Q. 69 (1988). 
 3. See 1998 WATER QUALITY REPORT, supra note 1, at ES-3 (identifying nonpoint 
source pollution as the leading cause of water quality impairments).  
 4. Craig A. Cox, What Should be the Role of Resource Stewardship in Future Farm 
Policy?, presentation at the USDA Agricultural Outlook Forum 2001 (Feb. 22, 2001), at 
http://www.swcs.org/t_advocacy_cox_speech.htm. 
 5. C. Ford Runge, Environmental Protection From Farm to Market, in THINKING 
ECOLOGICALLY: THE NEXT GENERATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 200, 204 (Marian R. 
Chertow & Danial C. Esty eds., 1997); J.B. Ruhl, Farms, Their Environmental Harms, and 
Environmental Law, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 263, 274-91 (2000). 
 6. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, TARGETING ENVIRONMENTAL PRIORITIES IN 
AGRICULTURE: REFORMING PROGRAM STRATEGIES 11 (1995) [hereinafter TARGETING 
ENVIRONMENTAL PRIORITIES].  
 7. For a critical view of these myths, see Jim Chen, Get Green or Get Out: Decoupling 
Environmental from Economic Objectives in Agricultural Regulation, 48 OKLA. L. REV. 333 
(1995).  
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urban development.8 It is against these waves of solicitude, 
admiration, and concern for the well-being of farmers and their 
farms, and the political muscle of the agricultural industry, that 
environmental law must navigate. As the EPA recently observed: 
Agriculture is recognized in watersheds across the country as a 
source of nonpoint source pollution. On the other hand, 
agricultural land is recognized in many areas as a “preferred” 
use for environment, social, and economic purposes. 
Addressing problems caused by various agricultural activities 
while maintaining the overall, long-term sustainability of the 
environment and the industry presents special challenges.9 
To date, farms have largely escaped direct regulation under 
federal and state environmental law.10 Instead, a patchwork of 
voluntary incentive programs implemented by myriad federal and 
state agencies, such as the provision of “green payments” in the 
billions of dollars to subsidize the costs of implementing pollution-
reducing practices or to retire environmentally valuable resources 
from agricultural use, has been the primary method of inducing more 
water-protective behavior from farmers.11 This limited offering of 
incentives is, quite simply, not enough; if the United States is to make 
significant further progress toward attaining water quality objectives, 
 
 8. See Ruhl, supra note 5, at 315-16.  
 9. 1998 WATER QUALITY REPORT, supra note 1, at 68. 
 10. For a detailed discussion of the “safe harbors” agriculture has enjoyed under federal 
environmental law, see Ruhl, supra note 5, at 293-316. See also Runge, supra note 5; Chen, 
supra note 7, at 350-51; Margaret Rosso Grossman, Agriculture and the Environment in the 
United States, 42 AM. J. COMP. L. 291 (1994 Supp.).  
 11. See Robin Kundis Craig, Local or National? The Increasing Federalization of 
Nonpoint Source Pollution Regulation, 15 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 179, 190-91 (2000) (quoting 
OFFICE OF WATER, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, SECTION 319 SUCCESS STORIES 1 
(Nov. 1994) (“‘[U]nder the Clean Water Act, nonpoint source control is largely voluntary, not 
regulatory as is point source control.’”); James Boyd, The New Face of the Clean Water Act: A 
Critical Review of the EPA’s New TMDL Rules, 11 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 39, 66 (2000) 
(“To date, state initiatives [to control nonpoint source pollution] have relied heavily on 
voluntary, unenforceable measures, particularly with regard to agricultural runoff.”); Debra L. 
Donahue, The Untapped Power of Clean Water Act Section 401, 23 ECOLOGY L.Q. 201, 283 
(1996) (“Nonpoint source pollution control . . . consists largely of vague plans and voluntary 
programs.”); David Zaring, Agriculture, Nonpoint Source Pollution, and Regulatory Control: 
The Clean Water Act’s Bleak Present and Future, 20 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 515, 528 (1996) 
(“[T]he programs in place to reduce nonpoint source pollution remain completely voluntary.”).  
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efforts to control nonpoint source pollution must be expanded.  
To be sure, there have been significant federal and state efforts to 
work just such an expansion of existing control measures, to reach 
beyond point sources, and to adopt a much more aggressive stance 
toward control of nonpoint source pollution. Congress has amended 
the CWA to include programs that target nonpoint sources.12 More 
recently, the Clinton Administration placed control of nonpoint 
source pollution at the center of its 1998 Clean Water Action Plan, 
emphasizing the need for watershed planning and holistic approaches 
to water quality improvements.13 The Bush Administration has 
recently pledged new initiatives to improve water quality, echoing the 
Clean Water Action Plan’s emphasis on watershed-based controls, 
but the details of this initiative have yet to be worked out.14 The EPA 
has launched new initiatives to capture more animal feeding 
operations within the CWA’s regulatory orbit,15 and the agency’s 
controversial “TMDL” rules have generated a new round of debate 
about how, and to what extent, the EPA can cajole the states into 
bringing agricultural and other nonpoint sources within the CWA’s 
regulatory web.16 The states, too, have begun to address nonpoint 
source pollution in a more aggressive way, suggesting that the 
longstanding “carrot, not stick” approach to dealing with this major 
 
 12. See text accompanying infra notes 251-90.  
 13. CLEAN WATER ACTION PLAN, supra note 1, at iii. 
 14. See Cat Lazaroff, $21 Million Pledged for Watershed Protection, Envtl. News Serv. 
(Jan. 28, 2002), at http://ens-news.com/ens/jan2002/2002L-01-28-06.html.  
 15. National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Permit Regulation and Effluent 
Limitations Guidelines and Standards for Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations, 66 Fed. 
Reg. 2960, 3005 (Jan. 12, 2001) [hereinafter National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System].  
 16. See Revisions to the Water Quality Planning and Management Regulation and 
Revisions to the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Program in Support of 
Revisions to the Water Quality Planning and Management Regulation, 65 Fed. Reg. 43,586 
(July 13, 2000) [hereinafter TMDL Rule]; NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, ASSESSING THE 
TMDL APPROACH TO WATER QUALITY MANAGEMENT 1, available at http://www.cpa. 
gov/owo/tmdl/NRC (June 15, 2001) [hereinafter ASSESSING THE TMDL APPROACH] (noting 
that “EPA is obligated to implement the Total Maximum Daily Load (TMDL) program, the 
objective of which is attainment of ambient water quality standards through the control of both 
point and nonpoint sources of pollution.”). The literature on the TMDL program is quickly 
becoming enormous. See, e.g., OLIVER A. HOUCK, THE CLEAN WATER ACT TMDL PROGRAM: 
LAW, POLICY, AND IMPLEMENTATION (1999) [hereinafter HOUCK, TMDL PROGRAM]; WESLEY 
M. JARRELL, GETTING STARTED WITH TMDLS (1999), at http://216.68.81.171 
/852568CB0010F86A/web+by+document+type/624A8A3F0E40805F85256A21007A0572?Op
en (last visited Mar. 30, 2002) [hereinafter GETTING STARTED].  
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pollution problem may be wearing a bit thin.17  
The increased attention given to controlling nonpoint source 
pollution has not yet, however, translated into either widespread 
demonstrable results or clearly defined, coherent regulatory 
programs. A large and looming question concerns the extent to which 
a shift from voluntary, incentive-based policies to direct regulation is 
necessary to achieve needed water quality improvements, and 
whether existing statutory authorities are sufficient to work such a 
transition. 
This Article considers the extent to which more direct federal 
regulation of agricultural nonpoint source pollution is warranted. My 
first conclusion is that an increased federal presence is necessary. 
Many states have been reluctant to impose direct controls on 
agricultural nonpoint source pollution for a variety of reasons, 
including the relative political power of agricultural interests at the 
local and state level.18 In addition, nonpoint source pollution often 
implicates interstate waters or contributes to downstream water 
quality deterioration; in such circumstances, coordination among 
states is difficult and incentives to regulate often are lacking.19 
Minimum enforceable federal requirements would obviate these 
difficulties.  
My second conclusion is that the costs of implementing such 
plans and practices should be distributed in a pragmatic way that 
recognizes the extraordinary organizational presence and political 
clout of the agricultural industry. In this vein, it is unrealistic to 
expect that an unflinching application of the “polluter pays” principle 
will yield effective programs. Accordingly, existing federal and state 
cost-sharing and land acquisition programs should be retained and, in 
some cases, expanded. Taxes on polluting inputs such as fertilizer 
 
 17. See ENVTL. LAW INST., PUTTING THE PIECES TOGETHER: STATE NONPOINT SOURCE 
ENFORCEABLE MECHANISMS IN CONTEXT 1, available at http://www.eli.org/pdf/ 
nonpointstateenfmech.PDF (June 2000) (concluding that “relying on voluntary . . . [programs] 
has proven to be an incomplete strategy in many cases [to control nonpoint source pollution]”) 
[hereinafter PUTTING THE PIECES TOGETHER]. 
 18. See MARC O. RIBAUDO ET AL., ECONOMICS OF WATER QUALITY PROTECTION FROM 
NONPOINT SOURCES: THEORY AND PRACTICE, USDA AGRICULTURAL ECONOMIC REP. NO. 
782, at 29 (Nov. 1999), available at http://www.ers.usda.gov/epubs/pdf/aer782/aer782.pdf 
[hereinafter RIBANDO, ECONOMICS OF WATER QUALITY PROTECTION]. 
 19. See id. at 30-31. 
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and feed products that contribute to nonpoint source pollution could 
supplement these programs.  
Third, measures that promise water quality improvements beyond 
baseline regulatory requirements should be encouraged. Innovative 
programs such as point-nonpoint source pollution trading programs 
may yield sizeable environmental benefits at reduced costs, and states 
should be free to experiment with this sort of alternative.  
Part I of this Article describes existing water quality impairments 
and the part agricultural nonpoint source pollution has played in 
causing such impairments. Part II describes existing federal efforts to 
control agricultural nonpoint source pollution. Part III proposes a new 
regulatory structure that builds upon the basic elements of the current 
TMDL program. 
The approach recommended here is not, however, simply a 
traditional “command and control” program based on uniform 
standards, although important elements of the proposal bear these 
features. The traditional criticisms of command and control 
regulation are now familiar: its relative insensitivity to small (or 
large) variations from one geographic area to another and from one 
regulated activity to another, resulting in inefficient use of resources; 
its relative lack of “flexibility”; its generally “top-down” approach, 
creating barriers to meaningful citizen participation and stifling state 
authority and the possibility of innovative state programs.20 
Undoubtedly, from an idealist perspective, prescriptive regulation is 
oftentimes clumsy, can be authoritarian, and may impose mandates 
that do not always fit well with the problem they address (even in 
some cases putting in place mechanisms that have unintended 
consequences that exacerbate, rather than diminish, environmental 
and health problems).21 Direct regulation may also generate 
 
 20. See, e.g., Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law: 
The Democratic Case for Market Incentives, 13 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 171 (1988); Bruce A. 
Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1333 
(1985). 
 21. This is not to say, however, that alternative approaches would perform any better or 
more efficiently. For a defense of “command and control” regulatory programs to address water 
pollution, see Caputo, supra note 2, at 10578-80; Wendy E. Wagner, The Triumph of 
Technology-Based Standards, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 83 (2000); and Sidney A. Shapiro & 
Thomas O. McGarity, Not So Paradoxical: The Rationale for Technology-Based Regulation, 
1991 DUKE L.J. 729.  
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significant resistance and resentment on the part of the regulated 
community, which in many cases may rightly (but sometimes 
wrongly) take issue with the idea that appropriate solutions can be 
better devised by “government bureaucrats” than by those who know 
and work the land. These features of direct regulation also tend to 
make implementation both costly and difficult; confrontation and 
litigation characteristically burden the progress of such prescriptive 
programs.  
Moreover, the traditional criticisms of direct federal regulation 
have resonated strongly in the nonpoint source pollution context. The 
variety of practices that contribute to nonpoint source pollution are 
ubiquitous and diverse. Even within the agricultural component of 
this problem, the sheer number of farms, their very different practices 
and locations in the landscape, and their varying potential for water 
quality impacts make a technology-based approach with uniform 
effluent limitations appear quite fantastical. The practices that 
contribute most to nonpoint source pollution are patterns of land use, 
the control of which has been guarded jealously by local government 
authorities, making direct federal control at best a touchy political 
proposition.22 Current federal programs to control nonpoint source 
pollution are the product of judgments that controls of this sort 
should remain with state and local authorities, as has been the 
traditional practice. Much of the federal effort has been to induce the 
states to implement such controls by offering cost-sharing 
arrangements and technical assistance. 
On the other side, the current approach to agricultural nonpoint 
source pollution depends much too heavily on voluntary participation 
and has not induced adequate changes in agricultural practices to 
yield acceptable outcomes. These shortcomings may be due to the 
inadequacies of the incentives offered: the unsubsidized costs of 
implementing control measures may remain too high, in reality or in 
perception, to induce the desired change in behavior. Billions of 
dollars have been poured into incentive-based programs, and the 
results have not been encouraging. It is not realistic to expect 
 
 22. Daniel R. Mandelker, Controlling Nonpoint Source Water Pollution: Can it Be 
Done?, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 479, 482 (1989) (“any control applied to nonpoint sources is a 
land use control because it reduces nonpoint pollution through measures that modify land use”).  
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taxpayers to approve the massive increase in spending that is likely to 
be required to improve the rates at which farmers and others are 
willing to participate in conservation practices. Moreover, the notion 
that farmers must be “bribed” to engage in sound, conservation-
minded practices has had the subtle effect of promoting the idea that 
farmers have a “right” to engage in environmentally destructive 
practices and must be paid to change those practices. A “baseline” 
shift to regulatory programs that implicitly assign entitlements to 
cleaner water to citizens may, of course, face obstacles that generally 
accompany such alterations of the status quo ante. In its extreme 
form, such a baseline shift might be characterized as a bureaucratic 
effort to “take” farmers’ rights to the use of their property.23  
Voluntary incentives may also fail because farmers may resist 
changing longstanding practices or perceive such programs as the 
product of intrusive intermeddlers. In these circumstances, targeted 
populations may even reject “win-win” strategies that deliver 
environmental improvements while bolstering the bottom line. 
Whatever the reason, existing voluntary programs have too few 
“volunteers” to advance the program’s primary objectives in any 
significant way. Perhaps most troublesome, the “take it or leave it” 
incentives relied on by current programs have tended to minimize the 
harmful character of the practices against which the incentives are 
designed to operate, suggesting implicitly that program objectives 
are, in the end, not so important after all. The cumulative effect of 
this message may be to “lock-in” practices, making them highly 
resilient against efforts at change.24  
 
 23. See United States v. Larkins, 852 F.2d 189, 194 (6th Cir. 1988) (Merritt, J., 
concurring). 
The framers of the Constitution were solicitous of the rights of landowners—especially 
small farmers struggling for survival—not to have land appropriated by the 
government. They therefore adopted the provision of the Fifth Amendment of the 
Constitution prohibiting the taking of private property for public use without just 
compensation. 
On the notion that “takings” claims should be based on regulatory disruptions of “normal” uses 
of property, see Carol M. Rose, Takings, Federalism, Norms, 105 YALE L.J. 1121 (1996) 
(reviewing WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND POLITICS 
(1995)). 
 24. See Clayton P. Gillette, Lock-In Effects In Law and Norms, 78 B.U. L. Rev. 813, 813 
(1998) (“If institutions become too routinized . . . they may be unable to adapt to changes in the 
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The difficulties with both regulatory and voluntary approaches 
make conclusions about an optimal mix of control strategies difficult. 
In my view, Robert Percival has it just about right when he says that 
“the best approach to regulation is to employ a mix of regulatory 
strategies that varies depending upon the problem being addressed 
and the relative importance of the various values served by each 
approach.”25 The reforms I suggest here attempt to build on that 
insight, permitting a great deal of flexibility in the design of programs 
to control agricultural nonpoint source pollution, while insisting on 
several core minimum regulatory requirements. Ultimately, in my 
view, we should worry less about whether programs are “regulatory” 
or “voluntary” and more about whether the programs are 
environmentally sound, fair, and cost-effective. Once minimally 
acceptable allocations of “rights” are established, there is 
considerable room for a variety of regulatory, incentive-based, and 
private contractual mechanisms to be used.26  
Finally, romantic notions of farms and farmers may contribute to 
the difficulty in effecting a baseline shift. We must recognize that, to 
a significant degree, the reigning idyllism of farms and farmers is 
based on a lost history. It is also time to recognize that existing 
programs have given farms and farmers ample opportunities to 
reform unsustainable practices, often through generous taxpayer 
subsidies. However, agriculture’s response has been less one of 
seeking effective solutions than of resisting efforts at change. As 
Linda Malone has noted: 
There is still a place in American culture to revere and honor 
the American farmer. Yet whatever favored position remains 
for the farmer in our society, it is rooted in the Jeffersonian 
ideal of agriculture as the friend, not foe, of nature. As 
agriculture has distanced itself from the land - with corporate, 
 
underlying conditions they seek to organize or accommodate. When an institution fails to 
adjust, we can say . . . that it has become ‘locked-in.’”).  
 25. Robert V. Percival, Regulatory Evolution and the Future of Environmental Policy, 
1997 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 159, 190 (1997). 
 26. See Bonnie G. Colby & Tamra Pearson d’Estrée, Evaluating Market Transactions, 
Litigation, and Regulation as Tools for Implementing Environmental Restoration, 42 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 381, 382-86 (2000). See generally ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW 
NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1991). 
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absentee, non-organic farm management - the reverence for 
agriculture in American society has diminished. It is not the 
American public which has forgotten Jefferson’s vision, but 
agriculture itself.27 
I. WATER QUALITY AND AGRICULTURAL NONPOINT SOURCE 
POLLUTION 
The Clean Water Act’s direct regulation of industrial and 
municipal sewage discharges and its emphasis on technology-based 
standards have undoubtedly produced large water quality benefits. 
Discharges of toxic materials into surface waters reportedly have 
been reduced substantially.28 Impressive reductions in fecal bacteria, 
phosphorus, ammonia, and other conventional pollutants have also 
been reported.29 The number of persons served by wastewater 
treatment plans, which reduce the burden on water quality associated 
with pollutants in human waste streams, has more than doubled.30  
Similarly, the Clean Water Act’s section 404 Dredged and Fill 
Material Permit Program,31 which is the nation’s primary means of 
protecting wetlands, has importantly affected the rate of wetland 
degradation and destruction. These efforts to achieve a “no net loss” 
of wetland functions and values32 may have incidentally prevented 
significant water quality decrements due to nonpoint source 
pollution.33 While there is no shortage of strong criticism for the 
 
 27. Linda A. Malone, Reflections on the Jeffersonian Ideal of an Agrarian Democracy 
and the Emergence of an Agricultural and Environmental Ethic in the 1990 Farm Bill, 12 
STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 49 (1993). See generally Chen, supra note 7. 
 28. RIBAUDO, supra note 18, at 3; see also CLEAN WATER ACTION PLAN, supra note 1, at 
4 (toxic pollutants reduced by 24 million tons annually).  
 29. Id.; see RIBAUDO, supra note 18, at 3-4.  
 30. EPA, The Clean Water Act: A Brief History (2000), available at http://www.epa.gov/ 
owow/cwa/history.htm (last visited Mar. 30, 2002). 
 31. 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1994).  
 32. See Memorandum of Agreement Between the Environmental Protection Agency and 
the Department of the Army Concerning the Determination of Mitigation Under the Clean 
Water Act Section 404(b)(1) Guidelines, available at http://www.usace.army.mil/inet/functions/ 
cw/cecwo/reg/moafe90.htm (Feb. 6, 1990) (describing goal of the section 404 program as “no 
overall net loss of the nation’s remaining wetlands base”).  
 33. On the water quality benefits associated with wetlands’ functional capacity to control 
nonpoint source pollution, see generally EPA, NATIONAL MANAGEMENT MEASURES TO 
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manner in which this program has been implemented, the program 
undoubtedly has placed some obstacles in the path of the otherwise 
relentless urge to drain and fill precious ecological resources.34 
Annual rates of wetlands losses are now twenty-five percent of what 
they were prior to the passage of the CWA.35  
But the objective of the CWA is not only to reduce, or even to 
eliminate, point source discharges, nor to put some brakes on the 
destruction of wetlands. The objective is to “restore and maintain the 
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.”36 
Stated in more concrete terms, the minimally acceptable outcome to 
be achieved by the CWA is “water quality which provides for the 
protection and propagation of fish, shellfish, and wildlife and 
provides for recreation in and on the water”37—in short, waters that 
are “fishable” and “swimmable.”38 Sadly, we are nowhere near 
attaining that objective.  
A. The Limits of Current Information 
There is a consensus that a significant number of the nation’s 
waters are currently not meeting water quality standards. Before 
discussing what we know about the state of the nation’s waters, it is 
useful to consider just how much we do not know. In fact, our 
knowledge of existing water quality conditions is alarmingly thin, 
making quantitative measures of progress and deterioration, to some 
extent, speculative. Indeed, the lack of adequate monitoring and 
water quality assessment data are substantial obstacles to an effective 
 
PROTECT AND RESTORE WETLANDS AND RIPARIAN AREAS FOR THE ABATEMENT OF NONPOINT 
SOURCE POLLUTION, available at http://www.epa.gov/owow/nps/wetmeasures/ (Draft, June 21, 
2001); EPA, NATIONAL GUIDANCE WETLANDS AND NONPOINT SOURCE CONTROL PROGRAMS, 
available at http://www.epa.gov/owow/wetlands/wlnps.html (June 1990).  
 34. On the status and trends of wetland losses, see US FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE, 2001 
REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE STATUS AND TRENDS OF WETLANDS IN THE CONTERMINOUS 
UNITED STATES 1986 TO 1997 (2001), available at http://wetlands.fws.gov/bha/SandT/ 
SandTReport.html (last visited Sept. 1, 2002). 
 35. CLEAN WATER ACTION PLAN, supra note 1, at 1.  
 36. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1994). 
 37. Id. § 1251(a)(2).  
 38. See 1998 WATER QUALITY REPORT, supra note 1, at 10. The stated objectives apply 
to surface waters. Groundwater quality is another matter—and a very large one (see id. at 157-
98) that I do not expressly address in this Article.  
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program to improve water quality39 and, as I shall argue below, bear 
importantly on the question of what types of water quality policies 
are likely to operate most effectively and fairly.  
The lack of adequate water quality assessment data is largely due 
to limited resources; state and federal agencies simply do not have 
the staff or funding to support comprehensive water quality 
assessments. Also, many problems with water quality data are the 
product of the current regulatory structure.  
In its latest report to Congress, the EPA reported that states had 
assessed only twenty-three percent of river miles, forty-two percent 
of lake acres, thirty-two percent of estuary square miles, and five 
percent of ocean shoreline miles to determine whether water quality 
standards were being met.40 Even this distressingly meager data set 
overstates the extent of our knowledge about existing water quality. 
Water quality assessments41 are not always the product of actual 
monitoring, and are not performed in a consistent manner from one 
state to the next.42 Sampling from different water bodies, differences 
in data gathering protocols, and other less defensible factors also 
contribute to differences in reported water quality over time.43 The 
 
 39. For an extensive discussion of the inadequacy of existing water quality monitoring 
programs, see Adler, supra note 2, at 257-63.  
 40. 1998 WATER QUALITY REPORT, supra note 1, at 14. A useful, and more manageable, 
source of information, based on the 1998 Water Quality Report, is EPA, THE QUALITY OF OUR 
NATION’S WATERS (2000), at http://www.epa.gov/305b/98report/98brochure.pdf (last visited 
Mar. 31, 2002). 
 41. Section 305(b)(E) of the CWA requires each state to submit biennial reports to EPA. 
The reports must include information on water quality within the state, an analysis of whether 
water quality objectives will be achieved by the CWA’s requirements, and any 
recommendations for additional action where necessary to achieve those objectives; estimates 
of the costs of achieving CWA objectives; and “a description of the nature and extent of 
nonpoint sources of pollutants, and recommendations as to the programs which must be 
undertaken to control each category of such sources, including an estimate of the costs of 
implementing such programs.” 33 U.S.C. § 1315(b)(E) (1994).  
 42. See Adler, supra note 2, at 253-54 (noting the “absence of a consistent set of rules and 
procedures by which states monitor ambient [water] quality and reach judgments about whether 
or not the standard is met”).  
 43. RIBAUDO, ECONOMICS OF WATER QUALITY PROTECTION, supra note 18, at 5; see 
also 1998 WATER QUALITY REPORT, supra note 1, at 4; Adler, supra note 2, at 254 (“[E]ven if 
two states have identical was [water quality standards] for a given pollutant, water bodies might 
be listed [as impaired] in one state but not the other, based only on differences in the methods, 
frequency, and location of monitoring or on different criteria for deciding what constitutes a 
violation.”).  
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current system for monitoring state waters has been described as 
“highly variable in both water bodies assessed and methods of 
assessment.” Furthermore, it is “virtually unsupervised by EPA, and a 
‘game’ of ‘politics, bureaucratic inertia and bad science’ leading to 
‘erroneous and manipulated sets of water quality data.’”44 According 
to a recent report by the General Accounting Office, “[w]hat is 
uncertain . . . is the precise extent of water quality problems, where 
and what the most severe problems are, and the location of high-
quality waters that need to be protected.”45 If we are to establish 
programs for improving water quality that “are applied evenhandedly 
both in terms of those who must do the hard work of pollution control 
and those who bear the brunt of the remaining pollution,” 
comprehensive and consistent water quality monitoring and 
assessment are the first order of business.46 
Our understanding of existing water quality is hampered by the 
absence of consistent benchmarks against which determinations of 
impairment are made. Under the current regulatory framework, 
judgments about water quality are based on water quality standards, 
which may vary significantly from state to state. While some 
minimum federal standards apply, they are inadequate to ensure 
consistent judgments about water quality.  
Water quality standards consist of three elements: use 
designations, water quality criteria, and an antidegradation policy.47 
Use designations under the CWA essentially amount to “state-by-
 
 44. HOUCK, TMDL PROGRAM, supra note 16, at 138 (quoting PUBLIC EMPLOYEES FOR 
ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSIBILITY, MURKY WATERS, OFFICIAL WATER QUALITY REPORTS 
ARE ALL WET: AN INSIDE LOOK AT EPA’S IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT 2, 3 
(1999)).  
 45. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, WATER QUALITY: KEY EPA AND STATE DECISIONS 
LIMITED BY INCONSISTENT AND INCOMPLETE DATA, GAO/RCED-00-54, at 6 (2000). For 
related views concerning the quality of existing state-generated data on water quality, see 
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 16, at 16 (noting limits on state data). For a 
description of various programs to monitor water quality, see CLEAN WATER ACTION PLAN, 
supra note 1, at 8-9.  
 46. Adler, supra note 2, at 263. 
 47. 40 C.F.R. § 131.6 (2001). For a good, concise discussion of these elements of water 
quality standards, see Karen M. Wardzinski et al., Water Pollution Control Under the National 
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System, in THE CLEAN WATER ACT HANDBOOK 8, 26-33 
(Parthenia B. Evans ed., 1994). See also Adler, supra note 2, at 210-13. 
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state ‘zoning’ of the Nation’s surface waters.”48 Unlike the Clean Air 
Act, which mandates that air quality be assessed against federally-
promulgated ambient standards,49 the CWA reflects the judgment that 
the appropriate level of water quality may be based on the normative 
choices each state makes for the uses of waters within its 
jurisdiction.50 At a minimum, however, states “must take into 
consideration the use and value of water for public water supplies, 
protection and propagation of fish, shellfish and wildlife, recreation 
in and on the water, agricultural, industrial, and other purposes 
including navigation.” Additionally, states may not “adopt waste 
transport or waste assimilation as a designated use.”51 Designated 
uses are, as part of a state’s water quality standards, subject to 
approval by EPA, which enjoys “the final voice on the standard’s 
adequacy.”52  
Examples of use designations include aquatic life support, 
drinking water supply, fish consumption, shellfish harvesting, 
primary contact recreation (e.g., swimming), secondary contact 
recreation (e.g., boating), agriculture, groundwater recharge, and 
wildlife habitat.53 In addition to the prohibition on designating waters 
as waste disposal sites, states may not select designated uses that are 
inconsistent with the “fishable/swimmable” objectives of the CWA. 
This limitation is avoided, however, if the state demonstrates that 
such minimally acceptable uses are not feasibly attainable due to one 
of six specific conditions.54  
The wide range of choices available to the states in designating 
uses of water bodies makes statements about how many waters are 
“impaired” a radically incomplete picture of the overall state of the 
nation’s water resources. A state that has chosen a less protective use 
 
 48. Adler, supra note 2, at 209 (quoting Mississippi v. Costle, 625 F.2d 1269, 1275 (5th 
Cir. 1980)).  
 49. See generally Douglas R. Williams, Cooperative Federalism and the Clean Air Act: A 
Defense of Minimum Federal Standards, 20 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 67 (2001); Adler, supra 
note 2, at 251-53. 
 50. See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c) (2001).  
 51. 40 C.F.R. § 131.10(a).  
 52. Mississippi v. Costle, 625 F.2d at 1275; see 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(2).  
 53. 1998 WATER QUALITY REPORT, supra note 1, at 12. 
 54. 40 C.F.R. § 131.10(g); see David S. Baron, Water Quality Standards for Rivers and 
Lakes: Emerging Issues, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 559, 567-71 (1995).  
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designation may conclude that a waterbody is meeting water quality 
standards, while a downstream state, looking at a different segment of 
the same water body may conclude that the water is impaired. While 
it may certainly be appropriate to permit variation from state to state 
on the preferred uses for waters, such variation may raise an issue as 
to the equitable distribution of cleanup responsibilities between 
upstream and downstream water users.55  
The second element of water quality standards, water quality 
criteria (WQC), is central to water quality assessment and water 
quality-based control strategies. WQC are an expression of the 
minimally adequate ambient water conditions deemed necessary to 
support designated uses; the WQC criteria thus represent the ambient 
benchmarks at which pollution controls are aimed.56 These criteria 
can be expressed in a variety of ways: numerically, as pollutant-
specific ambient concentrations and toxicity levels, or in narrative 
form, such as “no toxic pollutants in toxic amounts.”57  
Uncertainty pervades efforts to link narrative and quantitative 
criteria to designated uses.58 The current regulatory structure tolerates 
wildly inconsistent judgments about these linkages. Consider, on this 
point, the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Natural Resources Defense 
 
 55. See Adler, supra note 2, at 253. Cf. Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 111 (1992) 
(noting that “[i]f every discharge that had some theoretical impact on a downstream State were 
interpreted as ‘degrading’ the downstream waters, downstream States might wield an effective 
veto over upstream discharges”).  
 56. See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(2)(A); American Paper Inst., Inc. v. EPA, 996 F.2d 346, 349 
(D.C. Cir. 1993).  
 57. See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(2)(A); American Paper Inst., Inc. v. EPA, 996 F.2d 346, 349 
(D.C. Cir. 1993). EPA has been experimenting with new approaches to developing water 
criteria, including sediment criteria and “biological water . . . criteria.” See Adler, supra note 2, 
at 212. For toxic pollutants, the CWA mandates the use of biological criteria if numeric criteria 
are unavailable. See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(2)(B). EPA has also recently developed guidelines for 
water quality standards for wetlands. See EPA, NATIONAL GUIDANCE: WATER QUALITY 
STANDARDS FOR WETLANDS (June 1990), at http://www.epa.gov/owow/wetlands/ 
regs/quality.html (last visited Apr. 21, 2002) [hereinafter NATIONAL GUIDANCE]. 
 58. American Paper Inst., 996 F.2d at 351 (narrative criteria). See generally ROBERT 
PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, AND POLICY 704-05 (3d ed. 
2000); OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, AGRICULTURE, TRADE, AND ENVIRONMENT: 
ACHIEVING COMPLEMENTARY POLICIES 74 (1995) [hereinafter AGRICULTURE, TRADE, AND 
ENVIRONMENT]; HOUCK, TMDL PROGRAM, supra note 16, at 136-42; Wendy E. Wagner, 
Restoring Polluted Waters with Public Values, 25 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 429, 
438 (2000); Oliver A. Houck, TMDLs IV: The Final Frontier, 29 Envtl. L. Rep. 10469 (Aug. 
1999). 
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Council v. EPA,59 in which the court rejected challenges to the EPA’s 
approval of Maryland’s and Virginia’s water quality criteria for 
dioxin. The states concluded that designated uses could be supported 
at ambient dioxin concentrations that were one thousand times higher 
than the concentrations established in prior EPA guidance.60 Quite 
obviously, such a marked disparity in judgments about water quality 
criteria casts substantial doubt on conclusions regarding water 
segment impairment based upon ambient concentrations of one or 
more pollutants, even when good ambient data are available.61  
The problem is exacerbated with narrative criteria, which 
necessarily call for judgments about the amount of a pollutant that is 
tolerable under standards that do not themselves articulate clear 
levels. Experience with narrative criteria in the related context of 
establishing permit conditions on point source discharges show that 
such judgments may be wildly inconsistent from one regulator to the 
 
 59. 16 F.3d 1395 (4th Cir. 1993) 
 60. EPA guidance specified an ambient concentration of .0013 parts per quadrillion (ppq); 
Maryland and Virginia adopted a 1.2 ppq criterion. See id. at 1398-99. As the court explained: 
numeric water criteria, such as the 1.2 ppq and .0013 ppq standards, are based on an 
assessment of the dose of dioxin that may cause harm and the dose to humans that can 
be expected as a result of dioxin present in water. Six factors are considered in 
determining the numeric dioxin criteria: (1) cancer potency; (2) risk level; (3) fish 
consumption; (4) bioconcentration; (5) water intake; and (6) body weight. . . .  
The .0013 ppq figure is taken from EPA’s dioxin criteria guidance document, Ambient 
Water Quality Criteria for 2,3,7,8-Tetrachlorodibenzo-p-dioxin, published in 1984 
(“1984 dioxin criteria document”). In this document, EPA summarized the scientific 
information available in 1984 regarding dioxin toxicity and provided useful 
information for the states to use in adopting their own water quality standards. EPA 
recommended that where bodies of water are used as a source for both drinking water 
and edible fish, a dioxin concentration of .0013 ppq is desirable. This .0013 ppq figure 
means, approximately speaking, that one out of every ten million individuals faces an 
excess risk of cancer exposure as a result of the water’s dioxin content. Thus, a 1.2 ppq 
standard would mean that, according to EPA’s assessment, roughly one out of every 
ten thousand individuals would face such exposure. 
Id. at 1398 n.3.  
 61. Professor Adler also demonstrates that water criteria fail to address some sources of 
impairment. He notes, for example, that water quality criteria have historically focused on 
pollutant concentrations in water columns, ignoring the manner in which pollutants become 
embedded in sediment, posing risks to bottom-dwelling organisms, or pass through the food 
chain through processes of bioconcentration, biomagnification, and bioaccumulation. See Adler, 
supra note 2, at 212.  
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next.62 In some cases, “the complexity of these decisions and 
judgments led many a permit writer, and perhaps a water quality 
analyst, to avoid making them altogether.”63 These problems have 
been limited to some extent by EPA regulations requiring permit 
writers to use specific methods to translate narrative criteria into 
enforceable effluent limitations;64 however, similar constraints do not 
apply to water quality monitoring.  
The problems associated with the absence of quantitative criteria 
are likely to be serious in the case of nutrients (principally nitrogen 
and phosphorous) and pathogens, which are principal pollutants 
associated with agricultural nonpoint source water quality 
impairments.65 Until very recently, the EPA had issued no guidelines 
on water criteria for nutrients.66 Currently though, it is expanding 
guidance on criteria for pathogens to include more contaminants.67 
 
 62. On the variability of outcomes based on best professional judgment, see Stewart, 
supra note 2, at 56 (best professional judgment “allowed EPA and state regulators to exercise 
great flexibility and ease the phase-in of more stringent controls, contrary to the statutory 
scheme”). Similarly, Professor Latin has concluded: 
Congress wanted technology-based standards to apply uniformly to similar sources 
across the nation, but the permits were negotiated on an individualized basis 
incorporating whichever control measures and compliance schedules dischargers 
would accept. EPA characterized these permits as grounded on “best professional 
judgment;” but they often reflected simply the “best deal” the Agency could obtain in 
light of manpower and time constraints and its desire to demonstrate progress. These 
“best professional judgments” were usually made by EPA regional personnel with 
water quality, not technology-based orientations. 
Howard Latin, Regulatory Failure, Administrative Incentives, and the New Clean Air Act, 21 
ENVTL. L. 1647, 1672 (1991).  
 63. Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 915 F.2d 1314, 1317 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing 
WILLIAM RODGERS, 2 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, 283-84 (1986)); see Am. Paper Inst., Inc. v. 
EPA, 996 F.2d 346, 350 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (“Faced with th[e] conundrum [of translating 
narrative criteria into permit limitations], some permit writers threw up their hands and, 
contrary to the Act, simply ignored water quality standards including narrative criteria 
altogether when deciding upon permit limitations.”). 
 64. See 40 C.F.R. § 122.44(d)(1)(vi) (2001); American Paper Inst., supra note 56 
(upholding regulations). 
 65. See Memorandum from Geoffrey Grubbs to Regional Water Directors, Development 
and Adoption of Nutrient Criteria into Water Quality Standards, at 2 (Nov. 14, 2001), available 
at http://www.epa.gov/ost/standards/nutrient.html (nutrients); EPA, Developing Strategy for 
Microbial Waterborne Disease, at 3 (Discussion Draft, Aug. 29, 2001), at http://www.epa.gov/ 
ost/humanhealth/microbial/microbial.html [hereinafter Discussion Draft]. 
 66. See Nutrient Criteria Development; Notice of Ecoregional Nutrient Criteria, 66 Fed. 
Reg. 1671 (Jan. 9, 2001).  
 
 67. See Discussion Draft, supra note 65. 
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Few states have developed water quality criteria for nutrients, and 
those that have rely on narrative standards.68  
Problems of the same sort apply to assessments of wetlands. The 
EPA proposed guidelines for water quality standards for wetlands in 
1990,69 but only eleven states have designated uses for wetlands in 
their water quality standards and only three states used monitoring 
data to determine whether uses were being supported.70  
It is not simply weak scientific understanding that leads to 
inconsistent judgments. Natural Resources Defense Council also 
illustrates that there is room for considerable disagreement between 
EPA and the states, and among the states, on judgments about the 
acceptable level of risk to those who wish to engage in designated 
uses of waters. In Natural Resources Defense Council, the 
inconsistency between the EPA’s guidelines and the states’ criteria 
was not attributable simply to differences in views about how much 
dioxin can be tolerated to keep risks within an agreed-upon range. 
The EPA’s guidance for dioxin was based on a judgment that an 
acceptable individual risk of contracting cancer from waterborne 
dioxin is 1 in 10 million. By contrast, the states deemed a much 
higher individual risk of 1 in 10,000 to be sufficient to protect human 
health.71 Disparities in judgments of this sort make it difficult to 
make reasonable conclusions about whether a particular water body 
is or is not “impaired,” or whether the water body is safe for its 
designated uses. These disparities are also likely to make it politically 
and legally difficult to defend regulatory controls designed to meet 
water quality criteria, particularly when the costs of such controls 
become very high and the benefits are often difficult to establish in 
concrete terms.72  
While the dioxin criteria in Natural Resources Defense Council 
may be a rather extreme illustration of disparities in scientific and 
 
 68. EPA, NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF REGIONAL NUTRIENT 
CRITERIA 2 (June 1998), at http://www.epa.gov/ost/standards/nutrient.html (last visited Apr. 21, 
2002). 
 69. NATIONAL GUIDANCE, supra note 57.  
 70. 1998 WATER QUALITY REPORT, supra note 1, at 147.  
 71. See supra note 70.  
 72. See HOUCK, TMDL PROGRAM, supra note 16, at 137 (noting that scientific 
uncertainty supports resistance on part of regulated community).  
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policy judgments about appropriate regulatory targets, it is by no 
means an isolated example.73 These inconsistencies can lead to 
serious problems in assessing water quality conditions, and more 
severe problems where consistency across states is important—for 
example, in interstate waters or interconnected aquatic ecosystems. 
Variable standards may lead to the conclusion by one state that 
further regulation is necessary and required under the CWA to 
achieve water quality goals in a particular river segment, while 
another state, across the river, may conclude that the same segment is 
currently supporting designated uses. Wendy Wagner nicely 
summarizes these difficulties: 
[W]e know so little about aquatic ecology and the effects of 
the hundreds of manmade pollutants on our rivers and streams 
[that] setting water quality standards . . . involves making 
unverifiable approximations. These scientific uncertainties, in 
fact, result in state-specific standards and goals that are quite 
variable and hence particularly misguided with respect to 
interstate waters.74  
The final element of water quality standards, an antidegradation 
policy, also raises particular difficulties for nonpoint source pollution 
and determinations about whether water quality is impaired.75 The 
antidegradation policy adopts a three-tier approach.76 In the first tier, 
existing uses and water quality to support them must be maintained.77 
In the second tier, waters of higher quality than the minimum 
“fishable/swimmable” standards may not be allowed to degrade to 
the fishable/swimmable level absent a showing that such degradation 
is necessary for important social or economic reasons or cannot be 
avoided even with the most stringent legal requirements on point 
sources and best management practices on nonpoint sources.78 Tier 
 
 73. See Adler, supra note 2, at 251.  
 74. Wagner, supra note 58, at 438-39.  
 75. See generally John Harleston, What is Antidegradation Policy: Does Anyone Know?, 
5 S.C. ENVTL. L.J. 33 (1996); Adler, supra note 2, at 213-15, 223-25.  
 76. 40 C.F.R. § 131.12(a) (2001). See generally David S. Baron, Water Quality Standards 
for Rivers and Lakes: Emerging Issues, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 559, 576-77 (1995).  
 77. 40 C.F.R. § 131.12(a)(1).  
 78. Id. § 131.12(a)(2).  
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three requires that certain designated waters of high quality—
“outstanding national resource waters”—be protected and 
maintained.79 Many states have not applied the antidegradation policy 
to nonpoint source pollution.80 For these states, increases in nonpoint 
source pollution that impair existing uses would not be considered to 
violate state water quality standards or the antidegradation policy, so 
long as designated uses are fully supported. By contrast, if existing 
uses were impaired by increased point source pollution, the 
antidegradation policy would be violated and the waterbody would be 
deemed to be impaired.81  
Establishing workable water quality standards and criteria, while 
critical, is but one step in the process of developing an effective 
pollution control policy. Effective monitoring should also provide 
information about the sources of water quality problems. The 
techniques to make such determinations are fraught with uncertainty, 
particularly with respect to nonpoint sources. “Monitoring to support 
nonpoint-source-pollution control requires a more comprehensive 
understanding of natural systems and the impacts of human activities, 
such as agriculture or urban land uses, on natural systems”82—an 
understanding that we currently lack. While there are several possible 
models employed for these purposes, basic understanding of the fate 
and transport in waters of particular pollutants is often quite thin.83 
Accordingly, a pressing need exists in water quality management 
programs for techniques to bridge the gaps in the knowledge base so 
that appropriate judgments about the design of control programs can 
be made.84  
 
 79. Id. § 131.12(a)(3).  
 80. See, e.g., Am. Wildlands v. Browner, 260 F.3d 1192 (10th Cir. 2001) (upholding 
EPA’s approval of Montana’s water quality standards, which exempt nonpoint sources from 
review under antidegradation policy). 
 81. See TMDL Rule, supra note 16, at 43607. 
 82. FINAL REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL TASK FORCE ON MONITORING WATER 
QUALITY, THE STRATEGY FOR IMPROVING WATER-QUALITY MONITORING IN THE UNITED 
STATES (1995), at http://water.usgs.gov/wicp/Summary.html (last visited Apr. 21, 2002).  
 83. See ASSESSING THE TMDL APPROACH, supra note 16, at 29; Adler, supra note 2, at 
222 & n.119; Boyd, supra note 11, at 72-73.  
 84. See Wagner, supra note 58, at 433-42. Professor Wagner concludes that “the ultimate 
enforceable requirements of the TMDL program are built on a house of cards: a series of 
difficult and often impossible calculations that make the final requirement—additional 
quantitative limits on specific problematic dischargers—scientifically indefensible.” Id. at 440. 
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A final problem in water quality assessment is again related to the 
current regulatory structure. That structure has created mixed 
incentives for the states in reporting on the quality of their waters. 
Until very recently, states often had strong incentives in the face of 
uncertainty to conclude that certain waters were “impaired” by 
nonpoint source pollution. The section 319 program, discussed in 
detail below, offers federal funding for states to devise and 
implement nonpoint source pollution control programs for certain 
impaired waters. Enticed by federal funding, many state agencies 
may have been tempted to list waters as impaired in order to enhance 
their budgets. The Governor of Wyoming noted these incentives in 
testimony to Congress: 
A few years ago, the authority for states to receive federal 
money for watershed work required that we declare that a 
waterbody was functionally impaired—regardless of its actual 
condition. That misunderstood incentive caused many streams 
to be mislabeled as impaired. As a result Wyoming was able to 
draw down section 319 money.85 
Recently, however, the resurrection of the TMDL program, also 
discussed below, may have reversed those incentives, for listing 
waters as impaired for this program gives rise to significant 
regulatory responsibilities. The state of Wyoming reduced the 
number of its waters considered “impaired” from over 400 to 61, with 
315 viewed as incapable of being characterized due to the absence of 
sufficient data.86  
 
More optimistically, The National Research Council recently concluded: 
[T]he data and science have progressed sufficiently over the past 35 years to support 
the nation’s return to ambient-based water quality management. Given reasonable 
expectations for data availability and the inevitable limits on our conceptual 
understanding of complex systems, statements about the science behind water quality 
management must be made with acknowledgment of uncertainties. The committee has 
concluded that there are creative ways to accommodate this uncertainty while moving 
forward in addressing the nation’s water quality challenges.  
ASSESSING THE TMDL APPROACH, supra note 16, at 3.  
 85. Hearing on Governors’ Perspectives on the Clean Water Act Before the Subcomm. On 
Water Resources and Env’t of the House Comm. On Transportation and Infrastructure, 106 
Cong. 4 (1999), quoted in HOUCK, TMDL PROGRAM, supra note 16, at 139. 
 86. HOUCK, TMDL PROGRAM, supra note 16, at 138.  
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B. A Water Quality Snapshot 
Within the limits of existing data, and with the foregoing caveats, 
a troubling picture emerges of the extent of water quality 
impairments throughout the nation and the sources that are 
contributing to those impairments. Of the waters assessed for 1998, 
thirty-five percent of river, forty-five percent of lake, and forty-four 
percent of estuarine waters are considered impaired because the 
waters do not fully support one or more of the uses protected by 
applicable water quality standards.87 An additional, significant 
percentage of waters is considered “threatened,” a term that state 
officials use to express concern that a given water segment is in 
jeopardy of not supporting designated uses because of trends in 
pollution or land uses that threaten water quality.88 In nine states all 
of the rivers and streams would be considered impaired, if statewide 
fish consumption advisories for mercury contamination are 
included.89  
The costs of these impairments are undoubtedly very large, but 
nearly unknown.90 While the Cayuhoga River is no longer burning,91 
it has been estimated that nine hundred thousand people are getting 
sick from the water they drink.92 Over seven thousand beach closings 
were reported in 1998, and a third of shellfish beds are closed to 
 
 87. 1998 WATER QUALITY REPORT, supra note 1, at ES-3. 
 88. Id. at 53. Figures on the percentage of rivers considered threatened are set forth at id. 
at 58 (10%); for lakes, see id. at 84 (9%); and for estuaries, see id. at 104 (9%).  
 89. Id. at 58. The states are Connecticut, Indiana, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, 
New Jersey, North Carolina, and Vermont.  
 90. In quantified terms, it has been estimated that the annual costs imposed by sediment 
from agricultural erosion may be as high as $8 billion, and include costs to navigation, 
recreational activities, water treatment, and water use systems. See RIBAUDO, ECONOMICS OF 
WATER QUALITY PROTECTION, supra note 18, at 7. EPA has estimated that the annual costs to 
treat drinking water due to nitrate contamination is $200 million. See id. at 11. Damages to 
agriculture, households, utilities, and industry caused by salinity in the Colorado River alone 
may exceed $800 million. Id. at 15. Health costs due to waterborne pathogens are also 
significant. Id. For a summary of the costs associated with water pollution and the benefits of 
water pollution control, see id. at 16. 
 91. See Caputo, supra note 2.  
 92. NATIONAL WILDLIFE FEDERATION, POLLUTION PARALYSIS II: CODE RED FOR 
WATERSHEDS 4 (2000), at http://www.nwf.org/watershed/paralysis/pp2_report.pdf (last visited 
Apr. 21, 2002) [hereinafter POLLUTION PARALYSIS]. 
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harvesting.93 States issue thousands of fish consumption advisories 
annually, affecting almost every state.94 Problems of various kinds 
have also plagued virtually all parts of the country: in the South, a 
“dead zone” in the Gulf of Mexico, caused in part from pollutants 
originating as far away as the upper Midwest, is now the size of New 
Jersey;95 along the Eastern Seaboard, a “cell from hell” contaminated 
rivers linked to the Chesapeake Bay, causing massive fish kills in 
1997;96 in the West, fish and wildlife habitats are disappearing due to 
water diversion and uses;97 ninety-seven percent of the Great Lakes’ 
shoreline miles were subject to fish consumption advisories;98 in 
Milwaukee, cryptosporidium contamination made 370,000 people 
sick and may have killed 100;99 and both on the Atlantic seaboard 
and in the Midwest, water contaminated by animal waste has killed 
thousands of fish.100 There is also growing concern that some 
pesticides—so-called persistent organic pollutants or “POPs”—are 
disrupting the endocrine systems of aquatic species, wildlife, and 
humans, causing among other things significant threats to 
reproductive health.101 Clearly, improvements in water quality are, or 
should be, a significant national priority. 
 
 93. Id. 
 94. CLEAN WATER ACTION PLAN, supra note 1, at 10. 
 95. POLLUTION PARALYSIS, supra note 92, at 4.  
 96. Rena I. Steinzor, Devolution and the Public Health, 24 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 351, 
396-99 (2000); William J. Broad, Battling the cell from Hell; research on Pfiesteria piscida, 35 
NAT’L WILDLIFE 10 (Aug. 18, 1997); Elaine Bueschen, Pfiesteria Piscicida: A Regional 
Symptom of a National Problem, 28 Envtl. L. Rep. 10317 (June 1998). 
 97. See Baron, supra note 54, at 588. 
 98. POLLUTION PARALYSIS, supra note 92, at 3-4.  
 99. See Baron, supra note 54, at 560.  
 100. See NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, CESSPOOLS OF SHAME: HOW 
FACTORY FARM LAGOONS AND SPRAYFIELDS THREATEN ENVIRONMENTAL AND PUBLIC 
HEALTH 36 (2001), at http://www.nrdc.org/water/pollution/cesspools/cesspools.pdf (last visited 
Apr. 21, 2002) [hereinafter CESSPOOLS OF SHAME].  
 101. See THEO COLBORN, DIANNE DUMANOSKI, AND JOHN PETERSON MYERS, OUR 
STOLEN FUTURE: ARE WE THREATENING OUR FERTILITY, INTELLIGENCE, AND SURVIVAL?—A 
SCIENTIFIC DETECTIVE STORY (1996); NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, HORMONALLY ACTIVE 
AGENTS IN THE ENVIRONMENT (1999), available at http://www.nap.edu/books/ 
0309064198/html (last visited Apr. 21, 2002); Noah Sachs, Blocked Pathways: Potential Legal 
Responses to Endocrine Disrupting Chemicals, 24 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 289 (1999).  
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C. The Link Between Impaired Water Quality and Agriculture  
The impairments discussed above are associated with a number of 
pollution problems caused by a variety of sources. Significantly, 
nonpoint source pollution is the culprit in most cases.102 Agriculture’s 
role in nonpoint source pollution is, in turn, also quite large.103 The 
states reported that in 1998 agricultural pollution was considered 
primarily responsible for fifty-nine percent of impaired river miles,104 
thirty-one percent of impaired lakes,105 and fifteen percent of 
impaired estuarine waters.106 Anecdotal evidence confirms a strong 
relation between agriculture and water quality. A 1995 report by the 
now-defunct Office of Technology Assessment noted that “71 
percent of U.S. cropland remains in watersheds where at least one 
agricultural pollutant exceeds standards for recreation or ecological 
health.”107 The extent of agriculture’s contribution to extant water 
quality problems should not be surprising. There are over 1.9 million 
farms in the American landscape covering 930 million acres108—
nearly half of all the land in the nation.109 
Agricultural nonpoint pollution can contaminate surface waters as 
pollutants are carried in runoff and through the air and ultimately 
settle in surface waters and groundwater.110 In addition, some sources 
of water pollution are treated as “nonpoint” sources simply because 
they are excluded from the CWA’s definition of a “point source,” not 
because the “point” at which the pollutants are discharged is 
unidentifiable.111 An example is certain irrigation return flows from 
 
 102. See text accompanying supra note 3.  
 103. See Ruhl, supra note 5, at 287-91; PAUL FAETH, FERTILE GROUND: NUTRIENT 
TRADING’S POTENTIAL TO COST-EFFECTIVELY IMPROVE WATER QUALITY 5 (2000), available 
at http://www.wri.org/water/nutrient.html (last visited Apr. 21, 2002) (“The principal cause of 
surface water impairment is agriculture . . . .”) [hereinafter FERTILE GROUND].  
 104. 1998 WATER QUALITY REPORT, supra note 1, at 62.  
 105. Id. at 88. 
 106. Id. at 108.  
 107. TARGETING ENVIRONMENTAL PRIORITIES, supra note 6, at 11.  
 108. Ruhl, supra note 5, at 272.  
 109. See AGRICULTURE, TRADE, AND ENVIRONMENT, supra note 58, at 69.  
 110. See generally PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 58, at 752.  
 
 111. See Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156, 166 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (The 
nonpoint source “category is defined by exclusion and includes all water quality problems not” 
regulated as point sources under the CWA.). EPA defines nonpoint source water pollution as 
“water pollution caused by rainfall or snowmelt moving over and through the ground and 
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agricultural operations.112  
The varieties of pollutants associated with, and agricultural 
practices implicated in, nonpoint source pollution are numerous, and 
pose very different kinds of threats to water quality, and as a 
consequence, to aquatic life, wildlife, and human health. The leading 
categories of agricultural activities that impair water quality are non-
irrigated crop production, irrigated crop production, and concentrated 
animal feeding operations.113 The most widespread agricultural 
pollutants are sediment, nutrients, bacteria, and toxic organic 
chemicals.114 
Tilling and cultivating soil increases soil erosion. Wind and runoff 
 
carrying natural and human-made pollutants into lakes, rivers, streams, wetlands, estuaries, 
coastal waters, and ground water.” Environmental Protection Agency, Section 319 Consistency 
Guidance, 63 Fed. Reg. 45,504 (1998). Elsewhere, EPA has emphasized that many nonpoint 
source water pollutants enter water bodies through atmospheric deposition. 1998 WATER 
QUALITY REPORT, supra note 1, at 248. The CWA, while not defining nonpoint source water 
pollution directly, does provide what may be regarded as an illustrative list of nonpoint sources 
in 33 U.S.C. § 1314(f), which provides: 
[EPA], after consultation with appropriate Federal and State agencies and other 
interested persons, shall issue to [various agencies], within one year after [Oct. 18, 
1972] (and from time to time thereafter) information including (1) guidelines for 
identifying and evaluating the nature and extent of nonpoint sources of pollutants, and 
(2) processes, procedures, and methods to control pollution resulting from— 
(A) agricultural and silvicultural activities, including runoff from fields and crop and 
forest lands;  
(B) mining activities, including runoff and siltation from new, currently operating, and 
abandoned surface and underground mines;  
(C) all construction activity, including runoff from the facilities resulting from such 
construction;  
(D) the disposal of pollutants in wells or in subsurface excavations;  
(E) salt water intrusion resulting from reductions of fresh water flow from any cause, 
including extraction of ground water, irrigation, obstruction, and diversion; and  
(F) changes in the movement, flow, or circulation of any navigable waters or ground 
waters, including changes caused by the construction of dams, levees, channels, 
causeways, or flow diversion facilities.  
33 U.S.C. § 1314(f)(2) (2001). 
 112. See 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (excluding these sources from the definition of a point 
source). 
 113. Claudia Copeland, Water Quality Initiatives and Agriculture, Cong. Research Rep. 
No. RL30437, at 5 (Feb. 16, 2000), available at http://www.cnie.org/NLE/CRSreports/ 
water/h2p-38.cfm (last visited Mar. 22, 2002). 
 114. 1998 WATER QUALITY REPORT, supra note 1, at ES-3, 18-21.  
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carry soil particles, often contaminated with pesticides and other 
pollutants, to surface waters (sheet and rill erosion). The effects from 
these sediments, or siltation, include blockage of streams, destruction 
of wetlands and habitat for aquatic life, disruption of water treatment 
facilities, and increased frequency and severity of floods. While rates 
of erosion have decreased significantly over the years, in 1997, soil 
loss from water erosion was still very high in absolute terms: 1.14 
billion tons, or a rate of 6.4 tons per acre.115 Sediments from soil 
erosion are estimated to impose costs as high as eight billion dollars 
annually.116 In a 1997 report to Congress, EPA concluded that: 
(1) Sediment contamination affects every region and state of 
the country; overall 96 watersheds are a source of “probable 
concern” and two-thirds of these watersheds have fish 
consumption advisories in place; 
(2) Streams, lakes, harbors, nearshore areas, and oceans are all 
affected by sediment contaminated with PCBs, mercury, 
organochlorine pesticides, and polyaromatic hydrocarbons; and  
(3) As much as 10% of the sediment underlying U.S. surface 
waters is contaminated with toxic pollutants that pose potential 
risks to fish and to humans and wildlife who eat fish.  
Polluted agriculture runoff continues to release other chemicals to 
surface waters which then accumulate to harmful levels in sediment. 
Many of the contaminants can persist for many years in the sediment, 
raising continuing concerns for the environment.117 
Vast quantities of nutrients from excess fertilizers and animal 
wastes, particularly phosphorous and nitrogen, are deposited into 
waters, some in sediment loads. These pollutants accelerate the 
process of eutrophication, which in turn causes several problems, 
 
 115. USDA, Natural Resources Conservation Service, Cropland Acreage, Soil Erosion, 
and Installation of Conservation Buffer Strips: Preliminary Estimates of the 1997 National 
Resources Inventory, at http://www.nhq.nrcs.usda.gov/land/pubs/buffer1.html (last visited Mar. 
22, 2002). For maps estimating the amount of sediment delivered to streams and rivers from 
agricultural operations, see http://www.nhq.nrcs.usda.gov/land/meta/m2087.html (last visited 
Mar. 22, 2002). 
 116. RIBAUDO, ECONOMICS OF WATER QUALITY PROTECTION, supra note 18, at 7.  
 
 117. See EPA, Contaminated Sediment: EPA’s Report to Congress, at http://www.epa.gov/ 
waterscience/cs/consed.html (last visited Oct. 27, 1998). 
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including: increased algal growth; decreased water clarity and 
transparency; foul taste and odor; increased water treatment costs; 
depletion of dissolved oxygen; fish kills; and loss of desirable fish 
species.118 Nitrate contamination in water supplies may also cause 
“blue-baby syndrome,” a disease that can be fatal to infants.119 In 
addition, excess nutrients may contribute to toxic algal blooms that 
can cause massive fish kills, threaten commercial fisheries, and harm 
other aquatic life forms. “Red tides,” as well as Pfiesteria, which 
killed as many as a billion fish in 1991 and ten million menhaden fish 
in the Neuse River in 1995,120 “pose an increasingly frequent 
recurring problem for U.S. coastal communities.”121 Over zealous 
farmers through excess fertilization cause as much as thirty-nine 
percent of all nitrogen loads and thirty percent of phosphorous loads 
in surface waters.122  
Similarly, animal manure contributes significant quantities of 
nutrients and bacteria to rivers, lakes, and streams.123 This is a 
problem of increasing concern, because animal feeding operations are 
becoming larger and more concentrated, placing considerable stress 
on nearby water resources.124 The General Accounting Office 
reported that “[n]ationwide, about 130 times more animal waste is 
produced than human waste—roughly 5 tons for every U.S. citizen—
and some operations with hundreds of thousands of animals produce 
as much waste as a town or a city.”125 Inadequate waste 
management—such as applying manure as “fertilizer” on frozen 
winter fields or in quantities far in excess of actual need; and use of 
 
 118. See FERTILE GROUND, supra note 103, at 6.  
 119. See Donald L. Hey, Nitrogen Farming: Harvesting a Different Crop, 4 WETLAND 
MATTERS (Nov. 1999), at http://www.wetlands-initiative.org/pages/page80.html.  
 120. See POLLUTION PARALYSIS, supra note 92, at 5; see also EPA and USDA, Unified 
National Strategy for Animal Feeding Operations, at § 2.2 (Mar. 9, 1999), at 
http://www.epa.gov/npdes/pubs/finafost.htm [hereinafter Unified National Strategy].  
 121. 1998 WATER QUALITY REPORT, supra note 1, at 130. 
 122. See FERTILE GROUND, supra note 108, at 7. 
 123. Id. at 9.  
 124. See Unified National Strategy, at § 2.1 ; RIBAUDO, ECONOMICS OF WATER QUALITY 
PROTECTION, supra note 18, at 10; see also Ken Silverstein, Meat Factories, SIERRA (Jan. 
1999), at http://www.sierraclub.org/sieria/199901/cafo.asp.  
 125. General Accounting Office, Animal Agriculture: Waste Management Practices, 
GAO/RCED 99-205, at 1 (July 1999), available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/ 1999/rc99205. 
pdf.  
 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p 21 Williams book pages.doc  12/17/2002 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
48 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 9:21 
 
poorly constructed or poorly maintained waste containment 
facilities—result in spills, leaks, and runoff of these wastes—often in 
very large quantities.126 
These and other pollutants, their associated agricultural activities, 
and their impacts on water quality are summarized in the following 
table:  
Agricultural impacts on water quality127 
Agricultural 
Activity 
Impacts on Surface Water Quality 
 
Tillage/ 
ploughing  
Sediment/turbidity: Sediments carry phosphorus 
and pesticides adsorbed to sediment particles; 
siltation of river beds and loss of habitat, 
spawning ground, etc.  
Fertilizing Runoff of nutrients, especially phosphorus, 
leading to eutrophication causing taste and odor 
in public water supply, excess algae growth 
leading to deoxygenation of water and fish kills.  
Manure Spreading Carried out as a fertilizer activity; spreading on 
frozen ground results in high levels of 
contamination of receiving waters by pathogens, 
metals, phosphorus and nitrogen leading to 
eutrophication and potential contamination.  
Pesticides Runoff of pesticides leads to contamination of 
surface water and biota; dysfunction of ecological 
system in surface waters by loss of top predators 
due to growth inhibition and reproductive failure; 
public health impacts from eating contaminated 
fish. Pesticides are carried as dust by wind over 
very long distances and contaminate aquatic 
systems 1000s of miles away (e.g. 
tropical/subtropical pesticides found in Arctic 
mammals).  
 
 126. Id.; CESSPOOLS OF SHAME, supra note 100, at 3-4.  
 127. Table adapted from FOOD AND AGRICULTURAL ORGANIZATION, CONTROL OF WATER 
POLLUTION FROM AGRICULTURE, Table 5 (1996), at http://www.fao.org/docrep/W2598E/ 
w2598e04.htm#agricultural_impacts_on_water_quality (last visited Mar. 22, 2002). 
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Agricultural 
Activity 
Impacts on Surface Water Quality 
 
Feedlots/ 
animal 
corrals 
Contamination of surface water with many 
pathogens (bacteria, viruses, etc.) leading to 
chronic public health problems. Also 
contamination by metals contained in urine and 
feces. 
Irrigation Runoff of salts leading to salinization of surface 
waters; runoff of fertilizers and pesticides to 
surface waters with ecological damage, 
bioaccumulation in edible fish species, etc. High 
levels of trace elements such as selenium can 
occur with serious ecological damage and 
potential human health impacts. 
II. THE CURRENT FEDERAL FRAMEWORK FOR AGRICULTURAL 
NONPOINT SOURCE POLLUTION 
People have been cognizant for some time of the large impact that 
agriculture has on water resources. A glut of federal programs 
address, directly or indirectly, agricultural water pollution.128 
Nonetheless, the aggressiveness with which federal agencies may 
pursue efforts to control agricultural nonpoint source pollution is 
significantly constrained by existing statutory authorities. 
Agriculture, in a very real sense, has enjoyed a free ride in existing 
water quality programs: there is virtually no direct regulatory controls 
on agricultural practices that contribute to nonpoint source pollution 
and the costs of those in place are largely underwritten by public 
subsidies. This section provides an overview of existing federal 
programs under the Clean Water Act. Programs administered by 
 
 128. A 1999 report by the General Accounting Office identified thirty-five federal 
programs representing a “broad array of activities, reflecting diversity in both the nature of 
nonpoint source pollution and the remedies needed to address it.” General Accounting Office, 
Water Quality: Federal Role in Addressing—and Contributing to—Nonpoint Source Pollution, 
Report No. GAO/RCED 99-45, at 25 (Feb. 1999) [hereinafter GAO Report 99-45]. Some of the 
more prominent federal programs not discussed in this Article include the Federal Insecticide, 
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA); the Endangered Species Act (ESA); the Safe 
Drinking Water Act (SDWA); and the Clean Air Act. For discussion of how these programs 
may affect agricultural water pollution, see Ruhl, supra note 5, at 305-09 (Clean Air Act), 309-
12 (FIFRA), 321-23 (ESA); GAO Report 99-45, supra, at 30-31 (SDWA).  
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other federal agencies, most prominently the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture (USDA), are described in a more summary manner. 
A. Clean Water Act Regulatory Programs for “Point Sources” 
The Clean Water Act authorizes a number of programs that 
address or have effects on agricultural water pollution. These 
programs include: the section 402 National Pollutant Discharge 
Elimination System (NPDES);129 the section 404 Dredged and Fill 
Material Permit Program (section 404 program);130 a number of 
planning requirements and grant programs, including the section 303 
TMDL program and the section 319 Nonpoint Source Control 
Program;131 and a few regional programs.132  
The first two programs, the NPDES and section 404 permitting 
programs, are the major regulatory programs in the CWA, and both 
are limited to controlling discharges from point sources. The 
remaining programs do not authorize direct federal regulation of 
nonpoint sources, but rely instead on incentives to induce the states to 
implement programs designed to control nonpoint source pollution.  
The absence of direct federal controls on nonpoint source 
pollution in the CWA has, until very recently, had the effect of 
deemphasizing the water quality objectives of the CWA in favor of 
the relatively less complex and administratively more feasible 
objective of implementing technology-based standards for point 
sources.133 To be sure, the CWA includes provisions for imposing 
more stringent, enforceable limitations on point sources if the 
technology-based standards prove insufficient to meet water quality 
 
 129. 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2001). 
 130. Id. § 1344. 
 131. Id. §§ 1313(d), 1329.  
 132. The regional programs address the Chesapeake Bay, the Great Lakes, Long Island 
Sound, and Lake Champlain. For a good overview of these programs, see Robert Adler, 
Addressing Barriers to Watershed Protection, 25 ENVTL. L. 973, 1070-77 (1995) [hereinafter 
Alder, Watershed Protection]. Professor Adler also discusses several other CWA programs, 
including the Clean Lakes and Estuary programs. Id. at 1077-79.  
 133. See generally WILLIAM H. RODGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (1986); Adler, 
Watershed Protection, supra note 132, at 1038 (1995); James Boyd, The New Face of the Clean 
Water Act: A Critical Review of the EPA’s New TMDL Rules, 11 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 
39 (2000); Caputo, supra note 2.  
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standards.134 But the larger task of ensuring an ambient water quality 
that minimally satisfies the CWA’s ambition for “fishable and 
swimmable” waters is relegated to a complex and confusing array of 
planning requirements that have yielded few enforceable controls.135  
1. The NPDES Program and Agricultural Pollution  
Section 402 of the CWA establishes the NPDES, a nationwide 
permitting program applicable to all point sources of water 
pollution.136 The CWA defines a point source as “any discernible, 
confined and discrete conveyance . . . from which pollutants are or 
may be discharged.”137 While this language may be interpreted to 
include agricultural practices that are sometimes viewed as 
contributors to nonpoint source pollution,138 most agricultural 
practices have escaped the NPDES program’s regulatory net. In part, 
this is due to the nature of much agricultural pollution—it is difficult 
to characterize as discharges from a “discernible, confined and 
discrete conveyance”—and, more expansively, to the express 
exclusion of “agricultural stormwater discharges and return flows 
from irrigated agriculture” from the CWA’s definition of a point 
source.139 
 
 134. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(b)(1)(C); 1312(b)(2)(A); 1313(d); 1314(l).  
 135. See Adler, Integrated Approaches, supra note 2, at 215-16 (describing water quality 
provisions of the CWA as “a series of somewhat confusing, overlapping planning and 
implementation requirements spread throughout various sections and subsections of the Act”). 
 136. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a).  
 137. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14).  
 138. See Concerned Area Residents for the Env’t v. Southview Farm, 34 F.3d 114 (2d Cir. 
1994) (holding that manure spreading operations of a dairy farm constitute a point source for 
purposes of CWA). The decision in this case caused an outcry from the agricultural community, 
who regarded the activities as nonpoint source pollution immune from CWA regulation. The 
House of Representatives passed legislation to overrule the decision, but the provision was 
never enacted as law. See Ruth A. Moore, Controlling Agricultural Nonpoint Source Pollution: 
The New York Experience, 45 DRAKE L. REV. 103, 115-18 (1997).  
 139. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14). These exclusions from the definition of a point source were 
added by Congress in 1977, effectively overruling the decision in NRDC v. Costle, 568 F.2d 
1369 (D.C. Cir. 1977), in which the court rejected EPA’s attempt to exempt discharges of these 
sorts from the CWA’s permit requirements. Congress also inserted the exclusion for irrigation 
return flows in section 402—the NPDES provisions—providing: “[EPA] shall not require a 
permit under this section for discharges composed entirely of return flows from irrigated 
agriculture, nor shall [EPA] directly or indirectly, require any State to require such a permit.” 
33 U.S.C. § 1342(l). On these exclusions, see Ruhl, supra note 5, at 294-96.  
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Permits for discharges from point sources must include 
categorical, technology-based effluent limitations established by the 
EPA140 or, where the EPA has not promulgated such limitations, 
control requirements based on the permit writer’s “best professional 
judgment” about what cleanup technologies individual sources can 
implement.141 In addition, point sources may be subject to more 
stringent control requirements if necessary to meet ambient water 
quality standards.142 
States may administer an EPA-approved permit program within 
their respective jurisdictions in place of the EPA-administered 
NPDES program. These programs are often described as State 
Pollutant Discharge Elimination Systems (SPDES).143 
A major category of agricultural sources that has a significant 
impact on water quality is animal feeding operations (AFOs). The 
industry is very large, accounting for half of all sales in U.S. 
agriculture.144 The variety of facilities that can properly be considered 
AFOs is quite diverse, including livestock farms, feedlots, pens, 
corrals, roundup areas, wintering operations, dairies, stockyards, 
auctions houses, poultry operations, stables, racetracks, fairs, and 
rodeos.145 Some very large AFOs are subject to direct regulation 
 
 140. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b); see E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112 
(1977). 
 141. Mark C. Van Putten & Bradley D. Jackson, The Dilution of the Clean Water Act, 19 
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 863, 882 (1986); see 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(1) (permits issued “prior to 
the taking of necessary implementing actions” must include “such conditions as [EPA] 
determines are necessary to carry out the provisions of [the CWA]”).  
 142. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(C).  
 143. See id. § 1342(b)-(c), (n) (full and partial state programs). EPA retains important 
oversight functions. See id. § 1342(c)-(d). For a list of states with approved NPDES programs, 
see http://cfpub.epa.gov/npdes/statestats.cfm?program_id=12 (last modified Mar. 20, 2001).  
 144. EPA & USDA, Unified National Strategy for Animal Feeding Operations, 63 Fed. 
Reg. 50192, 50193 n.1 (Sept. 21, 1998) [hereinafter Unified National Strategy]. This document 
is a draft version of the Unified National Strategy, supra note 120, that the agencies submitted 
for public comment. 
 145. See National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System, supra note 15, at 2960, 3005. 
An AFO is a facility where animals are “stabled or confined and fed or maintained for a total of 
45 days or more in any 12-month period”; (ii) “Crops, vegetation forage growth, or post-harvest 
residues are not sustained in the normal growing season over any portion of the lot or facility.” 
40 C.F.R. § 122.23(b)(1)(ii) (2001). Cases have addressed this definition and concluded that the 
second criterion—that crops are not sustained over any portion of the facility—does not exclude 
from the definition of an AFO farms where crops are grown on fields adjacent to feedlots; thus, 
“[t]he vegetation criterion applies to the lot or facility in which the animals are confined.” 
 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol9/iss1/3
p 21 Williams book pages.doc  12/17/2002 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2002]  When Voluntary, Incentive-Based Controls Fail 53 
 
under the CWA’s NPDES program as “concentrated animal feeding 
operations” (CAFOs).146 Technically, CAFOs are not nonpoint 
sources because they are expressly included in the CWA’s definition 
of point sources.147  
Until recently, CAFOs have received little federal or state 
regulatory attention.148 Under current regulations, AFOs are not 
considered CAFOs—and thus point sources subject to NPDES 
permits and effluent limitations—unless they meet restrictive 
regulatory criteria based on a three-tier approach. Subject to 
important exceptions, facilities that confine more than 1000 “animal 
units,” facilities that confine between 300 and 1000 animal units and 
meet certain additional criteria, and facilities determined on a case-
by-case basis to contribute significantly to water pollution, are 
CAFOs.149 The technology-based effluent limitation for CAFOs 
 
Concerned Area Residents for the Env’t v. Southview Farm, 34 F.3d 114, 123 (2d Cir. 1994). 
EPA has proposed to clarify the definition of an AFO in new CAFO regulations. The proposal 
provides: 
An animal feeding operation or AFO is a facility where animals (other than aquatic 
animals) have been, are, or will be stabled or confined and fed or maintained for a total 
of 45 days or more in any 12-month period. Animals are not considered to be stabled 
or confined when they are in areas such as pastures or rangeland that sustain crops or 
forage growth during the entire time that animals are present. Animal feeding 
operations include both the production area and land application area . . . . 
Id. 
 146. See Copeland, supra note 113. According to EPA and USDA: 
Approximately 450,000 agricultural operations nationwide confine animals. (2) USDA 
data indicate that the vast majority of farms with livestock are small. About 85% of 
these farms have fewer than 250 animal units (AUs).(3) This data comes from an 
analysis of the 1992 Agricultural Census. An AU is equal to roughly one beef cow, 
therefore 1,000 AUs is equal to 1,000 beef cows or equivalent number of other 
animals. Of these, in 1992 about 6,600 had more than 1,000 AUs and are considered to 
be large operations.  
Unified National Strategy, supra note 120, at § 2.1.  
 147. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14). 
 148. See generally LOCATING LIVESTOCK, infra note 152, at 6-7.  
 149. An animal feeding operation may be a point source if it meets the definition of a 
“concentrated animal feeding operation.” 40 C.F.R. § 122.23(a). That definition lists the 
following criteria: (1) the facility confines more than 1000 “animal units,” or (2) the facility 
confines more than 300 animal units and either “pollutants are discharged into navigable waters 
through a manmade ditch, flushing system or other similar man-made device; or pollutants are 
discharged directly into waters of the United States which originate outside of and pass over, 
across, or through the facility or otherwise come into direct contact with the animals confined in 
the operation.” 40 C.F.R. § 122.23, Appendix B. An “animal unit” is a benchmark used to 
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mandates that permits specify a “no discharge” to surface waters 
limitation, with an exception for discharges during extreme storm 
events.150 
A large number of AFOs falling within the criteria for CAFOs 
have nonetheless escaped regulation. A Congressional Research 
Service Report states that less than thirty percent of AFOs meeting 
the size requirements in the EPA’s definition of a CAFO—or roughly 
2,000 out of 6,000—had permits as of February, 2000.151 Another 
report provides a much higher estimate—as many as 18,000—of the 
number of CAFOs that should have permits, but do not.152 The report 
also notes that “in roughly half the states, no CAFOs have NPDES 
permits.”153 Moreover, the EPA reported that of the permits that had 
been issued, only 760 were current at the end of 1995.154  
The low rates at which AFOs are included in the NPDES program 
is, in part, due to EPA’s definition of a CAFO, which excludes any 
AFO that does not discharge pollutants except in the event of a “25-
year, 24-hour storm event.”155 Additional reasons for the relatively 
low rate of coverage by the NPDES program include: an historical 
tendency of regulators to focus on urban rather than rural water 
quality, ignoring AFOs in favor of large municipal and industrial 
 
equalize the waste characteristics of various kinds of animals. Excluded from CAFO status are 
animal feeding operations that “discharge[] only in the event of a 25 year, 24-hour storm 
event.” Id. Animal feeding operations that do not meet the CAFO criteria may nonetheless be 
treated as a CAFO subject to the NPDES program if, on a case-by-case basis, it is determined 
that the facility is “a significant contributor of pollution to the waters of the United States.” 40 
C.F.R. § 122.23(c). 
 150. Feedlots Point Source Category, 40 C.F.R. § 412 (1999) (effluent limitations on 
feedlots).  
 151. Copeland, supra note 113, at 8. 
 152. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INSTITUTE, LOCATING LIVESTOCK: HOW WATER POLLUTION 
CONTROL EFFORTS CAN USE INFORMATION FROM STATE REGULATORY PROGRAMS 6 (June 
1999), available at http://www.eli-org/pdf/rreafo99.pdf [hereinafter LOCATING LIVESTOCK].  
 153. Id. 
 154. See Copeland, supra note 113, at 8 (citing Roberta Parry, Agricultural Phosphorous 
and Water Quality: A U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Perspective, 27 J. ENVTL. 
QUALITY 258 (1998)). 
 155. See supra note 149; Copeland, supra note 113, at 8 (noting that “disputes between 
regulators and agricultural operators over whether particular facilities meet the regulatory 
threshold, such as whether the regulations apply to feedlots that claim to have no discharge” is a 
factor explaining low level of permitting); Water Keeper Alliance, Inc. v. Smithfield Foods, 
Inc., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21314, at 7-8 (E.D.N.C. 2001) (defendant unsuccessfully moved to 
dismiss CWA citizen suit on grounds that it was not CAFO due to the 25-year storm exclusion).  
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point sources; changes in waste management technology that have 
rendered EPA’s rules largely irrelevant; state programs that address 
CAFOs outside the NPDES program; and difficulties in identifying 
and locating these facilities.156 Even those CAFOs that operate under 
NPDES permits traditionally have not been subject to restrictions on 
practices that may have significant impacts on water quality—such as 
land application of manure and wastewater—and are inspected for 
compliance only after citizen complaints or accidental releases.157 
Moreover, the NPDES program for CAFOs has largely proceeded on 
the basis of general permits,158 which may be difficult to enforce and 
which tend to make effective public participation difficult.159  
In recent years, CAFOs have come under intense scrutiny, and 
with good reason.160 Releases of wastes from these facilities in North 
Carolina and Missouri have caused large fish kills.161 Manure 
generated by these large animal factories is often spread over land 
and may contribute substantial amounts of nutrients, sediment, 
pathogens, heavy metals, hormones, antibiotics, and ammonia to 
surface waters. Nutrient loadings of nitrogen and phosphorous from 
AFOs are a major cause of water quality impairments.162 Animal 
 
 156. Copeland, supra note 113, at 8; LOCATING LIVESTOCK, supra note 152, at 6-7; 
ANIMAL AGRICULTURE, supra note 125, at 61. 
 157. Id.; see RIBAUDO, ECONOMICS OF WATER QUALITY PROTECTION, supra note 18, at 11 
(noting survey that in ten Midwest states “few States actively inspect . . . [CAFOs] for 
problems, including the integrity of storage structures” and that “wastes were leaking from half 
of North Carolina’s lagoons built before 1993”).  
 158. In 2001, EPA estimated that seventy percent of permitted CAFOs were operating 
under general permits. National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System, supra note 15, at 
3042.  
 159. For a sample general permit for CAFOs, see National Pollutant Discharge Elimination 
System General Permit and Reporting Requirements for Discharges From Concentrated Animal 
Feeding Operations, 58 Fed. Reg. 7610 (Feb. 8, 1993). On the potential problems of 
enforcement of general permit terms, see Staci J. Pratt et al., A Comparison of US and UK Law 
Regarding Pollution from Agricultural Runoff, 45 DRAKE L. REV. 159, 171-73 (1997). Many 
states have also issued general permits for CAFOs under EPA’s delegated authority to 
administer the NPDES program within the state. For an example, and a general discussion of 
general permits, see John H. Davidson, South Dakota Groundwater Protection Law, 40 S.D. L. 
REV. 1, 60-61 (1995).  
 160. For a review of the water pollution contribution for which AFOs are responsible, see 
ANIMAL AGRICULTURE, supra note 125, at 8-27. 
 161. See Bob Schildgen, Murphy’s Laws: 1. Hogs Rule 2. You Pay; Environmental 
Hazards of Hog Farms, 81 SIERRA 29 (May 1996), available at http://www.sierraclub.org/ 
sierra/199605/priorities.asp. 
 
 162. See ANIMAL AGRICULTURE, supra note 125, at 10; Danielle Nierenberg, Toxic 
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manure is also suspected to have contributed to outbreaks of 
Pfiesteria along the Mid-Atlantic seaboard and the tragic 
cryptosporidium contamination in Milwaukee.163 The amount of 
manure that may be generated and stored by these operations is 
enormous. For example, in Concerned Area Residents for the 
Environment v. Southview Farms,164 the court noted that the 
defendant’s dairy farm had five lagoons for storing manure, one of 
which had a capacity of six to eight million gallons of liquid cow 
manure.165 Even this pales in comparison to a waste lagoon in North 
Carolina which, when breached in 1995, released twenty-five million 
gallons of hog waste, killing nearly all aquatic life in a seventeen-
mile stretch of the New River.166 Citizens have become more 
aggressive in their opposition to CAFOs. In fact, a number of citizen 
suits have been initiated under the CWA in recent years, sometimes 
meeting with success.167 One important strategy for bringing about 
greater control of water pollution from these facilities is to promote 
opportunities for greater citizen involvement and enforcement.168 
As part of the Clinton Administration’s Clean Water Action Plan, 
the EPA and the USDA have jointly issued a Unified National 
Strategy for Animal Feeding Operations (Unified National 
Strategy).169 A major component of this initiative is an overhaul, and 
strengthening, of the EPA’s CAFO rules. The EPA concluded that 
 
Fertility, 14:2 WORLD WATCH 30 (Mar. 1, 2001).  
 163. Unified National Strategy, supra note 120, at § 2.2.  
 164. 34 F.3d 114 (2d Cir. 1994). 
 165. Id. at 116. 
 166. See Anita K. Chancey, “Clean Water Act Compliance Audit Program for Pork 
Producers”: How was such an Agreement Reached Between EPA and the National Pork 
Producers?, 7 MO. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 62, 64 (2000).  
 167. See Concerned Area Residents for the Env’t v. Southview Farm, 34 F.3d 114 (2d Cir. 
1994); Carr v. Alta Verde Indus., Inc., 931 F.2d 1055 (5th Cir. 1991); Water Keeper Alliance, 
Inc. v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., 2001 U.S. Dist. Lexis 21314, at 7-8 (E.D.N.C. 2000); Idaho 
Rural Council v. Bosma, 143 F. Supp. 2d 1169 (D. Idaho 2001); Cmty. Ass’n for Restoration of 
the Env’t v. Henry Bosma Dairy, 65 F. Supp. 2d 1129 (E.D. Wash. 1999); American Canoe 
Ass’n v. Murphy Farms, Inc., 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21402 (E.D. N.C. 1998); Weber v. Trinity 
Meadows Raceway, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15302 (N.D. Tex. 1996). 
 168. A significant issue concerns the tendency of new CAFOs to locate in areas where the 
population is generally poor or of an overwhelmingly minority racial composition, raising 
“environmental justice” issues. See Becky Gillette, Makin’ Bacon, E MAGAZINE, (June 1, 
2000), at http://www.alternet.org/story.html?StoryID=9263.  
 169. Unified National Strategy, supra note 120.  
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“CAFO programs var[y] from state-to-state, as does the 
implementation of NPDES programs for CAFOs,” and that “[a]s 
animal production continues to become more industrialized 
nationwide, a coherent and systematic approach to implementing 
minimum standards is needed to ensure consistent protection of water 
quality.”170 EPA proposed new CAFO regulations on January 12, 
2001.171  
The EPA’s proposed rule attempts to ensure greater protection of 
water quality from animal feeding operations in two basic ways. 
First, the rule expands the number of AFOs that are subject to the 
NPDES program. Second, the rule addresses the most significant 
threats that AFOs pose to water quality—discharges of manure and 
wastewater from both poorly designed waste storage facilities and 
from runoff from fields on which excessive amounts of these wastes 
have been placed.  
To expand the coverage of the NPDES to more AFOs, the EPA 
proposed two alternatives to determine which AFOs are CAFOs, and 
thus subject to regulation under the NPDES permitting program. The 
first is a two-tier structure under which AFOs would be considered 
CAFOs if they contain a threshold number of animal units (reduced 
from the current threshold of 1,000 to 500) or are designated as 
CAFOs on a case-by-case basis.172 The second alternative would 
retain the existing three-tier approach, but include more stringent 
conditions applicable to AFOs in the middle, 300-1000 animal unit 
tier.173 In addition, the EPA proposed to eliminate the 25-year, 24-
hour storm exception, expressing concern that many AFOs claiming 
the exception are “improperly interpreting which discharges are the 
result of 25-year 24-hour storms and chronic rainfall which may 
result in breaches and overflows of storage systems,” or ignoring 
“discharges from improper land application of manure and 
wastewater.”174 The EPA estimated that the number of AFOs required 
 
 170. National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System, supra note 15, at 2970. 
 171. Id. at 2960. EPA’s action was in part taken in response to a lawsuit, Natural 
Resources Defense Council v. Reilly, No. 89-2980 (D.D.C.), which was settled by a consent 
decree. See National Pollutant Discharge Elimination Systems, supra note 15, at 2962.  
 172. National Pollutant Discharge Elimination Systems, supra note 15, at 2996-98. 
 173. Id. at 2999-3003.  
 174. Id. at 3006. 
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to obtain permits would rise from 12,660 under the current 
regulations to 25,540 under the two-tier proposal or 31,930 under the 
revised three-tier proposal.175 The amount of all AFO-generated 
manure that would be covered by these options was estimated by 
EPA at sixty-four percent for the two-tier approach and seventy-two 
percent for the three-tier approach.176 
The rule strengthens effluent limitations governing CAFOs. 
Among other things, certain CAFOs must assess whether there is a 
hydrologic connection to surface waters from groundwater beneath 
feedlots and manure storage areas. In addition, a zero discharge 
limitation is imposed on certain CAFOs. Routine inspections of 
production areas, requirements for handling dead animals, and better 
monitoring and reporting requirements are also mandated.177 
To address additional threats to water quality posed by discharges 
of manure and AFO wastewater, the EPA expanded the definition of 
AFOs and CAFOs to include not only the animal production area but 
also “land application areas,” meaning “any land to which a CAFO’s 
manure and wastewater is applied (e.g., crop fields, fields, pasture) 
that is under the control of the CAFO owner or operator, whether 
through ownership or a lease or contract.”178 The proposed rule also 
clarifies that discharges of pollutants due to land application of 
manure may be considered point source discharges subject to NPDES 
regulation. The CWA’s exclusion of “agricultural stormwater 
discharges”179 will apply to discharges associated with land 
application of manure only if “proper agricultural practices” are 
observed.180 “Proper agricultural practices” governing land 
application of manure or wastewater must be based on the nutrient 
needs of crops as determined through periodic soil sampling. 
Discharges from land where manure or wastewater are applied at 
rates that exceed those calculated under prescribed methods would 
 
 175. Id. at 3003, tbls. 7-8.  
 176. Id. at 2987.  
 177. See EPA, Proposed Regulations to Address Water Pollution from Concentrated 
Animal Feeding Operations 3 (Mar. 2001) [hereinafter CAFO Factsheet], available at 
http://cfpub.epa.gov/npdes/afo/caforule.cfm?program_id=7.  
 178. National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System, supra note 15, at 3010. 
 179. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (2001). 
 180. See National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System, supra note 15, at 3029-32.  
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fall outside the agricultural stormwater exemption.181  
Land application restrictions would extend beyond CAFOs to 
those who apply CAFO-generated manure and wastewaters to land, 
as well as to AFOs that engage in such practices. Unless these 
facilities observe proper agricultural practices, resulting discharges 
would be considered point source discharges subject to NPDES 
permits.182 For CAFOs, land application of manure and wastewater is 
controlled by permit conditions requiring approved “permit nutrient 
plans,” which prohibit manure or wastewater applications within one 
hundred feet of surface waters and restrict applications to frozen, 
snow-covered, or saturated grounds.183  
EPA’s proposal also attempts to account for changes in the 
structure of the animal feeding operations industry, which have 
tended to blur lines of responsibility for animal waste management. 
Currently, many feedlot owners do not own the animals they raise. 
Rather, they contract with meat processors who retain ownership of 
the animals and often prescribe exacting conditions on how the 
animals are to be raised and housed.184  
As farmers become increasingly integrated into the agribusiness 
food chain, they lose control over the totality of the production 
process, therefore shifting more and more to the role of “technology 
applicators,” as opposed to managers making informed and 
independent decisions. Recent USDA surveys of contract poultry 
farmers in the United States found that, in seeking outside advice on 
their operations, these farmers now turn first to bankers and then to 
the corporations that hold their contracts. If the contracting 
corporation is also the same company that is selling the farm its seed 
and fertilizer, as is often the case, there is a strong likelihood that the 
company’s procedures will be followed. That corporation, as a global 
enterprise with no compelling local ties, is also less likely to be 
concerned about the pollution and resource degradation created by 
those procedures, at least compared with a farmer who is rooted in 
that community. Grower contracts generally disavow any 
 
 181. Id. at 3030.  
 182. Id. at 3032. 
 183. Id. at 3030.  
 184. Id. at 3023; see also LOCATING LIVESTOCK, supra note 152, at 39. 
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environmental liability.185  
In recognition of these increasingly common practices, the EPA 
proposed to require that all entities that exert substantial operational 
control over a CAFO be considered “operators” and co-permitted 
under the NPDES program. Co-permittees would be held jointly 
responsible for the management of the animal wastes, particularly for 
manure generated in excess of what can be managed properly on-
site.186  
EPA’s proposed rule continues to endorse the use of general 
permits for most CAFOs.187 Under this approach, a CAFO would be 
considered to have obtained a permit upon filing a Notice of Intent 
(NOI) with the permitting authority. The NOI must include certain 
information and, once filed, signifies the intention of the permittee to 
comply with the conditions and requirements of the general permit.188 
The most serious drawback with this approach is the absence of 
opportunity for public involvement in permitting decisions and 
difficulty in enforcing specific permit conditions. The EPA proposed 
to address these concerns by suggesting criteria for when general 
permits may not be appropriate for CAFOs. Under the proposal, the 
permitting authority may require individual permits for CAFOs 
where: (1) the CAFO is located in an environmentally sensitive area; 
(2) the CAFO has a history of compliance or operational problems; 
(3) the CAFO is considered an “exceptionally large” operation; and 
(4) CAFOs that are significantly expanding their existing 
operations.189 These criteria are to be established by the permitting 
authority through a public process. In addition, any member of the 
public may petition the permitting authority to require an individual 
permit for a CAFO covered by a general permit.190  
EPA’s rules are not due to be finalized until the end of 2002. 
Permit requirements will not go into effect for many CAFOs until 
 
 185. Brian Halweil, Where Have All the Farmers Gone?, 13:5 WORLD WATCH 12 (Sept. 1, 
2000).  
 186. National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System, supra note 15, at 3025-27.  
 187. Id. at 3042.  
 188. Id.  
 189. Id. at 3043.  
 190. Id. 
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2006.191  
The proposed rules are a substantial step in the right direction, but 
there is considerable room for improvement. First, EPA opted for 
general permits, based on the supposition that individual permits for 
all CAFOs would be too burdensome for permitting authorities.192 As 
a practical matter, some resort to general permits may be needed. But 
a more satisfactory approach would be to start with the assumption 
that all CAFOs, like all other point sources, must obtain individual 
permits, and then carve out some categories of CAFOs for treatment 
under general permits. In this way, meaningful public participation 
could be extended to a larger number of permit decisions, enhancing 
the possibility of appropriate and enforceable permit conditions. 
Requiring individual, pre-construction permits for new or expanding 
CAFOs may be particularly important. Through a public process, 
greater scrutiny can be given to critical decisions before they become 
a fait accompli, such as the location of the CAFO itself or of waste 
containment structures.  
Second, the proposed rule, even in its most expansive iterations, 
leaves large numbers of AFOs outside the reach of the NPDES. 
While estimates of the total number of AFOs vary, it appears that 
EPA’s rules may exempt anywhere from roughly 185,000 to 340,000 
AFOs as “nonpoint sources” not subject to the CWA’s regulatory 
program.193 Put in different terms, the proposed rule may exempt at 
least twenty-eight percent of total AFO manure production from the 
NPDES program, leaving control of these facilities to nonpoint 
source programs.194  
 
 191. CAFO Factsheet, supra note 177, at 3. 
 192. See National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System, supra note 15, at 3043. 
 193. In a supplemental notice, EPA provided data showing that the total number of AFOs 
may be somewhere between 375,700 (EPA’s estimate at the time the rules were proposed) and 
218,320 (a USDA estimate). Notice of Data Availability; National Pollutant Discharge 
Elimination System Permit Regulation and Effluent Limitations Guidelines and Standards for 
Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations, 66 Fed. Reg. 58555, 58568 (Nov. 21, 2001). As 
noted above, EPA proposed rule would capture, at most, about 31,000 AFO’s within the 
NPDES program.  
 194. The Unified National Strategy calls for all AFOs to implement Comprehensive 
Nutrient Management Plans (CNMPs), which “should address, as necessary, feed management, 
manure handling and storage, land application of manure, land management, record keeping, 
and other utilization options.” Unified National Strategy, supra note 120, at §§ 3.1, 3.2. But, as 
the Unified National Strategy emphasized: 
 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p 21 Williams book pages.doc  12/17/2002 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
62 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 9:21 
 
2. The Section 404 Permit Program 
Apart from the NPDES program, the CWA also includes a permit 
program governing discharges of “dredged and fill material” into 
navigable waters.195 This program, referred to as the section 404 
program, is administered jointly by the EPA and the Army Corps of 
Engineers with the Corps responsible for issuing permits.196  
The protection of wetlands on agricultural lands received a serious 
blow recently by the Supreme Court’s decision in Solid Waste 
Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.197 The 
Court rejected a twenty-five-year-old standing interpretation of 
section 404, and concluded that the Corps’ jurisdiction does not reach 
to the extent of Congress’s powers to regulate wetlands under the 
Commerce Clause of the Constitution. The Court held that, under 
section 404, the Corps may not regulate “isolated waters” and 
wetlands but rather is limited to regulation of “wetlands adjacent to 
‘navigable waters.’”198 It is estimated that the Court’s ruling will 
remove eight million acres of agricultural wetlands from the 
protection of the section 404 program.199 The impact of the Court’s 
decision may pose a significant threat of increased agricultural 
nonpoint source pollution. 
While the precise jurisdictional reach of this program remains 
 
For the vast majority of AFOs, voluntary efforts will be the principal approach to assist 
owners and operators in developing and implementing site-specific CNMPs, and in 
reducing water pollution and public health risks associated with AFOs. While CNMPs 
are not required for AFOs participating only in voluntary programs, they are strongly 
encouraged as the best possible means of managing potential water quality and public 
health impacts from these operations. 
Id. § 4.1. 
 195. 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1994). 
 196. Id.  
 197. 531 U.S. 159 (2001). 
 198. Id. at 171.  
 199. Congressional Research Service, Issue Brief for Congress, Soil and Water 
Conservation Issues, at 6 (Jan. 29, 2002), at http://www.cnie.org/NLE/CRS/abstract. 
cfm?NLEid=17007 [hereinafter Soil and Conservation Issues]. According to another report, the 
Court’s decision will remove 30-60% of the nation’s wetlands from the section 404 program, 
including 79% of wetlands in Wisconsin, 40% in Nebraska, 74% in Indiana, and 33% in 
Delaware. Jon Kusler, The SWANCC Decision and State Regulation of Wetlands, 1, at 
http://aswm.org/swancc/aswm-int.pdf (last visited Mar. 20, 2002). The cited Web page is an 
excellent source of information on the implications of the Supreme Court’s decision. 
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controversial,200 the program applies to various agricultural activities 
that destroy or degrade wetlands. Protection of wetlands can mitigate 
some of the effects of agricultural practices that contribute to 
nonpoint source pollution.201 The positioning in the landscape of 
some wetlands in the transitional zone between uplands and water 
resources, such as lakes and rivers, makes these wetlands natural and 
highly effective pollution controls. Unique assemblages of wetland 
vegetation are effective in processing, removing, and storing a variety 
of pollutants, including sediment, nutrients, and some heavy 
metals.202 The EPA recently advocated the protection and restoration 
of wetlands as a significant measure to reduce the adverse effects of 
nonpoint source pollution.203 Accordingly, the degree to which the 
section 404 program protects wetlands significantly the amount of 
nonpoint source pollution that enters surface waters, as well as the 
costs of reducing nonpoint source pollution.204  
As an historical matter, agriculture is the single most destructive 
force on wetlands. Agriculture accounts for eighty percent of wetland 
conversions in the period 1954-74, with the annual rate of wetland 
losses of 593,000 acres.205 However, the rate of wetland loss to 
agriculture decreased after the passage of the section 404 program, 
but it still remains significant. From 1986 to 1997, twenty-six percent 
of wetlands losses were attributable to agriculture.206 The relationship 
 
 200. See id. at 4-5; Pat Parenteau, Position Paper on Clean Water Act Jurisdiction 
Determinations Pursuant to the Supreme Court’s January 9, 2001 Decision, Solid Waste of 
Northern Cook County v. United States Army Corps of Engineers (SWANCC), presented to 
Administrator Whitman, United States Environmental Protection Agency by the Association of 
State Wetland Managers and the Association of State Floodplain Managers (Dec. 2001), at 
http://aswm.org/Swance/position.pdf. 
 201. See generally EPA, NATIONAL MANAGEMENT MEASURES TO PROTECT AND RESTORE 
WETLANDS AND RIPARIAN AREAS FOR THE ABATEMENT OF NONPOINT SOURCE POLLUTION 
(Draft, June 21, 2001), available at http://www.epa.gov/owow/nps/wetmeasures/. 
 202. Id. at 13. 
 203. Id. at 14.  
 204. This is also one of the key conclusions of the Clinton Administration’s Clean Water 
Action Plan. See CLEAN WATER ACTION PLAN, supra note 1, at 38. 
 205. RALPH E. HEIMLICH ET AL., WETLANDS AND AGRICULTURE: PRIVATE INTERESTS AND 
PUBLIC BENEFITS, U.S.D.A. Agricultural Economic Report No. 765, at 20 (1998), available at 
http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/der7651 (last visited Apr. 22, 2002).  
 206. U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE, STATUS AND TRENDS OF WETLANDS IN THE 
CONTERMINOUS UNITED STATES 1986-1997, at 11 (2000), available at http://wetlands.fws.gov/ 
status-trends/SandT2000Report.pdf (last visited Apr. 22, 2002). 
 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p 21 Williams book pages.doc  12/17/2002 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
64 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 9:21 
 
between the section 404 program and agriculture has been, and 
continues to be, an uneasy and controversial one.207  
Many activities that involve mechanical destruction of wetlands 
and wetland functions will require a permit from the Corps of 
Engineers, but significant exceptions exist. The limited types of 
regulated activities, exemptions from the requirements of section 404 
for a number of agricultural activities, and actual program 
implementation may permit a significant amount of wetland 
conversion for agricultural use.  
The section 404 program exempts “normal farming, silviculture, 
and ranching activities such as plowing, seeding, cultivating, minor 
drainage, harvesting for the production of food, fiber, and forest 
products, or upland soil and water conservation practices from the 
permit requirement.”208 This exemption is, however, not as broad as it 
first appears. The CWA also includes a “recapture clause” under 
which the listed activities are subject to permits if they involve “[a]ny 
discharge of dredged or fill material into the navigable waters” and 
have as their “purpose bringing an area of the navigable waters into a 
use to which it was not previously subject, where the flow or 
circulation of navigable waters may be impaired or the reach of such 
waters be reduced . . . .”209 
Because of this recapture clause, the courts construe the 
exemption for “normal farming activities” quite narrowly.210 For 
example, in Borden Ranch Partnership v. United States Army Corps 
of Engineers,211 the court held that “deep-ripping” in wetlands—a 
process in which wetlands are disturbed by a tractor or bulldozer 
 
 207. See generally Joseph G. Theis, Wetlands Loss and Agriculture: The Failed Federal 
Regulation of Farming Activities Under Section 404 of the Clean Water Act, 9 PACE ENVTL. L. 
REV. 1 (1991); GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, WETLANDS: THE CORPS OF ENGINEERS’ 
ADMINISTRATION OF THE SECTION 404 PROGRAM, Report No. GAO/RCED-88-110 (1988).  
 208. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(f)(1)(A) (1994). Exemptions are also provided for “construction or 
maintenance of farm or stock ponds or irrigation ditches, or the maintenance of drainage 
ditches,” and “construction or maintenance of farm roads.” Id. § 1344(f)(1)(C), (E). Like the 
exemption for “normal farming activities,” these exemptions are subject to section 404(f)(2)’s 
“recapture” clause.  
 209. Id. § 1342(f)(2).  
 210. See United States v. Bruce, 41 F.3d 117, 124 (3d Cir. 1994); United States v. Akers, 
785 F.2d 814, 819 (9th Cir. 1986); Avoyelles Sportsmen’s League v. Marsh, 715 F.2d 897, 926 
(5th Cir. 1983). 
 211. 261 F.3d 810 (9th Cir. 2001). 
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dragging long metal prongs up to seven feet in length through the 
wetland212—is not exempt from section 404’s permit requirements as 
a “normal farming” activity.213 The court held:  
although the Corps cannot regulate a farmer who desires 
“merely to change from one wetland crop to another,” 
activities that require “substantial hydrological alterations” 
require a permit . . . . “[T]he intent of Congress in enacting the 
Act was to prevent conversion of wetlands to dry lands,” and 
we have classified “as non-exempt those activities which 
change a wetland’s hydrological regime.”214 
Nonetheless, some question exists about whether the recapture 
clause applies to farming in wetlands previously converted through 
means not regulated under section 404, i.e., by means other than a 
“discharge of dredged or fill material.”215 In addition, “prior 
converted cropland”—wetlands converted to agricultural use prior to 
December, 1985—is exempt from the section 404 program, even if it 
currently provides some measure of wetlands functions and values.216 
Because permits are required only for “discharges of dredged and 
fill material,” farmers may convert wetlands to agricultural uses 
without permits by resorting to unregulated techniques, such a 
draining or dredging operations that involve only limited “incidental 
fallback” into wetlands.217 A significant number of activities that 
 
 212. Id. at 812.  
 213. Id. at 819. 
 214. Id. at 815-16 (citing United States v. Akers, 785 F.2d 814, 820, 822 (9th Cir. 1986); 
see also United States v. Brace, 41 F.3d 117, 123-29 (3d Cir. 1994)). 
 215. See generally Memorandum from Lance Wood to All Division and District Counsels, 
“Evading 404 Jurisdiction by Pumping Water from Wetlands” (Apr. 10, 1990), reproduced in 
MARGARET N. STRAND, WETLANDS DESKBOOK 688 (2d ed. 1997). For a general discussion of 
the section 404 program and agricultural activities, see Memorandum from Lajuara S. Wilcher 
& Robert W. Page to the Field, “Clean Water Act Section 404 Regulatory Program and 
Agricultural Activities” (May 3, 1990), reproduced in MARGARET N. STRAND, supra, at 682.  
 216. See 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(8) (2001).  
 217. See Nat’l Mining Assoc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 145 F.3d 1399 (D.C. Cir. 
1998). The types of activities regulated under section 404 as “discharges of dredged and fill 
material” has been most controversial in circumstances where the alleged “discharge” involves 
“redepositing” of disturbed soils and vegetation in wetlands. The courts tend to apply a 
generous construction to the term “discharge.” See, e.g., Borden Ranch P’ship, 261 F.3d at 810 
(9th Cir. 2001); United States v. Deaton, 209 F.3d 331 (4th Cir. 2000); Avoyelles Sportsmen’s 
League, Inc. v. Marsh, 715 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1983). 
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convert wetlands for agricultural purposes may thus escape scrutiny 
under section 404. For example, in Orleans Audubon Society v. Lee, 
the Fifth Circuit upheld the Corps of Engineers’ conclusion that it 
lacked jurisdiction over the installation of a drainage system in 
wetlands, because no jurisdictional “discharges” existed.218 
Even for activities clearly regulated under section 404, applicable 
regulations do not categorically preclude conversion of wetlands for 
agricultural purposes. Instead, restraints on regulated activities in 
wetlands are structured by a complex balancing of economic, 
environmental, and other factors, and on conclusions about whether 
alternative locations for the activity in question are practicable.219 
Permit applicants have had remarkable success in convincing the 
Corps that their proposed activities satisfy these applicable criteria.220 
Generally, compensatory mitigation is required to offset losses of 
wetland functions and values in pursuit of a “no net loss” policy, but 
these mitigation requirements have been notoriously under-enforced, 
leading to significant losses of wetland functions and values.221 In 
addition, the Corps of Engineers’ “nationwide permit” program 
authorizes agricultural activities that degrade or destroy wetlands 
with little or no scrutiny by the Corps.222  
 
 218. 742 F.2d 901, 910-11 (5th Cir. 1984); see also Save Our Cmty. v. EPA, 971 F.2d 
1155, 1163-64 (5th Cir. 1992); United States v. Wilson, 133 F.3d 251, 258 (4th Cir. 1997) 
(Section 404 “does not prohibit a non-polluting method of draining a wetland.”). 
 219. See generally WETLANDS DESKBOOK, supra note 215, at 41-45.  
 220. Statement of Michael Davis, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works, 
Before the Committee on Environment and Public Works, Subcommittee on Clean Air, 
Wetlands, Private Property and Nuclear Safety, United States Senate (Mar. 28, 2000), at 
http://www.senate.gov/~epw/dav_0328.htm. Recently, the Corps reported: 
[T]he Corps received an average of 74,500 Section 404 permit requests per year from 
FY 1996 to FY 1999. Of those requests, 84.4 percent were authorized through a 
general permit. Only 6.7 percent of all permit applications were subject to the more 
detailed individual permit evaluation, through which impacts are avoided and 
compensated. . . .[O]nly 3 tenths of a percent of all Section 404 requests were denied. 
Id. 
 221. See generally NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, COMPENSATING FOR WETLAND 
LOSSES UNDER THE CLEAN WATER ACT 94-122 (2001), at http://books.nap.edu/books/ 
0309074320/html/index.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2002). Recent changes to the Corps 
mitigation practices may exacerbate the problem. See Cat Lazaroff, Army Corps Redefines 
Wetlands Mitigation, Envtl. News Serv., Nov. 13, 2001, at http://ens.lycos.com/ens/ 
nov2001/2001L-11-13-06.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2002). 
 222. The Corps recently reissued its nationwide permits. See Issuance of Nationwide 
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B. Nonpoint Source Programs Under the Clean Water Act 
Apart from the NPDES and section 404 programs, no provision 
exists for direct federal regulation of agricultural nonpoint source 
pollution that may contribute to water quality impairments. The Act’s 
“national policy that programs for the control of nonpoint sources of 
pollution be developed and implemented in an expeditious 
manner,”223 is pursued through several programs that provide 
opportunities and funding to develop and implement control 
measures for nonpoint sources, but the primary responsibility in each 
of these programs lies with the states. Little or no authority exists for 
federal involvement in the event states choose not to tackle nonpoint 
source pollution in an effective way. Moreover, consistent with the 
Tenth Amendment to the Constitution, nothing in the CWA compels 
the states to adopt nonpoint source control programs.224 
1. Comprehensive Planning and Section 208 
With the 1972 amendments to the CWA, Congress included 
comprehensive planning provisions to ensure that “[t]o the extent 
practicable, waste treatment management shall be on an areawide 
basis and provide control or treatment of all point and nonpoint 
sources of pollution, including in place or accumulated pollution 
sources.”225 Section 208 required the states to “identify each area 
within the State, which, as a result of urban-industrial concentrations 
or other factors, has substantial water quality control problems” and 
to “designate (A) the boundaries of each such area, and (B) a single 
representative organization . . . capable of developing effective 
 
Permits; Notice, 67 Fed. Reg. 2020 (Jan. 15, 2002). Newly issued nationwide permit 40 
authorizes “discharges into non-tidal wetlands to improve agricultural production” provided 
certain conditions are met. See id. at 2086-87.  
 223. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(7) (1994). 
 224. See Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Costle, 564 F.2d 573, 580 (D.C. Cir. 1977); see 
also Am. Wildlands v. Browner, 260 F.3d 1192, 1197 (10th Cir. 2001) (“‘[N]othing in the 
CWA demands that a state adopt a regulatory system for nonpoint sources.’”). Compare New 
York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 161 (1992) (quoting Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & 
Reclamation Ass’n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981) (holding that Congress cannot “commandeer 
the legislative processes of the States by directly compelling them to enact and enforce a federal 
regulatory program”)). 
 225. 33 U.S.C. § 1281(c).  
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areawide waste treatment plans for such area.”226 Areawide plans 
were to be “in operation” within one year of the organization’s 
designation227 and were to include “a process to (i) identify, if 
appropriate, agriculturally and silviculturally related nonpoint sources 
of pollution . . . and (ii) set forth procedures and methods (including 
land use requirements) to control to the extent feasible such 
sources.”228  
In addition, for areas of a state not designated under the process 
described above, “[t]he State shall act as a planning agency.”229 In 
Natural Resources Defense Council v. Costle, the court relied on this 
latter provision to conclude that the section 208 planning program 
applied to all parts of a state, not just those designated as having 
substantial water quality problems.230 Section 208 thus provides for 
comprehensive, state-wide programs to address water quality 
problems, including nonpoint source pollution.  
Section 208 provides three basic incentives for states to develop 
areawide plans. First, the costs of developing and implementing the 
plans are supposed to be shared by the federal government through 
EPA grants.231 Second, once a plan is approved, the state may 
participate in a program administered by the Department of 
Agriculture through which the Soil Conservation Service (now the 
Natural Resource Conservation Service) enters into cost-sharing 
contracts with property owners “for the purpose of installing and 
maintaining measures incorporating best management practices to 
control nonpoint source pollution for improved water quality . . .”232 
Finally, comprehensive plans of the sort authorized in section 208 
may enable the states to make judgments about how best to allocate 
cleanup responsibilities. 
The statute does not, however, provide clear criteria under which 
 
 226. Id. § 1288(a)(2).  
 227. Id. § 1288(b)(1)(A).  
 228. Id. § 1288(b)(2)(F).  
 229. Id. § 1288(a)(6). 
 230. 564 F.2d 573, 577-79 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
 231. 33 U.S.C. § 1288(f). EPA also provides technical assistance “without reimbursement” 
to the states in developing plans. Id. § 1288(g).  
 232. 33 U.S.C. § 1288(j). This program was limited to contracts ending no later than 
September 31, 1988. Id. It was added to the CWA by amendments in 1977. See Federal Water 
Pollution Control Act Amendments, Pub. L. No. 95-217, § 35, 91 Stat. 1579 (1977).  
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EPA may determine whether a plan’s provisions are adequate. As a 
consequence, the content of these plans is largely discretionary with 
the states, creating a program that Professor Adler describes as 
“mandatory-voluntary.”233 Moreover, in the event that a plan is 
disapproved, there is nothing in the CWA comparable to the Clean 
Air Act’s mandate for federal implementation plans to substitute for 
such state failings.234 The EPA lacks authority to take up the slack of 
under-performing states by implementing its own enforceable 
areawide management plan. Other avenues of recourse open to the 
EPA, such as withholding grants or conditioning grants on a state’s 
adoption of control measures,235 are limited and have not been 
pursued to any significant extent.236 While a number of plans were 
written and approved, the consensus is that the plans did little to 
improve water quality or to create effective state programs aimed at 
nonpoint source pollution.237 As if to punctuate the ineffectiveness of 
the section 208 planning provisions, Congress ceased funding the 
grants program in 1981.238 In effect, many of the section 208 plans 
 
 233. Adler, Watershed Protection, supra note 132, at 1042.  
 234. See 42 U.S.C. § 7410(c) (2001) (requiring the EPA to promulgate a federal 
implementation plan if a state fails to develop state ambient air pollution control plans).  
 235. See Shanty Town Assocs. Ltd. P’ship v. EPA, 843 F.2d 782, 791 (4th Cir. 1988) 
(concluding that while section 208 “provides no direct mechanism by which EPA can force the 
states to adopt adequate nonpoint source pollution control programs . . . Congress anticipated 
that EPA would use the threat and promise of federal financial assistance to accomplish this 
task”). 
 236. Id.  
 237. See Adler, Watershed Protection, supra note 132, 1043. Professor Adler notes several 
reasons for the failure of comprehensive planning under section 208, including a lack of 
enthusiasm for the program on EPA’s part, the absence of any “link between planning and 
implementation,” inadequate funding, and resistance from local officials fearful of federal 
planning mandates. See id. at 1044 (citing S. REP. NO. 257, at 46 (1994). David Zaring sums up 
the effectiveness of the section 208 program: 
Section 208 planning agencies promote voluntary compliance rather than mandatory 
controls of nonpoint source pollution; the latter were too ‘controversial’ and 
‘politically sensitive’ for agricultural interests who opposed what they envisioned 
could amount to command and control regulation. States were unwilling to provoke 
powerful agricultural constituencies with strict regulation when the Federal 
Government did not obligate them to do so. The resulting nonpoint source pollution 
control plans were totally voluntary in 41 states. An additional eight states included 
many voluntary provisions. 
Zaring, supra note 11, at 523-24 (references omitted). 
 238. Id.  
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were simply shelved.239 
Aside from its structural shortcomings, several additional 
problems severely handicapped the section 208 program. The 
program lacked administrative support in its formative stages. The 
Nixon administration “basically was trying to close the program out 
. . . [T]here was a very definite attitude . . . that it was not a good 
program, and . . . should not be given any encouragement.”240 As a 
consequence, EPA was slow to issue regulations and guidance. 
Appropriated funds were not obligated and, therefore, fifteen percent 
of all monies authorized for the section 208 program as of 1980 
simply lapsed.241 EPA’s efforts, as well as those of the states, were 
directed primarily at funding and building municipal waste treatment 
plants and advancing the NPDES point source control program; the 
section 208 program was treated, in effect, as a disfavored 
“stepchild” and subordinated to efforts that produced more 
immediate, visible results.242 EPA’s lack of commitment and uneven 
funding led many to conclude that the section 208 program simply 
was not credible.243  
State agencies repeatedly attributed the poor performance of 
section 208 plans to a lack of data to establish cause-and-effect 
relations between practices and nonpoint source pollution and, hence, 
between practices and water quality impacts. These same data 
shortcomings hampered state efforts to determine the efficacy and 
cost-effectiveness of various “best management practices” (BMPs) 
that might decrease runoff.244 As a consequence, no clear linkages 
between section 208 planning and the attainment of water quality 
standards exist.245  
 
 239. ROBERT W. ADLER ET AL., THE CLEAN WATER ACT 20 YEARS LATER 184 (1993) 
[hereinafter 20 YEARS LATER]. 
 240. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, NONPOINT POLLUTION AND THE AREAWIDE 
WASTE TREATMENT PROGRAM UNDER THE FEDERAL WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT: 
SUMMARY OF HEARINGS BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND REVIEW, JULY 11, 
12, 17, AND 18, 1979, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., Committee Print 96-67, at 16 n.2 (1980) (quoting 
EPA Administrator) [hereinafter SUMMARY OF HEARINGS].  
 241. Id. at 16.  
 242. Id. at 22.  
 243. Id. at 18.  
 244. Id. at 19.  
 245. 20 YEARS LATER, supra note 239, at 184. 
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The lack of adequate data also had other significant effects on the 
nonpoint source elements of the section 208 program. The need for 
data prompted a significant shift in the focus of the section 208 
program once the EPA became somewhat more sympathetic with its 
objectives. EPA began to emphasize and fund prototype 
demonstration projects as a means to fill data gaps and to determine 
the sorts of management practices that would most cost-effectively 
reduce nonpoint source pollution.246 While EPA could boast of the 
success of many of these projects, the shift led one observer to 
describe the program as “a giant research project.”247  
The absence of clear linkages between BMPs and improvements 
in water quality made it difficult to develop regulatory programs, 
leaving most states to rely on voluntary cooperation rather than 
enforceable measures. The consensus view was that “regulators 
[were] not at the point where, under a burden of proof test, they could 
conclusively link a particular management practice to a desired 
result.”248 As a consequence, BMPs tended to be implemented only 
when they served coincidental objectives, such as soil conservation or 
more cost-effective agricultural production.249 
Other factors that hampered the section 208 program include 
conflicts between local, state, and federal officials over lines of 
responsibility for program implementation; uncertainty over whether 
state programs should rely on voluntary cooperation or on more 
regulatory approaches; and the lack of public education, and, hence, 
support, for nonpoint source control programs.250 
 
 246. SUMMARY OF HEARINGS, supra note 240, at 23. 
 247. Id. at 25.  
 248. Id. at 33; see also id. at 29 (“It is not sufficient merely to conjecture that BMPs will be 
good; it must be proven . . . .”).  
 249. Id. at 33.  
 250. See 20 YEARS LATER, supra note 239, at 184; SUMMARY OF HEARINGS, supra note 
240, at 27-34. Professor Michael Vandenbergh concludes that a major obstacle to effective 
control of nonpoint source pollution—which he describes as a “second generation” source 
problem—is the social meaning of the “command and control system.” Michael P. 
Vandenbergh, The Social Meaning of Environmental Command and Control, 20 VA. ENVTL. 
L.J. 191, 191-93, 196 (2001). He posits that the command and control regulation of large 
industrial sources facilitated the conveyance of an “us-them” sort of mentality on the part of 
individual citizens: “The command and control system . . . allowed individuals to support 
environmental protection by focusing both economic costs and moral opprobrium on industrial 
polluters.” Id. at 208. Presumably, this focus makes it more difficult to regulate farmers because 
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2. The Section 319 Nonpoint Source Management Program 
Prior to 1987, section 208 was the only CWA program to control 
nonpoint source pollution.251 With its relative demise and the active 
opposition of the Reagan Administration to any new federal 
programs to address nonpoint source pollution control, there was a 
gaping hole in federal efforts to address water quality problems 
throughout the early- and mid-1980s.  
In 1987, Congress responded to this lacuna by amending the 
CWA to address nonpoint source pollution. It subjected urban and 
industrial stormwater discharges to the requirements of the NPDES 
program.252 For agriculture, Congress took a different approach, 
creating a new, but essentially unenforceable, nonpoint source 
management program.253 Section 319 provides that each state must 
prepare and submit for EPA approval a report that: identifies waters 
within the state which, without control of nonpoint source pollution, 
are not reasonably expected to attain or maintain water quality 
standards; identifies categories of or particular nonpoint sources 
which contribute significantly to water quality problems in such 
waters; describes how best management practices for such sources 
will be identified; and describes applicable state and local nonpoint 
source pollution control programs.254 In addition, each state must 
prepare and submit for EPA approval “a management program” for 
controlling the nonpoint source pollution that contributes 
significantly to water quality impairments and must implement that
 
they have not traditionally been viewed as an “industry,” and thus do not fall within the 
cognitively available category of “polluters.” Interestingly, many environmental groups have 
worked hard to overcome this cognitive resistance, carefully characterizing some farming 
operations as being in the “corporate” and “factory” categories. See, e.g., CESSPOOLS OF 
SHAME, supra note 100, at 1 (“Multi-million dollar corporations control many factory farms.”).  
 251. SUMMARY OF HEARINGS, supra note 240, at 14 (noting that “[t]he only Federal 
program which directly addresses nonpoint source pollution is found in section 208 of the Clean 
Water Act”).  
 252. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(p) (2001).  
 253. Id. § 1329. In describing the 1987 amendments, Professor Houck noted that Congress 
“in effect split the nonpoint world into urban and agricultural sources.” Oliver A. Houck, 
Ending the War: A Strategy to Save America’s Coastal Zone, 47 MD. L. REV. 358, 376 (1988) 
[hereinafter Houck, Ending the War]. 
 254. 33 U.S.C. § 1329(a).  
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plan within four fiscal years of the date the plan is submitted to 
EPA.255  
Section 319 management plans must include certain elements: 
BMPs; a program to implement the BMPs, including “a schedule 
containing annual milestones” and “provid[ing] for utilization of the 
best management practices at the earliest practicable date;” and 
sources of funding.256  
The primary incentive for states to comply with section 319’s 
reporting and programmatic requirements, like the incentives in the 
section 208 program, is a cost-sharing grant program.257 In addition, 
continued participation in the grant program is conditioned on a 
performance standard, albeit a very weak one: states must make 
“satisfactory progress” in meeting their respective programs’ 
milestones.258 States must also “maintain its aggregate expenditures 
from all other sources . . . at or above the average level of such 
expenditures in its two fiscal years preceding” the date of the 1987 
amendments to remain eligible for 319 grants.259 In many cases, 
however, this “maintenance of effort” requirement is, in fact, no 
requirement at all. For example, Missouri’s Nonpoint Source 
Management Plan notes that in the relevant period, the state 
expended no funds on nonpoint source pollution control; its 
maintenance of effort requirement was, therefore, zero.260 Finally, 
states may be induced to participate in the section 319 program in 
order to benefit from the program’s “consistency” provision,261 which 
 
 255. Id. § 1329(b)(1). 
 256. Id. § 1329(b)(2). The report of waters and the management program were to be 
submitted to EPA before August 4, 1988. See id. § 1329(c)(2).  
 257. Id. § 1329(h). 
 258. Id. § 1329(h)(8). 
 259. Id. § 1329(h)(9). 
 260. STATE OF MISSOURI, NONPOINT SOURCE MANAGEMENT PLAN 108 (revised 2001), at 
http://www.dnr.state.mo.us/deq/wpcp/wpcnpsmp.htm (last visited Apr. 17, 2002). 
 261. Section 319 provides, in part: 
[E]ach Federal department and agency shall modify existing regulations to allow 
States to review individual development projects and assistance applications under . . . 
Federal assistance programs [identified by each State] and shall accommodate, 
according to the requirements and definitions of Executive Order 12372 . . . the 
concerns of the State regarding the consistency of such applications or projects with 
the State nonpoint source pollution management program. 
33 U.S.C. § 1329(k). EPA did not propose to published guidance on the consistency provision 
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“is a form of ‘reverse federal preemption’ . . . [that] [s]tates can 
invoke . . . to block federal and federally-funded projects that 
interfere with state nonpoint pollution controls.”262  
EPA has oversight responsibility for ensuring that states submit 
the required section 319 reports and management plans. The 
program, like the section 208 planning provisions, remains largely 
optional for the states.263 If a state fails to submit a report listing 
waters affected by nonpoint source pollution, or if EPA disapproves 
such a report, then EPA is to promulgate one.264 By contrast, the EPA 
lacks authority to prepare and implement a management plan for 
states who choose not to do so, although provisions are made for 
local agencies to assume the state’s role in such circumstances.265 For 
waters affected by out-of-state nonpoint source pollution, the EPA 
may “convene . . . a management conference of all States which 
contribute significant pollution resulting from nonpoint sources,”266 
but again, the EPA has no authority to develop or implement a plan to 
correct such interstate pollution problems if the management 
conference fails to yield an agreement among the states.267  
Moreover, even if states do produce management plans, section 
319 does not require that the plans contain enforceable measures. 
Indeed, the statute rather explicitly suggests that BMPs or other 
controls need not be enforceable.268 As Professor Craig has noted, 
 
until 1998. See Section 319 Federal Consistency Guidance, 63 Fed. Reg. 45504 (Aug. 26, 
1998).  
 262. Mandelker, supra note 22, at 499-500.  
 263. Oliver A. Houck, TMDLs, Are We There Yet?: The Long Road Toward Water Quality-
Based Regulation Under the Clean Water Act, 27 Envtl. L. Rep. 10391, 10400 (Aug. 1997) 
(concluding that “[section] 319’s provisions are voluntary. States may choose to participate or 
not; participating states may choose regulatory approaches or not”) [hereinafter Houck, Are We 
There Yet]. 
 264. 33 U.S.C. § 1329(d)(3).  
 265. Id. § 1329(e).  
 266. Id. § 1329(g).  
 267. Id. § 1329(e). 
 268. See id. § 1329(b)(2)(B) (requiring management plans to include “programs (including, 
as appropriate, nonregulatory or regulatory programs . . .) to achieve implementation of the 
[BMPs]”). John Davidson also observed:  
[T]he management programs . . . may be less than meets the eye. Although the 
language of . . . [§ 319] directs the state to develop plans that contain specific control 
measures, it is likely that the plans must state merely what would be done if a state has 
the money it needs. In their plans the states will say, “Here is what we will do if we get 
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“‘Section 319 does not require states to penalize nonpoint source 
polluters who fail to adopt best management practices; rather it 
provides for grants to encourage the adoption of such practices.’”269 
This continued reliance on a voluntary approach to agricultural 
nonpoint source pollution has led one commentator to conclude that, 
“[i]n 1987 Congress looked agricultural pollution in the eye and 
fainted.”270  
Congress underfunded the section 319 program for the first 
several years, providing little support even to states that were making 
serious efforts to address nonpoint source pollution.271 The Clinton 
Administration increased funding to some degree,272 but inadequate 
funding remains the biggest obstacle to improvements under section 
319.273 Without assurances that the costs of attacking agricultural 
nonpoint source pollution will be underwritten by the federal 
government, most states are unwilling, or unable, to attack 
agricultural nonpoint source pollution aggressively.274 Because the 
EPA lacks any authority to threaten regulatory action to correct state 
program deficiencies, the only effective way to achieve greater gains 
through section 319 is to increase funding for the program 
substantially.  
Even with increased funding, however, the absence of clear 
performance standards for state management plans makes it difficult 
to ensure that section 319 funds are used effectively. The statutory 
 
the money. . . . If funds are inadequate we won’t do it, . . . and if implementing the 
plans in our state will be politically unpopular, we won’t even apply for the grant.”  
John H. Davidson, Thinking About Nonpoint Sources of Water Pollution and South Dakota 
Agriculture, 34 S.D. L. REV. 20, 45 (1989) (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted). 
 269. Craig, supra note 11, at 190 (quoting Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 915 F.2d 
1314, 1318 (9th Cir. 1990)).  
 270. Houck, Ending the War, supra note 253, at 377.  
 271. See 20 YEARS LATER, supra note 239, at 189.  
 272. See GAO REPORT 99-45, supra note 128, at 28. 
 273. See National Association of Conservation Districts, Funding for Clean Water Act 
Section 319 (Mar. 2001), at http://www.nacdnet.org/govtaff/issuepapers/2001/Funding 
319in02.htm (last visited Apr. 22, 2002). 
 274. Aside from funding deficiencies, Professor Adler argues that the EPA hampers 
section 319’s potential as an aggressive measure to control nonpoint source pollution by 
refusing to “play hardball” with the states. Adler, Watershed Protection, supra note 132, at 
1045 n.427. He points out that the EPA could insist on the states adopting mandatory or stricter 
BMPs as a condition of program approval. See id.  
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“satisfactory progress” condition for a state’s continuing participation 
in the program is an extraordinarily vague benchmark.275 EPA 
regulations do not strengthen or clarify this requirement,276 although 
the agency has recently issued guidance to provide greater specificity 
in the expected outcomes to be achieved by funded projects.277  
Successful implementation of nonpoint source controls under 
section 319 is likely to be hampered by inadequate monitoring and 
assessment data as well as the absence of any requirement that states 
enact enforceable controls. The CWA includes a broad reporting 
obligation which requires the states to submit “a description of the 
water quality of all navigable waters in such State,” as well as “a 
description of the nature and extent of nonpoint sources of 
pollutants.”278 The states, as noted above, have not collected suitable 
data of this sort. Without the data, it may be hard to establish the 
linkages section 319 apparently demands between impaired waters 
and nonpoint sources. Thus, the same difficulties that hampered 
areawide planning and nonpoint source controls under section 208 
limit the willingness or ability of the states to take effective action 
under section 319.  
To its credit, the EPA has recognized that “[w]ithout a clear 
understanding of how to minimize pollution from . . . nonpoint 
sources, state and local organizations will be unable to develop 
strategies to protect their water resources.”279 To bridge this gap, the 
EPA established a “Section 319 Nonpoint Source National 
 
 275. 33 U.S.C. § 1329(h)(8) (1994).  
 276. See 40 C.F.R. § 35.268(d)(3) (2001). 
 277. The guidance modifies the states’ reporting requirements under the section 319 grants 
program. See Memorandum from Robert Wayland, to EPA Regional Water Division Directors, 
“Modifications to Nonpoint Source Reporting Requirements for Section 319 Grants” (Sept. 27, 
2001), available at http://www.epa.gov/owow/nps/Section319/grts.html. The memorandum 
notes that the increased funding for the grants program was “giving rise to more specific 
questions from Congress, the Office of Management and Budget, and the public as to how and 
where this money is being spent, and what water quality improvements are being achieved as 
the result of these Federal expenditures.” Id. The states are obligated to report on their funded 
activities under 33 U.S.C. § 1329(h)(11). Many states have revised their nonpoint source 
management programs in response to this guidance. 
 278. 33 U.S.C. § 1315(b)(1).  
 279. LAURA A. LOMBARDO ET AL., SECTION 319 NONPOINT SOURCE NATIONAL 
MONITORING PROGRAM: SUCCESSES AND RECOMMENDATIONS 9 (2000), available at 
http://www5.bae.ncsu.edu/programs/extension/wqg/section319/frontcover.html (last visited 
Apr. 22, 2002) [hereinafter NATIONAL MONITORING PROGRAM].  
 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol9/iss1/3
p 21 Williams book pages.doc  12/17/2002 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2002]  When Voluntary, Incentive-Based Controls Fail 77 
 
Monitoring Program.” The purpose of the program is to evaluate the 
effectiveness of nonpoint source pollution management measures and 
to gain a better understanding of nonpoint source pollution 
generally.280 The program provides enhanced funding and technical 
assistance for a limited number of pilot projects to “facilitate[] the 
understanding of processes that govern the transport and control of 
nonpoint source pollution, which can then be transferred to state and 
local organizations for use in addressing water quality problems.”281 
The parallels to the section 208 program implementation as a 
“research project” are somewhat striking, though the section 319 
program is not limited to projects funded under the Nonpoint Source 
National Monitoring Program.  
Section 319 made some significant differences in a limited 
number of watersheds.282 In 1995, the General Accounting Office 
reported on the 618 watershed projects to reduce agricultural 
nonpoint source pollution that were planned or carried out.283 The 
report selected nine projects for evaluation, and the results were 
generally regarded as successful.284 Similarly, the Nonpoint Source 
National Monitoring Program yielded some significant improvements 
in water quality in the projects sponsored under the program.285 In 
addition, the EPA is considering ways in which section 319 might be 
more effective.286 Nonetheless the scope of these successes is quite 
limited, primarily because most states have very weak programs,287 
 
 280. See id. at 3. 
 281. Id. 
 282. The EPA’s nonpoint source pollution Web site has links to section 319 “success 
stories,” available at http://www.epa.gov/owow/nps/cwact.html (last visited Apr. 22, 2002). 
 283. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, AGRICULTURE AND THE ENVIRONMENT: 
INFORMATION ON AND CHARCTERISTICS OF SELECTED WATERSHED PROJECTS, Report No. 
GAO/RCED-95-218, at 1 (1995).  
 284. See id. at 10.  
 285. NATIONAL MONITORING PROGRAM, supra note 280, at 3-9.  
 286. See, e.g., EPA, Nonpoint Sources: Picking up the Pace, EPA’s Draft Proposed 
Strategy for Strengthening Nonpoint Source Management, presentation prepared for Meeting of 
Stakeholders in the National Nonpoint Source Program at the Wye River Conference Center on 
October 14, 1997, available at http://www.epa.gov/owow/nps/nsfsnsm/ (last visited Mar. 13, 
2002). Many of the suggestions in this presentation were subsequently incorporated into the 
Clinton administration’s Clean Water Action Plan. 
 287. See generally ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INST., ENFORCEABLE STATE MECHANISMS FOR 
CONTROL OF NONPOINT SOURCE WATER POLLUTION iii (1997) (“Agriculture is the most 
problematic area for enforceable mechanisms. Many laws of general applicability, . . . have 
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and the possibilities for significant increases in funding are small, at 
least in the short-term.288 The net effect of the section 319 program is, 
as John Davidson has noted, “largely redundant” of the section 208 
planning requirements,289 “leav[ing] any resulting improvements in 
water quality largely to the political will of individual states.”290 
3. The TMDL Program—A Framework for a Regulatory 
Approach to Nonpoint Source Pollution?  
The absence of authority in either section 208 or section 309 for 
the EPA to step in when state efforts are inadequate severely 
constrains any incentives the states may have to control agricultural 
nonpoint source pollution. Indeed, Professor Houck has described 
these programs as “essentially ineffectual planning exercises.”291 This 
general deficiency in the CWA’s programs for controlling nonpoint 
source pollution may be offset by a recent resurrection of a long-
neglected program referred to as section 303(d)’s TMDL program.  
Like the section 309 program, the TMDL program requires states 
to identify waterbodies that are currently failing to meet water quality 
standards. The requirement in section 303(d) is not limited to waters 
where attainment of the standards is due solely to nonpoint source 
pollution.292 For these impaired waters, states must “establish . . . the 
 
exceptions for agriculture. Where state laws exist, they often defer to incentives, cost-sharing, 
and voluntary programs.”).  
 288. The Bush Administration’s proposed budget includes $20 million for “pilot projects” 
in a new “watershed initiative.” See BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES, FISCAL YEAR 2003, at 
308, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2003/budget.html (last visited Mar. 
13, 2002). Overall, the EPA’s discretionary budget will, under the Bush proposal, be decreased 
by $300 million. See id. at 401, Table S-7.  
 289. Davidson, supra note 267, at 44. 
 290. Id. at 43.  
 291. HOUCK, TMDL PROGRAM, supra note 16, at 135-36.  
 292. 33 U.S.C. §1313(d)(1)(A) (2001) provides: 
Each State shall identify those waters within its boundaries for which the [point 
source] effluent limitations required by [the NPDES program] are not stringent enough 
to implement any water quality standard applicable to such waters. The State shall 
establish a priority ranking for such waters, taking into account the severity of the 
pollution and the uses to be made of such waters. 
Id. Strictly speaking, the § 1313(d) requirements are not limited to impaired waters. Section 
1313(d)(3) provides: 
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total maximum daily load, for those pollutants [identified by EPA] as 
suitable for such calculation.”293 The total maximum daily loads 
(TMDLs) are to be “established at a level necessary to implement the 
applicable water quality standards with seasonal variations.”294 
Recognizing that linkages between discharges and ambient water 
quality are subject to large measures of uncertainty, Congress 
directed that TMDLs include “a margin of safety which takes into 
account any lack of knowledge concerning the relationship between 
effluent limitations and water quality.”295 Although the statute does 
not clearly require it, the EPA concluded that a TMDL must 
“allocate[] . . . pollutant loads among sources, and provide[] the basis 
for attaining or maintaining water quality standards.”296  
The statute requires that lists of impaired waterbodies and TMDLs 
be submitted to the EPA, but the statute is fairly casual about setting 
a timetable for such submissions.297 The “first such submission” are 
to be made within six months of the EPA action identifying the 
pollutants for which TMDLs are appropriate.298 This EPA action was 
to take place no later than October 18, 1973.299 After the “first such 
submission”—the content of which is not specified—the statute 
requires states to submit lists and TMDLs “from time to time.”300  
Should EPA disapprove either the lists or the corresponding 
TMDLs, the statute requires the agency to correct the deficiencies 
 
For the specific purpose of developing information, each State shall identify all waters 
within its boundaries which it has not identified [as being impaired under 
§ 1313(d)(1)(A)] and estimate for such waters the total maximum daily load . . . at a 
level that would assure protection and propagation of a balanced indigenous 
population of fish, shellfish and wildlife. 
Id. § 1313(d)(3). These “informational TMDLs” are not, however, required to be submitted to 
the EPA and the EPA, has no express authority to approve or disapprove of them. See 
Pronsolino v. Marcus, 91 F. Supp. 2d 1337, 1344 (N.D. Cal. 2000).  
 293. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1)(C). 
 294. Id. 
 295. Id. On the “margin of safety” requirement’s ability to bridge gaps in knowledge, 
particularly for nonpoint source pollution. See Adler, supra note 2, at 272-73. 
 296. TMDL Rule, supra note 16, at 43588.  
 297. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(2). 
 298. Id. 
 299. Id. § 1314(a)(2). 
 300. Id. § 1313(d)(2).  
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with its own lists and/or TMDLs.301 Curiously, however, the statute 
remains silent concerning EPA’s duties in the event that a state 
simply submits nothing at all. Approved or EPA-promulgated 
TMDLs must be incorporated by each state into a “continuing 
planning process” that “will result in plans for all navigable waters 
within” the state.302 The statute does not, however, clearly require 
that states actually implement TMDLs, nor does it provide a clear 
mechanism for doing so.303  
For many years, the TMDL provisions were ignored, largely 
because EPA and states preferred to focus on controlling point 
sources, and perhaps, because they held a faint hope that resorting to 
the “safety net” of TMDLS to attain water quality standards would 
never be necessary.304 Critical ambiguities or omissions in the statute 
and the EPA’s lack of enthusiasm for the program contributed to this 
relative neglect.305 
The EPA first proposed regulations identifying pollutants 
appropriate for TMDLs in 1973, but did not issue final rules until 
much later, in 1978.306 Without the regulations in place, the states 
were under no obligation to submit the section 303(d) lists and 
 
 301. Id. 
 302. Id. § 1313(e).  
 303. Section 303(e)(2) can plausibly be read to suggest that Congress meant to require 
TMDL implementation, but it does not state so in direct terms. That section requires EPA to 
review each state’s continuous planning process and provides that EPA “shall not approve any 
State permit program under [the NPDES program] for any State which does not have an 
approved continuing planning process . . . .” 33 U.S.C. § 1313(e)(2). The same inference of 
congressional intent requiring TMDL implementation may be gleaned from section 303(d)(4), 
which provides that effluent limitations based on TMDLs may be revised only in certain, 
limited circumstances where attainment of water quality standards will not be compromised. 
See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(4). In addition, as Professor Houck argued, EPA can demand that 
TMDL allocations to point sources be implemented through its authority under 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1342(d) to review permit decisions by the states. HOUCK, TMDL PROGRAM, supra note 16, at 
60. Nonetheless, Professor Houck notes that, “[o]nce [the lists of impaired waterbodies] and 
TMDLs are prepared, the language of § 303(d) ends.” Id. 
 304. See Pronsolino v. Marcus, 91 F. Supp. 2d 1337, 1354-55 (N.D. Cal. 2000); HOUCK, 
TMDL PROGRAM, supra note 16, at 49.  
 305. See HOUCK, TMDL PROGRAM, supra note 16, at 49-51. 
 306. EPA proposed such regulations in 1973, Water Quality Criteria, 38 Fed. Reg. 29646 
(Oct. 26, 1973), but final regulations were not promulgated until 1978, under compulsion of a 
court order. See Total Maximum Daily Loads Under Clean Water Act, 43 Fed. Reg. 42303 
(Sept. 14, 1978) (citing Board of County Comm’rs of Calvert County v. Costle, No. 78-0572, 
slip op. (D.D.C. June 20, 1978)).  
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TMDLs.307 When the rules were promulgated, the agency 
downplayed the significance of the program to a considerable extent. 
The EPA suggested that states satisfied their statutory obligation to 
make their “first” submission by simply identifying “one or more” 
impaired waterbodies and TMDLs.308 The states took the cue and 
submitted only a few TMDLs, but many simply did not submit 
anything.309 State inaction, EPA concluded, simply had to be 
tolerated. In EPA’s view, the absence of express authority to act in 
response to a state’s inaction meant that EPA could not use the threat 
of federal TMDLs to force state action. Thus, yielding “the 
anomalous conclusion that EPA intervention is called for in response 
to inadequate state performance, but not in response to no state 
performance.”310  
After a series of lawsuits culminating in court orders requiring 
EPA to promulgate TMDLs for states that failed to submit TMDLs or 
for states that submitted inadequate ones,311 EPA began to take the 
initiative in fashioning a credible TMDL program. It completed 
rulemaking to revise the TMDL program in July, 2000.312 Due to 
congressional action, the rules will not go into effect until April 30, 
2003. There is, also, a strong possibility that the rules may be 
substantially revised in the interim period.313  
EPA’s rules address and resolve several critical issues. First, the 
rules make clear that states must include in their lists, and prepare 
TMDLs for, waterbodies that are impaired exclusively or in part by 
nonpoint source pollution.314 As might be expected, agribusiness and 
 
 307. See Envtl. Def. Fund v. Costle, 657 F.2d 275 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Homestake Mining Co. 
v. EPA, 477 F. Supp. 1279 (D. S.D. 1979); see Houck, TMDL PROGRAM, supra note 16, at 49-
50. 
 308. See HOUCK, TMDL PROGRAM, supra note 16, at 51.  
 309. Id. at 51. 
 310. HOUCK, TMDL PROGRAM, supra note 16, at 66-67 n.32.  
 311. See HOUCK, TMDL PROGRAM, supra note 16, at 51-56. For a summary of TMDL 
litigation as of 2001, see MID-ATLANTIC ENVIRONMENTAL LAW CENTER, TOTAL MAXIMUM 
DAILY LOAD (TMDL) LITIGATION SUMMARY (June 2001), available at http://www.cwn.org/ 
docs/programs/tmdl/policy/tmdlpolicy.htm#litigation.pdf (last visited Mar. 12, 2002). 
 312. See TMDL Rule, supra note 16, at 43586. 
 313. See Effective Date Revisions to the Water Quality Planning and Management 
Regulation, 66 Fed. Reg. 53,044 (Oct. 18, 2001). 
 314. TDML Rule, supra note 16, at 43,588, 43,606, 43,609-10.  
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forestry interests vehemently oppose this conclusion.315 Second, the 
rules require that TMDLs include eleven specific elements, 
including: “wasteload allocations”; “load allocations”; “[a] margin of 
safety”; “[a]llowance for reasonably foreseeable increases in 
pollutant loads including future growth”; and, importantly, “[a]n 
implementation plan.”316 Third, states must submit TMDLS “as 
expeditiously as practicable” but no later than specified deadlines.317 
The EPA’s rules also provide that states must allocate the 
necessary reductions in pollutant loadings between “wasteload 
allocations” and “load allocations.” The former pertains to reductions 
from point sources to be made through NPDES permits.318 The latter 
includes “[t]he portion of a TMDL’s pollutant load allocated to a 
nonpoint source, storm water source for which a [NPDES] permit is 
not required, atmospheric deposition, ground water, or background 
source of pollutants.”319 EPA made clear that in establishing TMDLs, 
states were free to make reduction trade-offs between nonpoint and 
point sources. For example, “A TMDL provides the opportunity to 
compare relative contributions of pollutants from all sources and 
consider technical and economic trade-offs between point and 
nonpoint sources.”320 
The rules plainly require the states to include plans demonstrating 
how TMDLS will be implemented.321 For waste load allocations to 
 
 315. HOUCK, TMDL PROGRAM, supra note 16, at 61. 
 316. 40 C.F.R. § 130.2(h) (2001).  
 317. Id. § 130.28(b). The deadlines are: “no later than 10 years from July 10, 2000, if the 
waterbody and pollutant was listed . . . before that date”; or “10 years from the due date of the 
first subsequent list after July 10, 2000, on which the waterbody and pollutant is initially 
included.” Id. Extensions of up to five years are available. Id. Lists of impaired waters must be 
submitted every four years, beginning in 2002. Id. § 130.30(a). 
 318. Id. § 130.2(g). 
 319. Id. § 130.2(f).  
 320. Id. § 130.32(a); see also id. § 130.2(g) (“For waterbodies impaired by both point and 
nonpoint sources, wasteload allocations may reflect anticipated or expected reductions of 
pollutants from other sources if those anticipated or expected reductions are supported by 
reasonable assurance that they will occur.”).  
 321. 40 C.F.R. § 130.32(b)(11) & § 130.32(c). EPA also stated in the preamble: 
EPA believes that implementation of TMDLs is the most important aspect of today’s 
rule. Without implementation, TMDLs are merely paper plans to attain water quality 
standards. The implementation plan requirement assures that the Nation’s remaining 
water quality problems will actually be addressed by appropriate actions identified in 
the implementation plans submitted as part of the TMDLs. 
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point sources, the NPDES program reasonably assures 
implementation.322 For load allocations to nonpoint sources, 
assurances that TMDLs will be actually implemented may be more 
difficult. The rule does not require that load allocations to nonpoint 
sources be based on enforceable state requirements; instead, states are 
merely required to provide “[a] description of specific regulatory or 
voluntary actions, including management measures or other controls, 
by Federal, State or local governments . . . that provide reasonable 
assurance . . . that load allocations will be implemented and achieve 
the assigned load reductions.”323 “Reasonable assurance,” as to 
nonpoint sources, requires a showing that the measures on which a 
state proposes to rely are directed at the pollutant and waterbody of 
concern, will be implemented as expeditiously as practicable, are 
reliable and effectively delivered, and are adequately funded.324 EPA 
indicated that reliance on existing programs may “provide the suite of 
control actions and management measures for States to rely on when 
meeting the reasonable assurance test.”325 As James Boyd noted, 
“state law will ultimately determine the effectiveness of the TMDL 
program’s long-run implementation.”326  
One of the more prominent shortcomings of this approach is that 
the load allocations are not likely to be viewed as “effluent 
limitations” that can be directly enforced against sources under the 
CWA’s citizen suit provision.327 Accordingly, aside from the states 
 
See TDML Rule, supra note 16, at 43,625.  
 322. See Boyd, supra note 11, at 67. EPA could effectively oversee implementation of 
waste load allocations through its authority to review, object to, and revise, state-issued NPDES 
permits, see 33 U.S.C. § 402(d), or through its authority to withdraw approval of state NPDES 
programs. See id.  § 402(c) (1994). 
 323. 40 C.F.R. § 130.32(c)(2)(ii) (emphasis added).  
 324. Id. § 130.2(p)(2).  
 325. See TDML Rule, supra note 16, at 43600. 
 326. Boyd, supra note 11, at 66.  
 327. See Or. Natural Desert Ass’n v. Dombeck, 172 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. 1998); Or. Natural 
Res. Council v. United States Forest Serv., 834 F.2d 842 (9th Cir. 1987). In Or. Natural Desert, 
the court noted: 
Nonpoint source pollution is not regulated directly by the Act, but rather through 
federal grants for state wastewater treatment plans. Section 208 of the Act requires 
each such plan to contain procedures for the identification and control of nonpoint 
source pollution. 33 U.S.C. § 1288(b)(2). If the EPA approves a state’s plan, it may 
make grants to the state to defray the costs of administering the plan, see 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1288(f), or to construct facilities, see 33 U.S.C. § 1288(g). Thus, the Act provides no 
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themselves—which historically have not aggressively addressed 
nonpoint source pollution—effective implementation of TMDLs 
relying on nonpoint source controls will depend upon EPA’s 
willingness to use its carrots and sticks to induce appropriate state 
action.  
The rules also provide that EPA must promulgate a list of 
impaired waters and corresponding TMDLs if a state fails to submit 
lists and/or TMDLs or makes a submission that EPA disapproves.328 
The rules also require EPA, like the states, to provide “reasonable 
assurance” that its TMDLs will be implemented.329 These assurances, 
however, take the form of using the EPA’s funding and regulatory 
authority to induce states to implement the TMDLs. The agency, 
however, did not assert authority to enforce TMDL load allocations 
to nonpoint sources directly against those sources.330 Indeed, EPA 
explicitly noted: 
The CWA preserves the rights of States to experiment with 
alternative regulatory (and non-regulatory) approaches to 
control nonpoint sources of pollution. The CWA does not 
provide specific legal authority for EPA to regulate nonpoint 
sources in a way that would assure the attainment of water 
quality standards. Such authority is reserved for the States.331 
In another important phrasing, EPA made clear its view that 
affected citizens could not force the EPA or the states to implement 
load allocations to nonpoint sources through citizen suits. The agency 
stated that “[n]othing in this rule . . . creates in EPA[,] or the States[,] 
new legal authority beyond that provided by existing . . . law to 
 
direct mechanism to control nonpoint source pollution but rather uses the “threat and 
promise” of federal grants to the states to accomplish this task . . . . Section 1329, 
added to the Act in 1987, requires states to adopt nonpoint source management 
programs and similarly provides for grants to encourage a reduction in nonpoint source 
pollution. 
172 F.3d at 1096-97. 
 328. 40 C.F.R. § 130.30(b), 130.34(a)(1), 130.35.  
 329. Id. § 130.34(b).  
 330. Id. § 130.34(b) & (c) (“conditioning Clean Water Act grants to the fullest extent 
practicable” and “use . . . of [EPA’s] statutory or regulatory authorities and voluntary, 
incentive-based programs . . . to supplement conditioning Clean Water Act grants”). 
 331. See TDML Rule, supra note 16, at 43,650.  
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implement load allocations for nonpoint sources or creates for EPA 
[or] States . . . a mandatory duty to do so.”332  
Professor Houck noted that the re-emergence of the TMDL 
program is “forcing a showdown on the last water quality frontier, 
nonpoint source pollution.”333 Yet, a major controversy in the TMDL 
program is the extent to which the program may authorize or even 
require states to adopt controls on nonpoint sources and, if states fail 
to do so, whether EPA may step in and take appropriate action to cure 
state deficiencies.334 EPA’s rules suggest that EPA is ready and 
willing to take aggressive action to ensure that TMDLs are adopted 
and implemented. Yet, the extent of its legal authority to do so is 
severely constrained.  
The first showdown on the TMDL program reached a mixed 
result. In Pronsolino v. Marcus, the court considered “whether listing 
and TMDLs are required for rivers and waters polluted only by 
logging and agricultural runoff and/or other nonpoint sources . . . .”335 
The court concluded that TMDLS must be promulgated for waters 
impaired by nonpoint source pollution, but also held that EPA has no 
authority to enforce load allocations on nonpoiont sources. 
In Pronsolino, plaintiffs challenged TMDLs promulgated by the 
EPA for the Garcia River in northern California.336 The Garcia River 
suffered from excessive sediment loading, almost exclusively from 
nonpoint sources, which degraded fish spawning habitat and caused a 
severe decline in Coho salmon and steelhead trout populations.337 
EPA’s TMDL called for a sixty percent reduction in sediment loading 
and allocated cleanup responsibilities among nonpoint sources in the 
Garcia River watershed.338 When the Pronsolinos applied for a permit 
 
 332. Id. at 43,600-01. Citizen may bring suits against EPA only “where there is alleged a 
failure of [EPA] to perform any act or duty under [the CWA] which is not discretionary with 
[EPA].” 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(2) (2001). See Nat’l Wildlife Fed. v. Browner, 127 F.3d 1126 
(D.C. Cir. 1997) (citizen suit allowable only to enforce “mandatory duties”). 
 333. Oliver A. Houck, TMDLs IV: The Final Frontier, 29 Envtl. L. Rep. 10469, 10471 
(Aug. 1999).  
 334. See HOUCK, TMDL PROGRAM, supra note 16, at 84; Boyd, supra note 11, at 48. 
 335. Pronsolino v. Marcus, 91 F. Supp. 2d 1337, 1340 (N.D. Cal. 2000).  
 336. EPA promulgated the TMDLs when the state of California failed to meet a deadline 
for submitting the TMDLs that EPA had established in response to litigation and a consent 
decree. See id. at 1340. 
 337. Id. at 1339. 
 
 338. Id. at 1340. 
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from the California Department of Forestry (CDF) to harvest timber 
on their property, the agency imposed a variety of restrictions to 
prevent soil erosion, which the agency determined were necessary to 
implement the EPA’s TMDL. The CDF reluctantly applied the EPA’s 
TMDLs, concluding that to ignore them risked a loss of federal 
funding.339  
The court rejected the Pronsolinos’ argument that the TMDL 
program did not apply to waters impaired solely by nonpoint source 
pollution. The court noted the requirement of section 303(e)(3)(c), 
which provides that TMDLs must be incorporated into a state’s 
“continuing planning process,”340 and concluded that TMDLs were 
intended to promote a “comprehensive approach” to state water 
quality management. The court noted that excluding waterbodies 
impaired by nonpoint sources from the TMDL program would 
frustrate that intention.341 Similarly, the court concluded that the 
language of section 303(d)(1)(A) expressly excluded from the 
required list of impaired waterbodies only those that could be 
“redeem[ed] through the imposition of state-of-the-art technology on 
point sources . . . .”342 In the court’s view, “[t]o have excluded the 
large number of rivers and waters polluted solely by agricultural and 
logging runoff would have left a chasm in the otherwise 
‘comprehensive’ statutory scheme.”343  
The court made clear, however, that the TMDL program’s 
potential to control nonpoint source pollution depends largely on the 
states. Plaintiffs argued strenuously that EPA lacked authority to 
 
 339. Id.  
 340. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(e)(3)(C) (2001).  
 341. Pronsolino, 91 F. Supp. 2d at 1347. (quoting Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., v. Fox, 
909 F. Supp. 153, 156 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)). The court noted that, “[i]f the TMDL . . . were to be 
used only to adjust NPDES effluent limitations for point sources, then plaintiffs’ argument 
might have force,” but concluded that a broader use for TMDLs was contemplated by requiring 
their inclusion in the continuing planning process. Id. at 1346. 
 342. Id. at 1347. 
 343. Id. The court also relied on dicta in other cases indicating that TMDLs were to be 
fashioned for waters plagued by nonpoint source pollution, or that nonpoint sources were 
subject to regulation by the states under the comprehensive planning provisions of the CWA. 
See id. at 1347-49 (citing Trs. for Ala. v. EPA, 749 F.2d 549 (9th Cir. 1984); Or. Natural Res. 
Council v. United States Forest Serv., 834 F.2d 842 (9th Cir. 1987); Ala. Ctr. for the Env’t v. 
Browner, 20 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 1994); Dioxin/Organochlorine Ctr. v. Clarke, 57 F.3d 1517 (9th 
Cir. 1995)).  
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promulgate TMDLs because to do so was tantamount to authorizing 
EPA to “regulate state land-use practices”344—a function not 
expressly authorized in the CWA and one that has traditionally been 
exercised by state and local governments. The court agreed that EPA 
lacked authority to regulate nonpoint sources directly by imposing 
BMPs or other land use restrictions or indirectly by overriding state 
choices about the extent to which nonpoint sources are to be 
controlled.345 The court concluded, however, that the EPA’s TMDLs 
did not themselves impose such controls nor dictate a course that the 
state inevitably must follow. While the state must incorporate an 
EPA-promulgated TMDL into its planning processes,346 “[n]othing 
. . . requires that the TMDL be uncritically and mechanically passed 
through to every relevant parcel of land . . . . California is also free to 
moderate or to modify the TMDL reductions, or even refuse to 
implement them, in light of countervailing state interests.”347  
EPA may properly threaten to withhold grant money to induce a 
state to enforce TMDL load allocations, but the states are “free to run 
the risk“ and ignore these allocations.348 Moreover, if a state does 
“knuckle under to coercive threats by EPA” and implement the load 
allocations, the result is not “direct federal regulation. The regulation 
is by [the state]—though influenced by incentives established by 
Congress and the agency charged with protecting the 
environment.”349 
In short, while EPA may promulgate TMDLs for waters that 
suffer from nonpoint source pollution, and may allocate cleanup 
responsibilities to nonpoint sources, that action has no direct 
regulatory effect and cannot be enforced. A state may choose to adopt 
the allocations and enforce them under state law, but EPA cannot 
 
 344. Pronsolino, 91 F. Supp. 2d at 1355. 
 345. Id.  
 346. See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(2). Even this conclusion is shaky since nothing in the statute 
authorizes EPA to revise state plans. If a state simply refused to incorporate an EPA-
promulgated TMDL into its continuing planning process, EPA could take a number of actions, 
such as withdrawing federal funding to state programs or de-certifying an approved state 
section 402 permit program, see 33 U.S.C. § 1313(e)(2), but EPA is not authorized to 
promulgate a federal plan to cure deficiencies in the state’s plan.  
 347. Pronsolino, 91 F. Supp. 2d at 1355. 
 348. Id. 
 349. Id. 
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compel that result, nor may it enforce the allocations once they have 
been made by a state. Pronsolino confirms Professor Houck’s view 
that, “at bottom, the courts can only go so far. Indeed, under section 
303(d), EPA can only go so far. At some point, through leverage, 
funding and hard negotiation, the states are going to have to buy into 
the program.”350 To a considerable extent, then, the TMDL 
program—as a regulatory program for controlling nonpoint 
sources—like section 208 and section 319—“leads, ultimately, to a 
state prerogative.”351  
There are, however, considerable means available to EPA to 
induce effective state control of nonpoint sources through the TMDL 
program. Aside from withholding funding, as suggested in 
Pronsolino, the agency may be able to use its regulatory authority to 
“coerce” states into action. First, EPA may withdraw approval of 
state authority to administer the NPDES program.352 Second, EPA 
may designate certain sources that are currently unregulated under 
the NPDES as “point sources,” subjecting them to the NPDES 
regime. These sources may include unregulated AFOs, aquatic 
animal production facilities, and silvicultural operations.353 As EPA 
explained in its TMDL rule: 
EPA could invoke this authority when necessary to provide 
reasonable assurance that an EPA approved or established 
TMDL would be implemented with respect to the particular 
source to be designated. Moreover, EPA . . . could invoke this 
authority when necessary to provide reasonable assurance that 
 
 350. HOUCK, TMDL PROGRAM, supra note 16, at 64. 
 351. Id. at 60.  
 352. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(c)(3) (1994) (authorizing withdrawal of state programs 
“[w]henever [EPA] determines . . . that a State is not administering a program approved under 
this section in accordance with the requirements of this section”).  
 353. See TDML Rule, supra note 16, at 43646. AFOs and aquatic animal production 
facilities (AAPFs) are regarded as point sources only if they are considered “concentrated.” 
AFOs and AAPFs are deemed concentrated when they meet certain threshold requirements or 
when so designated ona case-by-case basis. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 122.23(c), 122.24(c) (2001). The 
potentially affected silviculture operations relate to storm water discharges that are currently 
treated as “nonpoint” sources, but “may physically resemble point source discharges.” TDML 
Rule, supra note 16, at 43650. EPA decided not to take action on silviculture operations. See id. 
at 43652. 
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the designated source would achieve its allocated load 
reductions under the TMDL.354 
In other words, if particular “nonpoint” sources are allocated load 
reductions in a TMDL, EPA could redesignate such sources as point 
sources and enforce the load allocation through the NPDES 
program.355  
Moreover, EPA could, under its antidegradation rules, condition 
NPDES permits to new or expanding point sources on those sources 
obtaining “offsets”—reductions from existing sources (both point and 
nonpoint)—to ensure that existing levels of water quality are not 
further degraded or to provide for reasonable progress toward 
attaining water quality standards.356 This would essentially follow the 
nonattainment program for “new” major sources under the Clean Air 
Act.357 EPA proposed such changes to its NPDES rules,358 but 
declined to finalize this proposal, concluding that an offset 
requirement would be difficult to apply in the CWA context and that 
the environmental benefits of such a requirement would likely be 
minimal.359  
Finally, EPA may also assert its authority to review state-issued 
permits for consistency with EPA-approved TMDLs, or to ensure 
water-quality-based effluent limitations are imposed when there is 
not an approved TMDL in place.360  
The extent to which these authorities will be exercised is, of 
course, an open question. By comparison, statutes that provide EPA 
 
 354. Id. 
 355. Cf. Ruhl, supra note 5, at 303 (noting that EPA has suggested that “states simply 
declare, presumably as a matter of state law, that offending nonpoint sources are actually point 
sources and require state-issued NPDES permits and full TMDL compliance”) (citing Office of 
Water, E.P.A., Ensuring That TMDLs Are Implemented—Reasonable Assurance, available at 
http://www.epa.gov/OWOW/tmdl/ensure.html (last visited Mar. 16, 2002). 
 356. See Revisions to the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Program and 
Federal Antidegradation Policy in Support of Revisions to the Water Quality Planning and 
Management Regulation, 64 Fed. Reg. 46058 (Aug. 23, 1999) (to be codified at 40 D.F.R. pts. 
122, 123, 124 and 131) (proposing offset requirement for new and expanded sources). 
 357. See 42 U.S.C. § 7503(a)(1)(A) (2001). For suggestions of using a similar program in 
the CWA, see Adler, Watershed Protection, supra note 132, at 281-84.  
 358. See supra note 356.  
 359. TDML Rule, supra note 16, at 43640-41. 
 360. See 40 C.F.R. § 123.44(k) (2001); see also TDML Rule, supra note 16, at 43644-46, 
43652-53.  
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with similar tools to induce state action, such as the Coastal Zone Act 
Reauthorization Amendments’ nonpoint source control program, 
discussed infra, and the Clean Air Act,361 do not show promising 
results. Moreover, the coercive tactics that the EPA can use against 
reluctant states are all discretionary sanctions. As a result, citizens 
cannot compel EPA to apply such sanctions through citizen suit 
litigation.362  
But even assuming EPA can successfully “encourage” the states 
to implement TMDLs, the program suffers from a fatal flaw: there is 
no explicit performance standard by which to assess state TMDL 
programs. To be sure, section 303(e) contemplates an iterative, 
continuous planning process, under which TMDLs may be re-
evaluated and fine-tuned to account for shortcomings as the plans are 
implemented and water quality improvements are assessed. Yet, the 
states are not subject to clear deadlines or clear consequences if 
TMDL implementation does not yield the desired outcomes.  
Given the vast uncertainties in linking specific pollutant loadings 
to actual water quality impacts, the opportunities for “gaming” the 
system through inadequate TMDLs are very large.363 But when the 
effects of this gaming become clear and water quality improvements 
do not materialize, all the states are required to do, and all EPA can 
demand for them to do, is to “try, try again.” There are simply no 
meaningful incentives for states, when developing and implementing 
TMDL plans, to err on the side of caution. Indeed, to the extent that 
imposing enforceable control measures on farms is politically 
difficult, the incentives run in precisely the opposite direction.  
This overview of CWA programs confirms the view that, taken in 
its entirety, the CWA—the nation’s primary legislative vehicle for 
cleaning up our waters—lacks any mandates against agricultural 
nonpoint source pollution that are directly enforceable either by 
 
 361. See Williams, supra note 49, at 83-96.  
 362. Citizen suits against EPA under the CWA are limited to those seeking to compel EPA 
“to perform any act or duty . . . which is not discretionary . . . .” 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(2) (2001); 
see also Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Browner, 127 F.3d 1126 (D.C. Cir. 1997).  
 363. For an example of the extraordinary “flexibility” that the EPA is granting to the states 
in fashioning TMDLs, see Natural Res. Def. Council v. Muszynski, 268 F.3d 91 (2d Cir. 2001) 
(upholding EPA’s approval of New York’s TMDLs which were expressed in terms of 
maximum annual loads of pollutants).  
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federal authorities or affected citizens. Despite several amendments 
and the renaissance of provisions once thought to be merely 
hortatory, Congress has failed to adequately confront agricultural 
nonpoint source pollution, continuing a longstanding solicitude to 
this industry. The TMDL program presents some opportunities to 
close this regulatory loophole, but it is hardly a direct approach, and 
there are significant barriers to its successful implementation. 
B. Other Federal Programs to Control Nonpoint Source Pollution 
In addition to the CWA, several other federal programs are aimed, 
directly and indirectly, at nonpoint source pollution. However, none 
of these programs directly regulate agricultural practices that 
contribute to nonpoint source pollution. Instead, these programs rely 
on “green payments” or the threat of withholding federal benefits to 
alter behavior that contributes to nonpoint source pollution. In this 
section, I briefly discuss the Coastal Zone Management Act and 
several programs administered by USDA to provide examples of 
alternative ways to control nonpoint source pollution.  
1. The Coastal Zone Management Act.  
The Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA)364 bears a close 
resemblance to the CWA planning programs discussed above, 
particularly the section 319 nonpoint source program, with some 
important exceptions. Much like section 319, the CZMA seeks to 
enlist the states’ help in creating coastal zone management programs. 
This is done by offering two basic incentives: federal financial 
assistance for approved management plans365 and a federal 
“consistency” requirement.366 Coastal zone management programs 
 
 364. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1465 (2001).  
 365. Id. § 1455(a)-(c). In addition, states with approved coastal zone management plans are 
eligible for federal technical assistance. See id. § 1455a(f).  
 366. Id. § 1456(C). Under the federal consistency requirement, subject to some important 
exceptions, no “[f]ederal license or permit to conduct an activity, in or outside of the coastal 
zone, affecting any land or water use or natural resource of the coastal zone” of a state with an 
approved management plan may be issued if a state concludes that the action authorized by a 
federal agency is inconsistent with the “enforceable policies” of the state’s approved plan. Id. 
§ 1456(c)(1)(3)(A). A similar consistency requirement applies to “any plan for the exploration 
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must include a number of required elements, but in general the 
program must be a “comprehensive statement . . . setting forth the 
objectives, policies, and standards to guide public and private uses of 
lands and waters in the coastal zone.”367 The management programs 
are voluntary; states may freely choose not to participate in the 
program. The CZMA is administered by the National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Agency (NOAA).368 
In 1990, with enactment of the Coastal Zone Act Reauthorization 
Amendments (CZARA), Congress created a new program (section 
6217 program) “to develop and implement management measures for 
nonpoint source pollution to restore and protect coastal waters.”369 
The section 6217 program requires all states with approved coastal 
zone management plans to submit to NOAA and EPA a Coastal 
Nonpoint Pollution Control Program (CNPCP).370 The CNPCP must 
identify, and provide a “continuing process for identifying, land uses 
which, individually or cumulatively, may cause or contribute to a 
degradation of” coastal waters that either are failing to attain state 
water quality standards or are “threatened by reasonably foreseeable 
increases in pollution loadings from new or expanding sources.”371 In 
addition, the CNPCP must provide for implementation of 
management measures conforming to guidelines issued jointly by the 
EPA and NOAA.372 States were to submit their programs to NOAA 
 
or development of, or production from, any area which has been leased under the Outer 
Continental Shelf Lands Act (43 U.S.C. 1331 et seq.) . . . with respect to any exploration, 
development, or production described in such plan and affecting any land or water use or 
natural resource of the coastal zone” of a state. Id. § 1456(c)(3)(B); see also Exxon Corp. v. 
Fischer, 807 F.2d 842, 844 (9th Cir. 1987). A weaker consistency requirement applies to other 
“[f]ederal agency activity” and “[f]ederal agency which shall undertake any development 
project.” These federal actions must be taken in ways that are “consistent to the maximum 
extent practicable with the enforceable policies of approved State management programs.” Id. 
§§ 1456(c)(1)-(2). The term “enforceable policy” is defined as “[s]tate policies which are 
legally binding through constitutional provisions, laws, regulations, land use plans, ordinances, 
or judicial or administrative decisions, by which a [s]tate exerts control over private and public 
land and water uses and natural resources in the coastal zone.” Id. § 1453(6a). The term “coastal 
zone” is defined at 16 U.S.C. § 1453(1).  
 367. 16 U.S.C. § 1453(12).  
 368. See http://www.ocrm.nos.noaa.gov/czm/ (last visited Mar. 16, 2002). 
 369. 16 U.S.C. § 1455b(a)(1).  
 370. Id. 
 371. Id. § 1455b(b)(1).  
 372. Id. § 1455b(b). Requirements governing the guidance are set forth at § 1455b(g). 
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and EPA no later than thirty months after the EPA promulgates the 
management measures guidance.373 Because these programs are 
mandatory only for states who have approved coastal zone 
management programs, any state may opt out of the requirements of 
the section 6217 program simply by withdrawing from participation 
in a cost-sharing coastal zone management program 
Each state’s CNPCP is to be implemented through changes to the 
state’s CWA section 319 plan and coastal zone management 
program.374 Unlike section 319, CZARA mandates that each state’s 
coastal zone management program “contain[ ] enforceable policies 
and mechanisms to implement the applicable requirements of” the 
state’s CNPCP.375 If a state fails to submit an approvable program, 
NOAA and EPA are directed to withhold funding to the state under 
the CZMA and section 319 of the CWA.376 As in section 319, no 
provision is made for federal management programs in those states 
that elect not to participate. Citizen suits are also not available to 
enforce state-adopted management measures or to force EPA or 
NOAA to perform nondiscretionary duties.  
EPA issued guidance on management measures in 1993.377 The 
guidance included management measures for agriculture, forestry, 
urban areas, marinas and recreational boating, hydromodification, 
and wetlands and riparian areas.378 The agricultural portion of the 
guidance included measures for erosion and sediment control, 
wastewater and runoff from AFOs, nutrients, pesticides, grazing, and 
 
“Management measures” are defined as 
economically achievable measures for the control of the addition of pollutants from 
existing and new categories of nonpoint sources of pollution, which reflect the greatest 
degree of pollutant reduction achievable through the application of the best available 
nonpoint pollution control practices, technologies, processes, operating methods, or 
other alternatives.  
Id.  § 1455b(g)(5).  
 373. Id. § 1455b(a)(1).  
 374. Id. §1455b(c)(2).  
 375. Id. § 1455(d)(16).  
 376. Id. § 1455b(c)(3).  
 377. EPA, Guidance Specifying Management Measures for Sources of Nonpoint Pollution 
in Coastal Waters (1993), available at http://www.epa.gov/owow/nps/MMGI/ (last visited May 
29, 2002).  
 378. Id. 
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irrigation.379 These agencies also issued program guidance the same 
year.380  
Despite some high hopes from various quarters, the section 6217 
program failed to live up to its potential. The states resisted the 
section 6217 program with a vengeance.381 As Professor Houck 
explained: 
Whatever else went wrong, EPA and NOAA ran into more 
than they could handle from the coastal states and their 
nonpoint source constituencies. . . . As the state pressure 
mounted, the federal agencies issued program clarification in 
1995. Entitled Flexibility for Sate Coastal Nonpoint Programs, 
it extended the time frames for state submission, presented a 
“range of enforceable policies and mechanisms that could be 
used by states to implement their programs,” and announced 
[a] policy of conditional approvals . . . .382 
In its final program guidance, and notwithstanding the statutory 
requirement that management measures be “enforceable,” the 
agencies concluded that states may rely on “voluntary or incentive-
based programs, backed by existing state enforcement authorities,” if 
the states satisfied certain minimal conditions.383 To date, only eight 
 
 379. Id. 
 380. Coastal Nonpoint Pollution State Program Guidance Documents, 58 Fed. Reg. 5182 
(Jan. 19, 1993).  
 381. See Andrew Solomon, Section 6217 of the Coastal Zone Act Reauthorization 
Amendments of 1990: Is There any Point?, 31 ENVTL. L. 151, 162 (2001). 
 382. HOUCK, TMDL PROGRAM, supra note 16, at 102 (quoting Availability of Proposed 
Administrative Changes to Coastal Nonpoint Pollution Programs Guidance, 63 Fed. Reg. 12078 
(Mar. 12, 1998)).  
 383. Final Administrative Changes to the Coastal Nonpoint Pollution Control Program 
Guidance, at 4 (1998), available at http://www.ocrm.nos.noaa.gov/czm/6217/ (last visited May 
29, 2002). The conditions require the states to provide: 
1. a legal opinion from the attorney general or an attorney representing the agency with 
jurisdiction for enforcement that such authorities can be used to prevent nonpoint 
pollution and require management measures implementation, as necessary;  
2. a description of the voluntary or incentive-based programs, including the methods 
for tracking and evaluating those programs, the states will use to encourage 
implementation of the management measures; and  
3. a description of the mechanism or process that links the implementing agency with 
the enforcement agency and a commitment to use the existing enforcement authorities 
where necessary.  
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of the twenty-nine coastal states maintain fully approved programs, 
even under the weaker requirements of the agencies’ final 
guidance.384 Yet, states continue to receive funding for CZMA or 
CWA section 319 programs despite the states’ failures to submit 
approvable plans. The lesson here is that, “[w]hen push comes to 
shove, the federal environmental agencies will not be able to hold 
their own without the offsetting influence of direct citizen 
involvement and at least the possibility of litigation.”385  
2. USDA Programs 
For many years, the federal government’s agricultural policy was 
to shore up agricultural commodity prices to ensure a productive 
national agricultural base. The government provided direct payments, 
in the form of crop subsidies and land retirement programs, with 
these basic policy priorities in mind. With the passage of the 1985 
Farm Bill, however, the traditional emphasis on supporting 
commodity prices shifted in recognition that many practices 
encouraged by these policies contributed to significant environmental 
degradation.386 The 1985 Farm Bill and subsequent legislation 
created several new programs to promote more environmentally-
friendly agricultural practices.387  
The programs fall into four basic categories: (1) compliance 
requirements, which condition a farmer’s continuing eligibility for 
traditional agricultural subsidies on the implementation of 
 
Id.  
 384. See id.  
 385. HOUCK, TMDL PROGRAM, supra note 16, at 104.  
 386. See Malone, supra note 27, at 9-12. Professor Malone attributes the shift in policy 
emphasis to four factors:  
the first opportunity since 1981 for a comprehensive revamping of agricultural policy; 
the spiraling cost of government subsidy programs aimed at the reduction of farm 
output; the growing recognition of the environmental destruction inflicted by past 
agricultural policies; and, perhaps most important, the recognition by urban and 
suburban interests, as well as by environmental groups, of their stake in the Farm Bill 
debate. 
Id. at 11.  
 387. See Michael R. Taylor, The Emerging Merger of Agricultural Land and 
Environmental Policy: Building a Vision for the Future of American Agriculture, 20 VA. 
ENVTL. L.J. 169, 179-81 (2001).  
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conservation plans and practices or the avoidance of land use changes 
that contribute to environmental degradation; (2) technical assistance 
and education programs; (3) cost-sharing programs for implementing 
practice and structural changes that protect environmental values; and 
(4) contract and easement programs to retire environmentally 
sensitive land from agricultural production.388 While these programs 
aim to alleviate a variety of environmental problems, all may address 
practices that contribute to nonpoint source water pollution.  
a. Compliance Programs: Sodbuster, Conservation 
Compliance, and Swampbuster 
Three programs, administered by USDA agencies, restrain 
practices that contribute to water quality degradation and other 
environmental problems. To do so, the programs condition eligibility 
for traditional USDA farm subsidies on a farmer’s observance of 
certain conservation measures. The first two programs, “Sodbuster” 
and the conservation compliance program, discourage agricultural 
production on highly erodible lands. The third program, 
“Swampbuster,” provides incentives to farmers to refrain from 
converting wetlands to agricultural production. In general, these 
programs rest on the principle that farmers who receive federal 
subsidies should be required to observe practices that reduce the 
adverse environmental effects of their activities, including water 
quality degradation.389 A brief outline shows a limited ability for 
these programs to induce lasting changes in agricultural practices that 
contribute to nonpoint source pollution.  
Under the Sodbuster program, the government pronounces as 
ineligible for USDA benefits any farmer who produces agricultural 
commodities on highly erodible land that was not in agricultural 
production, or set aside from production under a USDA program, 
between 1981 and 1985, unless the farmer implements a conservation 
 
 388. See U.S.D.A., ECONOMIC RESEARCH SERVICE, AGRICULTURAL RESOURCES AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL INDICATORS, 1996-7, at 255 (1977).  
 389. Congressional Research Service, Conservation Compliance for Agriculture: Status 
and Policy Issues, Report No. 96-648 ENR (Apr. 10. 1998), available at 
http://www.cnie.org/NLE/CRSreports/Agriculture/ag-45.cfm (last visited Apr. 22, 2002) 
[hereinafter Conservation Compliance]. 
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plan.390 For highly erodible land that was in agricultural production 
between 1981 and 1985, or that was set aside under a USDA 
program, the conservation compliance program also denies benefits 
unless the farmer implements a conservation plan.391 There is a subtle 
difference between the treatment of Sodbuster farmers and 
conservation compliance farmers. Conservation plans for farmers 
subject to Sodbuster tend to be more stringent than those developed 
under the conservation compliance program. The reason for this 
difference in treatment rests primarily on the different economic 
positions of affected farmers: 
persons who break out [highly erodible] lands are in a different 
position with regard to the economic consequences of 
implementing the conservation requirements than are those 
who have been using their land for commodity production, 
since crop bases or commodity price support eligibility are not 
yet established for the broken-out fields. Requiring the 
conservation systems on these lands to be more stringent than 
those applicable to existing cropland fields does not unfairly or 
unreasonably impose an economic hardship on producers who 
want to bring new land into production.392  
Conservation plans are subject to approval by local conservation 
officers. The relative lack of determinate criteria393 governing these 
 
 390. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 3811-12 (2001); see also Malone, supra note 27, at 13-14. 
 391. Malone, supra note 27, at 13-14. 
 392. Malone, supra note 27, at 17 (quoting Highly Erodible Land and Wetland 
Conservation: Correction, 53 Fed. Reg. 3998-3999 (1988)). In addition, farmers subject to the 
conservation compliance program were given a longer, phase-in period in which to fully 
implement their conservation plans. See id. at 18. 
 393. USDA regulations define a “conservation plan” as  
“the document that . . . [a]pplies to highly erodible cropland; . . . .[d]escribes the 
conservation system applicable to the highly erodible cropland and describes the 
decisions of the person with respect to location, land use, tillage systems, and 
conservation treatment measures and schedules; and [i]s approved by the local soil 
conservation district in consultation with the [designated] local committees . . . .”  
7 C.F.R. § 12.2 (2001). The USDA regulations define a “conservation system” as  
a combination of one or more conservation measures or management practices that are 
. . . [b]ased on local resource conditions, available conservation technology, and the 
standards and guidelines contained in the NRCS field office technical guides . . . and 
. . . [d]esigned . . . to achieve, in a cost-effective and technically practicable manner, a 
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approvals allows local conservation officers to exercise considerable 
discretion about the contents and practice requirements to which a 
framer must conform. As Professor Malone observed, this discretion 
allows agency representatives “to succumb to pressure from farmers 
to weaken conservation requirements.”394  
Further, significant concerns arise concerning under-enforcement 
of the conservation compliance program. “Cultural issues” may 
contribute to this problem, as the USDA agencies charged with 
enforcing the programs traditionally view their job as assisting 
farmers, not as “regulating” their activities.395 As of 1996, 3,875 
farmers neglected to comply with the conservation compliance and 
Sodbuster programs, resulting in a loss of benefits of $15.5 million.396 
Compared to the billions of dollars in USDA benefits disbursed in the 
same period,397 this sum appears rather paltry. 
In addition, these statistics fail to reflect changes made in these 
programs by the Federal Agricultural Improvement and Reform Act 
of 1996 (FAIR), which introduced a considerable amount of 
“flexibility” into these programs. Some examples of this flexibility 
include: allowing violators up to one year to meet compliance 
requirements before benefits are withheld; expediting “variances” for 
weather, pest, or disease problems; permitting farmers to “self-
certify” compliance when applying for benefits; allowing farmers to 
modify their conservation plans; allowing county committees to grant 
relief to farmers suffering “undue economic hardship”; and deleting 
crop insurance from the list of program benefits that can be denied.398  
The Swampbuster program is similar to the Sodbuster program, 
 
substantial reduction in soil erosion or a substantial improvement in soil conditions on 
a field or group of fields containing highly erodible cropland when compared to the 
level of erosion or soil conditions that existed before the application of the 
conservation measures and management practices.  
Id.  
 394. Malone, supra note 27, at 18.  
 395. See Conservation Compliance, supra note 389; see also General Accounting Office, 
Soil and Wetlands Conservation: Soil Conservation Service Making Good Progress but 
Cultural Issues Need Attention, available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/ 
useftp.cgi?IPaddress=162.140.64.21&filename=rc94241.txt&directory=/diskb/wais/data/gao 
(last visited Sept. 6, 2002)  [hereinafter Soil and Wetlands Conservation].  
 396. Conservation Compliance, supra note 389. 
 397. Id. 
 
 398. Id. 
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but specifically targets conversions of wetlands to agricultural 
production. In the 1985 Farm Bill, Swampbuster denied USDA 
benefits to “any person who in any crop year produces an agricultural 
commodity on converted wetland.”399 Ineligibility for such benefits 
was limited to the crop year in which converted wetlands yielded 
agricultural commodities.400 In 1990, Congress concluded that this 
limited basis for denying USDA benefits did not adequately 
discourage inappropriate agricultural uses of valuable wetlands.401 
Accordingly, Congress extended ineligibility to “any person who in 
any crop year beginning after [November 28, 1990], converts a 
wetland by draining, dredging, filling, leveling, or any other means 
for the purpose, or to have the effect, of making the production of an 
agricultural commodity possible on such converted wetland.”402 
Further, Congress extended the period of ineligibility for persons 
engaging in such activities to include “all subsequent crop years.”403  
FAIR introduced a number of measures designed to introduce 
greater flexibility into the Swampbuster programs. Farmers who 
converted wetlands for agricultural production are no longer 
classified as automatically ineligible for USDA program benefits. 
Instead, FAIR created a provision for graduated sanctions and good 
faith exceptions. Upon a finding that a farmer engaged in practices 
that render the farmer ineligible for benefits, the graduated sanctions 
approach permits the USDA to reduce benefits in “an amount 
 
 399. Food Security Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-198, Title XII, Subtitle C, § 1221, 99 Stat. 
1507. 
 400. Id. 
 401. S. REP. NO. 101-357, at 236 (1990), The legislative history of the 1990 amendments 
identified the deficiencies of the 1985 Act: 
[Under the 1985 Act ] a person may drain a wetland and not be in violation of 
swampbuster until the person produces an agricultural commodity on that land. 
Therefore, a person can produce on the converted wetland during a time of high 
commodity prices and stay out of the production adjustment programs. During a year 
of low commodity prices, the person can simply not produce on the converted wetland 
and regain eligibility for farm program benefits. The functional value of the wetland, 
however, is lost as long as it is converted. 
Id., reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4656, 4890.  
 402. Food, Agriculture, Conservation, and Trade Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-624, Title 
XIV, Subtitle B, § 1421(b), 104 Stat. 3572.  
 403. Id. 
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determined . . . to be proportionate to the severity of the violation.”404 
The good faith exemption waives ineligibility if “the person acted in 
good faith and without intent to violate” the conditions governing 
eligibility and agrees to implement a mitigation plan.405 FAIR also 
enabled ineligible farmers to regain eligibility for program benefits 
by implementing approved mitigation projects.406 Because these 
avenues of escape from program ineligibility lie largely within the 
discretion of USDA agencies, they will most likely be interpreted to 
favor farmers. As noted above with the Sodbuster program, these 
agencies traditionally act with reluctance as “regulators” towards 
their constituent farmers.407  
The methods used by compliance programs, such as Sodbuster 
and Swampbuster present serious drawbacks in addition to those 
previously identified. First, if the cost of compliance is high, the 
threat of losing some USDA benefits may not provide sufficient 
incentives to induce compliance. Consequently, farmers may opt out 
of the USDA farm program as conservation measures become stricter 
or more costly.408 Second, as commodity price supports are phased 
out in upcoming years, the incentives for conservation practices will 
 
 404. 16 U.S.C. § 3821(a)(2) (2001). Additionally, the 1996 amendments permit the 
Secretary of Agriculture to determine which, if any, of the various benefits may be withheld in 
response to restricted activities. See 16 U.S.C. § 3821(b). Prior to the 1996 amendments, 
graduated sanctions based on the severity of the violation were available only if the violation 
was found to have been committed inadvertently by a person acting in good faith and only if 
that person was actively restoring the wetland functions and values that were lost as a result of 
the violation. See Act of Nov. 28, 1990, P.L. 101-624, Title XIV, Subtitle B, § 1422, 104 Stat. 
3573. 
 405. 7 C.F.R. § 12.5(b)(5)(i) (2001). 
 406. Id. § 12.5(b)(4); see also 16 U.S.C. § 3822(i): 
Any person who is determined to be ineligible for program benefits . . . for any crop 
year shall not be ineligible for such program benefits . . . for any subsequent crop year 
if, prior to the beginning of such subsequent crop year, the person has fully restored 
the characteristics of the converted wetland to its prior wetland state or has otherwise 
adequately mitigated for the loss of wetland values . . . . 
 407. Soil and Wetland Conservation, supra note 396, at 7 (noting underreporting of 
violations to avoid citing farmers for violations.). 
 408. See J. Walker et al., The Efficiency and Effectiveness of Conservation Compliance 
under 1996 Farm Commodity Policy Reforms, 55 J. SOIL & WATER CONSERVATION 447 
(2000).  
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simply erode.409 Finally, controlling erosion and wetland conversions 
is only a small part of the totality of agricultural practices that 
contribute to nonpoint source pollution. Moreover, many of the most 
damaging practices—such as animal waste management—take place 
on farms that do not participate in USDA benefit programs; “[t]he 
programs have no hold over landholders who do not grow program 
crops or are prepared to forego program benefits.”410 Thus, even if 
these compliance programs worked effectively—and there is 
considerable evidence that they do not411—they would be much less 
than what is needed to make an effective response to agricultural 
nonpoint source pollution.412 
b. Land Retirement and Cost-Sharing Programs 
In addition to Swampbuster and Sodbuster, USDA administers a 
variety of programs that offer technical and financial assistance to 
farmers. Many of these address practices that contribute to nonpoint 
source pollution. The three major programs are the Wetland Reserve 
Program, the Conservation Reserve Program, and the Environmental 
Quality Incentives Program. These programs fall under an umbrella 
statutory program enacted in 1990 and reauthorized by the 1996 Farm 
Bill entitled, the Environmental Conservation Acreage Program 
(ECARP).413 
Congress instructed USDA to establish and maintain ECARP for 
calendar years 1996 through 2002. A significant split of opinion 
exists within Congress regarding reauthorization of these plans both 
on the need for change and the appropriate level of funding for 
existing programs.414 The general ECARP program authorizes USDA 
 
 409. See Bradley C. Karkkainen, Biodiversity and Land, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 67-68 
(1997); CLAASSEN ET AL., AGRI-ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AT THE CROSSROADS: GUIDEPOSTS 
ON A CHANGING LANDSCAPE, U.S.D.A. Agricultural Economic Rep. No. 794, at 12 (2001), 
available at http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/aer794/ (last visited Jan. 21, 2002).  
 410. David Farrier, Conserving Biodiversity on Private Land: Incentives for Management 
or Compensation for Lost Expectations, 19 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 303, 341 (1995); see 
CLAASSEN ET AL., supra note 409, at 12.  
 411. See General Accounting Office, Soil and Wetland Conservation, supra note 199, at 7; 
Farrier, supra note 410, at 341.  
 412. Farrier, supra note 410, at 341.  
 413. 16 U.S.C. § 3830(a)(3) (2001): see Malone, supra note 27, at 19 (1993). 
 
 414. See Congressional Research Service, Report No. RL31185, The 2002 Farm Bill: 
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to employ a variety of financial incentives to the agricultural 
community to promote conservation practices. In particular, Congress 
directed USDA to implement ECARP “through contracts and the 
acquisition of easements to assist owners and operators of farms and 
ranches to conserve and enhance soil, water, and related natural 
resources, including grazing land, wetland, and wildlife habitat.”415 
The general provisions of ECARP authorize USDA to designate 
“conservation priority areas” in which agricultural producers are 
eligible for “enhanced assistance” to comply with federal and State 
environmental law.416 Such enhanced assistance is to be based on (1) 
“the significance of the soil, water, wildlife habitat, and related 
natural resource problems in a watershed, multistate area, or region”; 
or (2) “the structural practices or land management practices that best 
address the problems, and that maximize environmental benefits for 
each dollar expended[.]”417 
i. Wetland Reserve Program 
The Wetland Reserve Program (WRP) authorizes USDA to 
purchase conservation easements from and enter into cost-sharing 
agreements with farmers to restore and protect wetlands.418 The WRP 
primarily targets farmed wetlands that can likely be restored in a 
 
Overview and Status, at 31 (Feb. 4, 2002), available at http://www.cnie.org/NLE/CRS/ 
abstract.cfm?NLEid=21987.  
 415. 16 U.S.C. § 3830(a)(1).  
 416. 16 U.S.C. § 3830(c)(1)-(2).  
 417. 16 U.S.C. § 3830(c)(3).  
 418. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 3837-3837f. USDA regulations provide this brief description of the 
WRP: 
Under the WRP, [USDA] will purchase conservation easements from, or enter into 
restoration cost-share agreements with, eligible landowners who voluntarily cooperate 
in the restoration and protection of wetlands and associated lands. To particpate in 
WRP, a landowner will agree to the implementation of a Wetlands Reserve Plan of 
Operations (WRPO), the effect of which is to restore, protect, enhance, maintain, and 
manage the hydrologic conditions of inundation or saturation of the soil, native 
vegetation, and natural topography of eligible lands. [USDA] may provide cost-share 
assistance for the activities that promote the restoration, protection, enhancement, 
maintenance, and management of wetland functions and values. Specific restoration, 
protection, enhancement, maintenance, and management functions may be undertaken 
by the landowner or other [USDA] designee.  
7 C.F.R. § 1467.4(a) (2001). 
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cost-effective manner, are capable of providing wildlife benefits and 
wetland values and functions, and would otherwise continue to be 
devoted to agricultural production.419 The WRP is administered by 
NRCS. 
The owner’s granting of an easement to the United States enrolls 
land into the WRP. The easements are permanent or for a term of 
thirty years420 and must provide for the implementation of a Wetland 
Reserve Plan of Operations (WRPO).421 The WRPO specifies the 
actions required to restore and protect wetlands within the easement 
area. Landowners develop these WRPOs through the NRCS in 
consultation with other agencies.422 Landowners receive 
compensation for the easements and may receive cost-sharing 
assistance in implementing the WRPO “to the extent that [such] cost 
sharing is appropriate and in the public interest[.]”423 The statue also 
authorizes USDA to enroll land into the WRP without obtaining an 
easement through cost-share agreements with landowners who agree 
 
 419. See 16 U.S.C. § 3837(c); 7 C.F.R. § 1467.4(d). Eligible lands include: wetlands 
farmed under natural conditions; farmed wetlands; prior converted cropland; farmed wetland 
pasture; farmland that has become a wetland as a result of flooding; rangeland, pasture, or 
production forestland where the hydrology has been significantly degraded and can be restored; 
riparian areas which link protected wetlands; lands adjacent to protected wetlands that 
contribute significantly to wetland functions and values; and previously restored wetlands. See 
USDA, Natural Resources Conservation Service, Fact Sheet, Wetlands Reserve Program, 
available at http://www.nhq.nrcs.usda.gov/CCS/FB96OPA/WRPfact.html last visited (Mar. 15, 
2002). Ineligible lands include: wetlands converted after December 23, 1985 (and thus subject 
to Swampbuster); lands containing timber or trees under a Conservation Reserve Program 
contract (discussed below); lands owned by an agency of the United States; lands subject to an 
easement or deed restriction prohibiting agricultural production for a duration of thirty or more 
years; and lands where restoration activities would be futile. Id.  
 420. 16 U.S.C. § 3837a(e)(2). The WRP is subject to a total acreage cap of 975,000 acres. 
Id. § 3837(b)(1). Additionally, beginning as of October 1, 1996, the Act requires USDA, “to the 
maximum extent practicable,” to enroll lands in the following ways: (1) one-third of the acres 
through use of permanent easements; (2) one-third of the acres through use of thirty-year (non-
permanent) easements; and (3) one-third of the acres through use of restoration cost-share 
agreements. Id. § 3837(b)(2)(A). 
 421. 7 C.F.R § 1467.10(a); see 16 U.S.C. § 3837a(b).  
 422. 7 C.F.R. § 1467.11. 
 423. 16 U.S.C. § 3837c(a)(1). For permanent easements, cost-share payments may not be 
less than seventy-five nor more than one hundred percent of the costs; for non-permanent 
easements, such payments may not be less than fifty nor more than seventy-four percent of 
implementation costs. 7 C.F.R. § 1467.9. USDA also directs “necessary technical assistance to 
assist owners in complying with the terms and conditions of the easement and the [WRPO].” 16 
U.S.C. § 3837c(a)(2).  
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to restore wetlands on their land.424 A landowner who violates the 
terms of an easement or contract with USDA is liable for any costs 
incurred by the NRCS in remedying the violation, including all 
administrative and legal costs.425  
ii. Conservation Reserve Program 
The Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) seeks to “cost-
effectively assist owners and operators in conserving and improving 
soil, water, and wildlife resources by converting highly erodible and 
other environmentally sensitive acreage normally devoted to the 
production of agricultural commodities to a long-term, resource-
conserving cover.”426 Acting through the Commodity Credit 
Corporation (CCC) and the Farm Service Agency (FSA), USDA 
enters into agreements with persons to retire eligible land from 
production and convert the land to a conserving use under the terms 
of an approved conservation plan.427 The agreements must be for a 
period of not less than ten nor more than fifteen years.428 The total 
acreage that may be enrolled in the CRP is capped at 36.4 million 
acres.  
The CRP primarily applies to agricultural lands that pose on-site 
or off-site environmental problems. Participants enroll in the CRP by 
entering into a contract with CCC that includes the terms and 
conditions for participation, a conservation plan, and any other 
materials or agreements CCC determines to be necessary.429 A 
conservation plan is “a record of the participant’s decisions, and 
supporting information, for treatment of a unit of land or water, and 
includes a schedule of operations, activities, and estimated 
expenditures needed to solve identified natural resource problems by 
devoting eligible land to permanent vegetative cover, trees, water, or 
 
 424. 16 U.S.C. § 3837a(h).  
 425. 7 C.F.R. § 1467.14. 
 426. Conservation Reserve Program—Long-Term Policy, 62 Fed. Reg. 7602, 7604 (Feb. 
19, 1997); see 7 C.F.R. § 1410.3(c).  
 427. 7 C.F.R. § 1410.3.  
 428. Id. 
 429. Id. § 1410.32. 
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other comparable measures.”430 The participant is required to 
implement the conservation plan and forego using the land for 
grazing, harvesting, or other commercial use of crops, unless 
approved by CCC.431 In return, CRP participants receive annual 
rental payments, not to exceed $50,000 per year. Participants may 
also receive cost-share assistance to establish the practices in the 
conservation plan, subject to a limitation of fifty percent of the actual 
or average costs.432  
The initial administration of the CRP was criticized, in part, 
because the acreage enrolled did not represent a broad range of 
environmentally sensitive land, but tended to be the product of the 
lowest bids offered by farmers, screened only by minimal acceptance 
criteria.433 In addition, the CRP represented to many farmers an 
opportunity to retire unprofitable acreage, regardless whether such 
retirement promised significant environmental benefits. In many 
cases, farmers treated the program as essentially a continuation of 
prior policies that aimed to limit production rather than preserve 
environmentally sensitive land. As Professor Malone notes, 
“implementation of the new program [was hampered] due to 
administrative attempts to serve the conflicting objectives of supply 
control and conservation.”434 In addition, many policy makers saw 
programs like the CRP as a way to offset losses in farm support 
occasioned by reduced funding for traditional crop subsidy programs 
and “preferred to provide conservation funds and programs more 
evenly to crop producers across the country[,]” rather than target 
conservation funding at practices and lands with the greatest potential 
for water quality or other environmental improvements.435 
USDA regulations provide that contract offers will be evaluated 
by employing “different factors, as determined by CCC [that] may be 
 
 430. Id. § 1410.2 
 431. Id. § 1410. 20.  
 432. Id. §§ 1410.21, 1410.41(a), 1410.42(c).  
 433. See General Accounting Office, Conservation Reserve Program: Alternatives Are 
Available for Managing Environmentally Sensitive Cropland, Report No GAO/RCED-95-42, at 
13 (Feb. 1995) [hereinafter Conservation Reserve Program]. 
 434. Malone, supra note 27, at 12.  
 435. Congressional Research Service, Environmental Quality Incentives Program (EQIP): 
Status and Issues, Report No. 96-881 ENR (Nov. 1, 1996), available at 
http://www.cnie.org/NLE/CRSreports/Agriculture/ag-74.cfm [hereinafter EQIP Report]. 
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considered from time to time for priority purposes to accomplish the 
goals of the program.”436 After the CRP was reauthorized and 
amended to include a focus on water quality issues, FSA began in 
1991 to use an Environmental Benefits Index (EBI) to evaluate, 
score, and rank contract proposals.437 The EBI assigns points to the 
practices included in a contract proposal based on a number of 
factors, including wildlife benefits, water quality benefits, erosion 
benefits, enduring benefits, air quality benefits, benefits to 
conservation priority areas, and cost.438 A 1995 report by the General 
Accounting Office nonetheless concluded that, “the CRP could have 
provided more environmental benefits for the same amount of federal 
expenditure if USDA had emphasized the program’s water quality 
goals . . . [The] USDA focused primarily on meeting mandated 
acreage goals that were established for each signup, to the detriment 
of the program’s environmental goals.”439 
As part of the Clinton Administration’s Clean Water Action Plan, 
USDA pursued a number of new initiatives under the CRP.440 One is 
 
 436. 7 C.F.R. § 1410.31(b). The regulations list the following factors that may be 
considered: soil erosion; water quality; wildlife benefits; conservation priority area 
designations; likelihood that enrolled land will remain in conserving uses; air quality; and cost 
of enrolling acreage in the CRP. Id. 
 437. Congressional Research Service, Report No. 97-673, Conservation Reserve Program: 
Status and Current Issues, at 2 (May 8, 2001) [hereinafter Status and Current Issues]. USDA 
amended its regulations governing the manner in which lands would be prioritized in 1997, but 
still employs EBI rankings. See Conservation Reserve Program—Long-Term Policy, 62 Fed. 
Reg. 7602 (Feb. 19, 1997); Status and Current Issues, supra, at 3. For a detailed history of the 
CRP and the effects of amendments, see Malone, supra note 27, at 24-33.  
 438. General Accounting Office, Conservation Reserve Program, supra note 433, at 14. A 
description of the EBI is contained in Farm Service Agency, Fact Sheet, Conservation Reserve 
Program Sign-Up 20, Environmental Benefits Index (Sept. 1999), available at 
http://www.fsa.usda.gov/pas/publications/facts/ebiold.pdf (last visited Mar. 16, 2002).  
 439. General Accounting Office, Conservation Reserve Program, supra note 433, at 18.  
 440. The CWAP set forth these “key actions” for USDA in its administration of the CRP: 
(1) “establish two million miles of conservation buffers on agricultural lands to prevent 
pollution and help meet water quality goals”; (2) “reserve four million acres from the 
Conservation Reserve Program for the establishment of conservation buffers”;(3) “pursue 
partnerships with the private sector, farm and conservation organizations, and states, tribes, and 
federal agencies to develop a coordinated campaign to encourage landowners to put 
conservation buffers on their farms and ranches”; (4) “issue a Federal Register notice by early 
1998 announcing the availability of the Conservation Reserve Enhancement Program (CREP) 
and providing programmatic and administrative guidance to states for submitting proposals for 
CREP agreements”; and (5) “work with states to help develop proposals leading to as many 
CREP agreements as practicable to address critical water quality, soil erosion, and fish and 
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known as the Conservation Reserve Enhancement Program (CREP). 
This is a joint federal-state program that uses CRP and state funding 
to develop and implement comprehensive plans that address 
significant environmental problems.441 The program is voluntary for 
farmers. To date, twenty-one state proposals have been accepted, 
while eight more state proposals are pending review.442 From 1998 to 
2002, over 17,300 contracts covering nearly 290,000 acres have been 
enrolled in this program at a cost of over $55,000,000.443  
An example of a CREP program is Maryland’s program to 
provide greater protection for the Chesapeake Bay watershed, which 
was the first program to be approved.444 The program calls for 
enrolling 100,000 acres in the CRP to provide stream buffers, restore 
wetlands, and reduce sediment from highly erodible land.445 The cost 
of Maryland’s program is $195 million, of which $170 million is 
provided by CRP federal funds.446 In explaining how the Maryland 
CREP program differs from more routine CRP matters, USDA noted 
that the program: (1) coordinates CRP with goals and funding 
established by the state; (2) applies only to land in Maryland; (3) 
restricts eligibility to riparian buffers, highly erodible land, and 
wetland restoration; (4) provides a higher incentive rate to enroll 
lands to protect the Chesapeake Bay; and (5) provides supplemental 
state funding for conservation practices and easements.447 
A second initiative involves the National Conservation Buffer 
Initiative, which has a stated goal of installing two million miles of 
 
wildlife habitat needs, including those for threatened and endangered species.” CLEAN WATER 
ACTION PLAN, supra note 1, at 48-49. 
 441. See Solicitation of Proposals for the Conservation Reserve Enhancement Program, 63 
Fed. Reg. 28965 (May 27, 1998); Environmental Defense Fund, Suggestions to States 
Interested in Developing Conservation Reserve Enhancement Programs (Mar. 1998), available 
at http://www.fb-net.org/CREP-EDF.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2002). 
 442. See http://www.fsa.usda.gov/dafp/cepd/stateupdates.htm (last visited Mar. 13, 2002). 
 443. See http://www.fsa.usda.gov/crpstorpt/12approved/r7crepyr/us.htm (last visited Mar. 
13, 2002). 
 444. Soil and Conservation Issues, supra note 199, at 4; see also USDA, Questions & 
Answers: Conservation Reserve Program—Maryland State Enhancement Program, at 1 (Oct. 
1997), available at http://www.fsa.usda.gov/pas/publications/facts/html/mderep.htm. 
[hereinafter “Maryland Program”]. 
 445. See Soil and Conservation Issues, supra note 199, at 4.  
 446. Id. 
 447. Maryland Program, supra note 444, at 2.  
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conservation buffers by 2002.448 Conservation buffers are small strips 
of land that are strategically placed in the landscape to intercept 
pollutant runoff and mitigate sediment, nutrient, and pesticide 
movements from farm fields to waterbodies.449 Included are riparian 
buffers, filter strips, grassed waterways, shelterbelts, windbreaks, 
living snow fences, contour grass strips, cross-wind trap strips, 
shallow water areas for wildlife, field borders, alley cropping, 
herbaceous wind barriers, and vegetative barriers.450 The program 
offers financial incentives, in the form of cost-sharing arrangements, 
to farmers who agree to install conservation buffers.451  
The program was initiated in 1997, but in April 2000, USDA 
began offering more incentives to attract greater participation, 
including signing bonuses, increased cost-share payments for cover 
crops and buffer maintenance, and increased payments for 
pastures.452 The buffer initiative is funded through a variety of USDA 
programs, including the Wetlands Reserve Program and the 
Environmental Quality Incentives Program (discussed infra), but the 
vast majority of funds are provided by the CRP.453 To date, 1,200,000 
miles of buffer strips have been installed under the initiative.454 
The CRP has undoubtedly yielded significant environmental 
benefits, but its current annual costs of $1.7 billion represent nearly 
half of all federal conservation spending.455 At the end of fiscal year 
2000, the program supported active contracts on 31.5 million acres.456 
While farmers’ interest in the program currently remains very high, it 
 
 448. Natural Resources Conservation Service, Buffer Strips: Common Sense Conservation, 
available at http://www.nhq.nrcs.usda.gov/CCS/bufgoal.html (last visited Mar. 13, 2002) 
[hereinafter “Buffer Strips”].  
 449. Id.  
 450. Id.; see also SOIL AND WATER CONSERVATION SOCIETY, REALIZING THE PROMISE OF 
CONSERVATION BUFFER TECHNOLOGY 9 (2001), available at http://www.swcs.org/docs/ 
proto.pdf (last visited Mar. 13, 2002).  
 451. Buffer Strips, supra note 448.  
 452. See National Association of Conservation Districts, USDA Announces New Buffer 
Incentives, BUFFER NOTES (Apr. 2000), available at http://www.nacdnet.org/buffers/00Apr/ 
ccrp.htm (last visited Mar. 13, 2002); Soil and Conservation Issues, supra note 199, at 4.  
 453. See National Association of Conservation Districts, Progress Toward the Two Million 
Mile Goal, BUFFER NOTES (Jan. 2002), available at http://www.nacdnet.org/buffers/index.html 
(last visited Mar. 13, 2002).  
 454. Id.  
 455. Status and Current Issues, supra note 437, at 5.  
 456. Id. at 4.  
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is widely feared that when the current contracts expire—and a large 
number will expire in 2002—farmers will not maintain the 
conservation practices without further subsidies.457 “After a CRP 
contract expires, federal payments cease, and producers are under no 
obligation to maintain the conservation values established under the 
contract”; accordingly, the benefits of the program can properly only 
be regarded as temporary.458  
Additionally, when cropland is taken out of production under the 
CRP, farmers face incentives to open previously untilled land to 
agricultural production. It is has been estimated that for every one 
hundred acres of cropland taken out of production in the central 
United States under the CRP, twenty acres of previously uncropped 
land has been placed into crop production.459 While the character of 
the lands involved or the environmental effects of placing them in 
production are not known, it is highly likely that this increased 
production will have discernible, negative impacts on water quality. 
To some extent, this problem, and the problem raised by expiring 
contract terms, is obviated by the conservation compliance program 
and Sodbuster, which place farmers who open highly erodible land to 
production at risk of becoming ineligible for USDA program 
benefits.460 
iii. The Environmental Quality Incentives Program 
The last program included within the Environmental Conservation 
Acreage Reserve Program is the Environmental Quality Incentives 
Program (EQIP). EQIP consolidates into a single program the 
functions of a number of conservation programs that were repealed in 
1996.461 The purposes of EQIP are to provide, in a cost-effective way, 
technical, financial, and educational assistance to farmers and 
ranchers (1) “who face the most serious threats to soil, water, and 
related natural resources, including grazing lands, wetlands, and 
 
 457. Id. 
 458. Id. at 5.  
 459. JunJie Wu et al., Targeting Resource Conservation Expenditures, 15 CHOICES: THE 
MAG. OF FOOD, FARM AND RES. ISSUES 33 (June 22, 2000).  
 460. Id.; see Conservation Reserve Program, supra note 433, at 38. 
 461. See 16 U.S.C. § 3839aa(1) (2001). 
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wildlife habitats”; (2) to comply with federal and state environmental 
laws; and (3) “in making beneficial, cost-effective changes . . . or 
other measures needed to conserve and improve soil, water, and 
related natural resources.”462 EQIP is jointly administered by NRCS, 
FSA, and CCC, with NRCS designated as the lead agency.463  
EQIP authorizes USDA to enter into contracts with eligible 
persons to provide cost-share assistance and incentive payments to 
farmers and ranchers who agree to implement “land management 
practices” and “structural practices.”464 Land management practices 
are defined as “site specific nutrient or manure management, 
integrated pest management, irrigation management, tillage or 
residue management, grazing management, or other land 
management practice carried out on eligible land that [USDA] 
determines is needed to protect, in the most cost-effective manner, 
water, soil, or related resources from degradation.”465 A structural 
practice means: 
the establishment on eligible land of a site-specific animal 
waste management facility, terrace, grassed waterway, contour 
grass strip, filterstrip, tailwater pit, permanent wildlife habitat, 
or other structural practice that [USDA] determines is needed 
to protect, in the most cost-effective manner, water, soil, or 
related natural resources from degradation; and . . . the capping 
of abandoned wells on eligible land.”466  
These practices are to be included in a conservation plan that is 
acceptable to NRCS and approved by a local conservation district.467 
Applications for participation in EQIP are scored according to 
ranking system developed by NRCS. This system considers the 
environmental benefits per dollar expended, a reasonable estimate of 
the cost of the conservation practices, payments to the applicant, and 
other factors for determining which applications will impose the least 
 
 462. Id. § 3839aa(2). Half of the funding for EQIP is targeted to persons who experience 
livestock-related environmental problems, such as waste management. 7 C.F.R. § 1466.4(e).  
 463. 7 C.F.R. § 1466.2 (2001). 
 464. 16 U.S.C. § 3839aa. 
 465. Id. § 3839aa-1(2). 
 466. 16 U.S.C. § 3839aa-1(5). 
 467. 7 C.F.R. § 1466.6(a). 
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costs on the program; the environmental benefits resulting from 
implementation of the conservation plan; the extent to which the 
contract will assist the applicant in complying with applicable 
environmental laws; and whether the land is in a priority area and the 
extent to which the contract will further priority area goals and 
objectives.468 “Priority areas” are determined through a process that 
begins with local work groups composed of USDA representatives 
and state and local officials.469  
EQIP contracts must be for a duration of not less five nor more 
than ten years. The contract incorporates a conservation plan that 
details the specific management practice(s) that the participant will 
implement.470 Participants receive cost-share assistance and incentive 
payments “in an amount and at a rate necessary to encourage a 
participant to perform the land management practice that would not 
otherwise be initiated without government assistance.”471  
All of the USDA programs discussed can, and undoubtedly have, 
produced some reductions in agricultural nonpoint source pollution. 
However, even when combined, these “voluntary” programs have 
failed to make significant progress in controlling such pollution. 
Some of the reasons for this failure have been discussed, but there are 
two overarching shortcomings with these programs. First, the 
incentives these programs offer to farmers are largely at the mercy of 
commodity prices. If farmers can increase profits by expanding 
production rather than maintaining conservation practices, they will 
do so. As a consequence, there remains a great deal of confusion 
about whether these programs are conservation programs or just an 
additional effort to shore up commodity prices. As Professor Ruhl 
has noted, “[e]vidence suggests that farmer participation in the green 
payments programs is highly sensitive to market commodity prices 
and does not reflect any newly found farm stewardship ethic. 
 
 468. Id. § 1466.20(f). 
 469. See Environmental Quality Incentives Program, 62 Fed. Reg. 28258, 28266-71 (May 
22, 1997); EQIP Report, supra note 435. 
 470. 7 C.F.R. § 1466.21(b). 
 471. Id. §§ 1466.23(a)(1),(2). Cost-share assistance may not exceed seventy-five percent of 
the projected cost of establishing a structural practice. Participants may receive both cost-share 
assistance and incentive payments, subject to a total limitation of $10,000 for any fiscal year 
and $50,000 for any multi-year contract. Id. §§ 1466.23(a)(4), (b)(1)(2).  
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Farmers, like most of us, follow the money.”472  
Second, the expenditures necessary to induce sufficient 
participation in these programs in order to have a significant impact 
on water quality nationally are quite large. Not only must initial 
funding be extensive enough to enroll a critical mass of “volunteer” 
farmers, but this large level of funding must be sustained over time. 
This will ensure that once conservation practices are implemented 
they will remain in place. Funding for these programs is derived from 
annual appropriations process, and accordingly, will be subject to 
ordinary fiscal pressures. It would be naive to believe that continuous 
and generous funding of these programs will be sustained.  
III. RESTRUCTURING FEDERAL LAW TO ADDRESS AGRICULTURAL 
NONPOINT SOURCE POLLUTION 
From the foregoing review of existing federal programs, it is 
apparent that an effective response to agricultural nonpoint source 
pollution requires a significant restructuring of existing federal 
authority. The major shortcomings of the existing amalgam of 
programs are: (1) the absence of an effective institutional structure to 
ensure consistent and defensible monitoring and assessment of water 
quality; (2) an over-reliance on “voluntary,” incentive-based 
programs to achieve needed pollution reductions; and relatedly (3) 
the absence of control measures on farms that can be enforced by 
federal authorities or by affected citizens. Some of these problems 
could be cured in part through significant, but not far-reaching, policy 
amendments. An effective overall policy for controlling agricultural 
nonpoint pollution will, however, require more sweeping reforms. In 
this section, I propose both.  
A. Minimum National Water Quality and Monitoring Standards 
The present system of water quality standards and monitoring and 
assessment of water bodies creates a number of problems. 
Inconsistencies from state to state can create confusion among 
 
 472. Ruhl, supra note 5, at 326 (citing Tina Adler, Prairie Tales, 149 SCI. NEWS 44, 45 
(1996)). 
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affected populations and, in some cases, particularly in interstate 
waters, lead to serious inequities in the allocation of cleanup 
responsibilities. In addition, the absence of effective monitoring and 
assessment permits farmers and others to point fingers of blame at 
others for perceived water quality problems. A fairly straightforward 
remedy for these problems would be the enactment of pre-emptive, 
minimum federal water quality standards with monitoring and 
modeling protocols.473  
For conventional water pollutants, the EPA could promulgate a 
menu of water quality criteria corresponding to various acceptable 
designated uses in various regions and in various types of water 
bodies. To some extent, the EPA’s existing criteria guidelines already 
provide a menu of this type.474 States would retain authority to 
designate uses, but would be required to adopt the EPA’s criteria. 
Similarly, the EPA could establish monitoring and assessment 
protocols that the states would be required to follow. States that fail 
to adopt appropriate water quality standards and monitoring and 
assessment protocols would face loss of federal funds. The EPA 
would be required to fill the gap with federal standards.  
Minimum federal standards would ensure greater consistency 
among states, which is a pressing need, particularly in interstate 
waters.475 The need for consistency will likely increase as 
implementation of the TMDL program accelerates. Minimum federal 
standards would prevent the states from yielding to the temptation of 
adopt the least protective standards in an effort to avoid the 
regulatory and economic impacts of the TMDL program 
requirements. As Professor Adler argues, with federal standards, “all 
waters in the country would be measured against a uniform 
benchmark, and TMDLs would be required wherever statutory and 
regulatory minima were exceeded.”476  
In addition, binding national standards would yield significant 
 
 473. See Wagner, supra note 21, at 463 (“EPA could establish mandatory minimum 
national water quality standards or at least standard methods for determining degradation for the 
most serious pollutants.”).  
 474. See, e.g., Nutrient Criteria Development; Notice of Ecoregional Nutrient Criteria, 66 
Fed. Reg. 1671 (Jan. 9, 2001).  
 475. Wagner, supra note 21, at 463-64.  
 476. Adler, supra note 2, at 256.  
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savings in administrative costs due to economies of scale.477 Under 
the current statutory program, states are required to revise water 
quality standards every three years, and the EPA must oversee these 
revisions.478 While the task of promulgating the variety of standards 
necessary to make a system of minimum national standards workable 
is daunting, it pales in comparison to the current workload the EPA 
faces.  
Minimum national standards may, somewhat paradoxically, also 
enhance citizen participation. Professor Wagner notes “the obvious 
handicap that the diffused citizenry encounters in participating in 
state-wide issues that appear largely technical in nature,”—a 
handicap made even more serious when state processes are 
dominated by “‘[s]pecial interest groups representing industry, water 
suppliers, and agriculture.’”479 In addition, the process of establishing 
designated uses, or water quality goals, could, with national water 
quality standards, proceed in a fashion that more clearly informs 
interested citizens of the economic and social implications of the 
choices they face. Water quality criteria and monitoring and 
assessment protocols would be promulgated and binding prior to and 
independent of the selection of use designations. As a consequence, 
the opportunities to “game” the system by selecting weak criteria or 
lax monitoring and assessment techniques would be reduced, if not 
eliminated.480 Citizens could, as a consequence, have greater 
assurance that the control measures they are willing to accept will 
likely yield the desired levels of water quality. This will lead to more 
informed and more widely endorsed choices. As a result, national 
standards will tend to promote the legitimacy of water quality 
programs as a whole.  
A final advantage to nationally uniform standards and assessment 
protocols is that they will help develop consistent and defensible 
 
 477. See generally Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 MICH. L. 
REV. 570, 614-15 (1996).  
 478. See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c) (2001). 
 479. Wagner, supra note 21, at 463-64 & n.120 (quoting NATIONAL WILDLIFE 
FEDERATION, SAVING OUR WATERSHEDS: A FIELD GUIDE TO WATERSHED RESTORATION 
USING TMDLS 24 (1998)).  
 480. On the ways in which the current program permits “gaming,” see Adler, supra note 2, 
at 293. 
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techniques for identifying the sources responsible for water quality 
impairments, including agricultural nonpoint sources. In the current 
framework, it is simply too easy to manipulate assessment and 
monitoring techniques to reach conclusions that are politically, if not 
environmentally, acceptable. Farmers can rest confident in 
maintaining unsustainable practices by the sheer lack of evidence 
linking their practices with resulting water quality impairments. 
There is some evidence, however, that if farmers are convinced that 
their practices are responsible for water pollution both on and off the 
farm, they are much more willing to adopt conservation practices.481 
Consistent approaches to establishing the connection between farm 
practices and resulting water quality impairments may thus provide 
avenues for breaking down farmers’ resistance to implementing new 
management practices.  
B. Strengthening the Institutional Structure of the TMDL Program 
Within the CWA’s TMDL program lies the seeds of an 
institutional structure for reforming federal and state programs for 
controlling agricultural nonpoint source pollution. The principal 
shortcoming of the current program is the absence of enforceable 
controls on nonpoint sources. The strength of the program is its 
emphasis on developing watershed-based approaches to improving 
water quality by allocating cleanup responsibilities among point and 
nonpoint sources.  
In addition to Professor Adler’s pioneering ideas,482 there are 
important lessons from the Clean Air Act that can be applied to the 
TMDL program to create a more effective response to agricultural 
nonpoint source pollution. First, explicit authority should be 
conferred on the EPA to designate watershed planning areas that 
would geographically define the appropriate unit for water quality 
plan development and implementation. Such watershed planning 
areas would be functionally analogous to the Clean Air Act’s “air 
 
 481. See Laura M. J. McCann & K. William Easter, Differences Between Farmer and 
Agency Attitudes Regarding Policies to Reduce Phosphorus Pollution in the Minnesota River 
Basin, 21 REV. AGRICULTURAL ECON. 189 (1999).  
 482. See Adler, supra note 2. 
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quality control regions.”483 Based on the TMDL reporting 
requirements concerning listings of impaired waters, the watershed 
planning areas could be designated as “attainment” or 
“nonattainment” areas.  
To avoid the notorious problems associated with the Clean Air 
Act’s “state implementation plan” development and approval 
process,484 the state level development of SIPs to meet water quality 
standards should simply be bypassed in favor of a single, broadly 
participatory process resulting in an enforceable federal water quality 
plan. Plan implementation could be delegated to state agencies, but 
the plan itself must include control measures that are enforceable by 
federal authorities and affected citizens through citizen suits. 
Plan development and implementation would not, however, 
simply replicate the federal implementation plan process under the 
Clean Air Act. Under the Clean Air Act, the EPA is responsible for 
both plan development and implementation. Such a “top-down” 
approach is not likely to yield an effective regulatory structure to 
improve water quality. Indeed, there is considerable evidence 
suggesting that water quality planning is most successful when a 
broad-based participatory process including all stakeholders is 
employed.485 “[W]ithout the support or involvement of the public, 
particularly at the state level . . ., water protection programs are 
bound to drift aimlessly and ultimately fail.”486 As Wesley Jarrell has 
noted: 
To be most effective, the citizens should be involved at all 
levels in the devlopment, implementation, monitoring, and 
evaluation of TMDLs. Though an expensive and time-
consuming way to start discussions over TMDLs, getting 
landowners and land users involved is the critical component 
in making the watershed approach successful. The political 
battles and finger pointing that mark many water quality 
discussions can be harnessed into productive dialogue if 
 
 483. See 42 U.S.C. § 7407 (2001).  
 484. See generally William F. Pedersen, Why the Clean Air Act Works Badly, 129 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1059 (1981).  
 485. See JARRELL, GETTING STARTED, supra note 16, at 9. 
 486. Wagner, supra note 21, at 432. 
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skillfully facilitated and initiated at the beginning of the 
TMDL process.487 
Plan development would roughly resemble a negotiated 
rulemaking culminating in an EPA-proposed rule subject to notice 
and comment procedures. Several models are available for organizing 
effective institutions for rule development and implementation. For 
example, the USDA’s Natural Resource Conservation Service 
(NRCS) has initiated a Coordinated Resource Management and 
Planning (CRMP) training program that has spawned watershed 
planning groups in various parts of the country. These groups operate 
under “Four Cardinal Rules”: (1) broad community involvement; (2) 
a commitment to finding solutions; (3) consensus-based 
decisionmaking; and (4) “[e]xpressing needs, not positions.”488  
In the Tualatin River Watershed, the TMDL planning process 
involved “designated management agencies” for each of the three 
categories of land users that contributed to phosphorous loading in 
the river: agriculture, forestry, and urban systems. A Technical 
Advisory committee was established to assist with agricultural issues, 
but membership in the committee “rapidly grew to include 
representatives of urban systems and forestry, as well as Oregon 
[Department of Environmental Quality].”489 In addition, a Tualatin 
River Research Advisory Committee was established. This 
Committee facilitated rapid and effective implementation of 
decisions concerning monitoring and best management practices.490 
Plans would have to satisfy certain minimum criteria. First and 
foremost, the plan would have to be promulgated by a certain date 
and demonstrate attainment of water quality standards by a certain 
date. The duty to promulgate the plan would be subject to citizen suit 
enforcement against the EPA. With deadlines and the threat of 
citizen-initiated litigation, stakeholders would be highly motivated to 
reach agreement.  
Plan requirements could be based on a classification system tied 
to the extent of the pollution problems faced in the respective 
 
 487. JARRELL, GETTING STARTED, supra note 16, at 10.  
 488. See id. at 11.  
 489. Id. at 7. 
 490. Id. 
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watersheds. This approach follows the lead of the Clean Air Act’s 
program for ozone nonattainment areas.491 A key element of plans for 
impaired waters would include “reasonable further progress” 
milestones, requiring step-wise, specific levels of incremental 
reductions in key pollutant loadings within particular time frames. 
For example, water bodies suffering from excess nutrient loadings 
would be required to demonstrate specific percentage reductions in 
total loadings of nitrogen and phosphorous by particular dates.492 If 
the implemented plan proves inadequate to attain water quality 
standards, additional mandatory requirements would apply.493  
The EPA would defer to choices made by watershed planning 
institutions that establish appropriate mixes of controls to meet basic 
plan requirements, so long as the controls can be demonstrated to 
achieve water quality objectives and so long as certain “baseline” 
levels of controls are imposed on certain categories of sources. 
Where appropriate, pollutant trading systems, including point-
nonpoint and nonpoint-nonpoint trading programs, could be 
employed to achieve load reductions at least cost.494 Once adopted, 
however, the choice of control measures would be subject to direct 
federal and citizen enforcement.  
 
 491. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7511-7511a (2001). 
 492. Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 7511a(c)(1)(B) (imposing “reasonable further progress” requirement 
of annual reductions in volatile organic compound emissions of three percent, averaged over 
each consecutive three-year period until air quality standard is attained).  
 493. See id. §§ 7511(b)(2), 7511a(i) (areas failing to attain are reclassified and subject to 
new classification’s control requirements).  
 494. For examples of trading programs involving agricultural pollutants and a framework 
for developing effective trading programs, see FAETH, FERTILE GROUND, supra note 103; 
Susan A. Austin, Designing a Nonpoint Source Selenium Load Trading Program, 25 HARV. 
ENVTL. L. REV. 337 (2001). A variety of trading programs have been suggested including a 
fertilizer “cap and trade” program, see Ruhl, supra note 5, at 345-46; and a “tradeable coupon 
system” under which each coupon would entitle a farmer to one ton of soil erosion. D. L. Hoag 
& H. A. Holloway, Farm Production Decisions Under Cross and Conservation Compliance, 27 
AM. J. OF AGRI. ECON., 184 (1991). However, opportunities for effective point-nonpoint 
trading programs appear to be quite limited. A USDA report notes that less than ten percent of 
impaired water bodies are affected by both point and nonpoint sources. Peter M. Feather & 
Joseph Cooper, Voluntary Incentives for Reducing Agricultural Nonpoint Source Water 
Pollution, USDA Agriculture Information Bulletin No. 716, at 3 (May 1995), available at 
http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/aib716/ (last visited Mar. 13, 2002).  
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C. Eliminating The CWA’s Regulatory Exemptions for Agriculture 
Controls developed through the watershed planning process 
described above would be incorporated into the overall NPDES 
program, with the allocation of cleanup responsibilities set forth in 
individual or general permits issued either by state or federal 
permitting authorities. A number of agricultural sources currently 
regarded as “nonpoint” sources should, however, be recharacterized 
as “point” sources. These sources should, regardless of specific 
choices made in a watershed plan, be subject to conventional 
regulation under the technology-based, NPDES permit system. Chief 
among these sources are certain “irrigation return flows,” some 
agricultural stormwater discharges, and AFOs. The environmental 
“safe harbors” that these sources currently enjoy—expressed as 
exemptions from NPDES program—should simply be eliminated.495  
With regard to these sources, the EPA’s proposed CAFO 
regulations, as noted above, are a substantial step in the right 
direction, but still exempt a large number of sources from the NPDES 
program. Appropriate reforms should, as Professor Adler has 
suggested, draw upon analogous policies implemented in the Clean 
Air Act.496 For example, drawing upon the Clean Air Act’s Title V 
permit program, individual permits could be required for all “major” 
CAFOs,497 with the remaining CAFOs subject to general permit 
conditions.498 The definition of a “major” CAFO may vary depending 
on whether and the extent to which potentially affected water bodies 
currently are deemed to be “impaired.”499 For example, in areas 
where waters are fully supporting designated uses, the EPA’s 
proposed thresholds for CAFO status might be treated as the 
appropriate criteria for a “major” CAFO. Tighter thresholds for 
“major” status, perhaps as low as one hundred animal units for 
“major” status, could be applied in areas where waters are deemed to 
 
 495. See Ruhl, supra note 5, at 335-37 (suggesting a sector-based integrated permitting 
program for CAFOs and “large-scale crop operations”).  
 496. See generally Adler, supra note 2.  
 497. See 42 U.S.C. § 7661a(a) (requiring permits for, inter alia, “major sources”).  
 498. See id. § 7661c(d) (authorizing general permits for “numerous similar sources”).  
 499. Cf. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7511a(c), (d), and (e) (varying definition of “major source” 
depending on severity of ozone air pollution problem).  
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be impaired.  
A similar approach could be used for crop farming that involves 
discharges of polluted irrigation return flows or collected agricultural 
stormwater.500 “Major” sources requiring individual permits could be 
based on water quality conditions and the amount of acreage placed 
into production. Default effluent limitations would likely take the 
form of design standards based on best management practices. Permit 
writers could draw upon the EPA’s guidance developed for the 
Coastal Zone Act Reauthorization Act Amendments’ nonpoint source 
control program to assign specific permit conditions.501  
The advantages to this approach are chiefly that these sources 
would become subject to enforceable permit conditions and 
enforcement actions initiated by state or federal authorities or by 
affected citizens utilizing the CWA’s citizen suit provision. This 
enhanced enforcement threat would provide powerful incentives for 
these sources to abide by the terms and conditions of their individual 
or general NPDES permits.  
D. Cost-Sharing Programs 
Existing programs provide opportunities to distribute the costs of 
implementing best management practices and other forms of controls 
in ways that may make the transition to a regulatory program for 
agriculture more politically acceptable. Cost-sharing and land 
retirement programs should be retained and funding of these 
programs should be substantially increased in the short-term. In 
 
 500. It is important to note that only irrigation return flows and stormwater discharges that 
can properly be described as “point source” discharges would be subject to the NPDES. For 
example, “[c]ourts have held that rainwater runoff from the surface is not pollution from a point 
source, but rainwater collected by ditches, gullies, or other conveyances that result from [a 
person’s] activities is pollution from a point source.” Karen M. McGaffey et al., Enforcement in 
THE CLEAN WATER ACT HANDBOOK 198-99 (Parthenia B. Evans ed., 1994) (citing Sierra Club 
v. Abston Constr. Co., 620 F.2d 41, 45 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Earth Sciences, Inc., 
599 F.2d 368, 374 (10th Cir. 1979); Friends of Sakonnet v. Dutra, 738 F. Supp. 623, 630 
(D.R.I. 1990)).  
 501. See U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Guidance Specifying Management 
Measures for Sources of Nonpoint Pollution in Coastal Waters, ch. 2, “Management Measures 
for Agricultural Sources,” available at http://www.epa.gov/owow/nps/MMGI/Chapter2/ 
index.html (last visited Mar. 13, 2002).  
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addition, it would be useful to establish a general revolving low-cost 
loan fund, offering farmers opportunities to finance water pollution 
control measures. The fund could be established and enlarged 
through a reasonable tax on the agricultural inputs that are most 
prone to abuse and contribute to water quality impairments. For 
example, a reasonable tax on fertilizers, pesticides, and high-nutrient 
feed for confined animal operations would both help to defray the 
costs of implementing pollution control measures and provide 
incentives for wiser use of these inputs.  
CONCLUSION 
For the past several decades, the nation’s reliance on voluntary, 
incentive-based programs for controlling agricultural nonpoint source 
water pollution has not yielded satisfactory improvements in water 
quality. We should begin to effect a baseline shift that removes the 
implicit and explicit entitlements that currently permit those in 
agriculture to pollute. The resulting regulatory program should 
encourage broad-based participatory planning at the watershed level, 
minimize institutional impediments to effective regulatory programs, 
and most importantly yield control measures that can be enforced by 
state and federal authorities, as well as by affected citizens through 
the CWA’s citizen suit provision. We should try to ease the transition 
costs of the shift by generously funding existing land retirement and 
cost-share programs, as well as creating a revolving loan fund that 
farmers can tap into to finance the implementation of sustainable 
management practices. In the end, however, we must be prepared to 
use the force of law to clean up our nation’s waters. We can tolerate 
nothing less than fishable, swimmable waters, and our children 
deserve at least the assurance that we have committed ourselves to 
creating a pathway toward sustainable agricultural practices.  
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